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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
 
Aaron Andrew Greer 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Anthropology 
 
December 2011 
 
Title: Imagined Futures: Interpretation, Imagination, and Discipline in Hindu Trinidad 
 
 
 Globalization has inaugurated many rapid changes in local communities 
throughout the world. The globalization of media, both electronic and print, has 
introduced new pressures for local communities to confront while also opening up new 
imaginative possibilities. As many observers have noted, transnational media transform 
local public cultures, or shared imaginative spaces, but never in predictable, totally 
hegemonic ways. This dissertation focuses on the efforts of a small Hindu community 
called the Hindu Prachar Kendra located in Trinidad, West Indies, as they develop critical 
strategies that help their children read, negotiate, and in some cases contribute to local 
and global public cultures. I argue that though many Hindu parents and teachers of the 
Kendra share anxieties about the effects of local and global popular cultures on their 
children, they also use many features, ideas, and texts emerging from imaginative media 
in creative ways. Furthermore, their concerns about media shape their interpretation and 
instruction of Hindu practice.    
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 CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
A philosophy is never a house; it is a construction site. But its completion is not that of 
science. Science draws up a multitude of finished parts and only its whole presents empty 
spaces, whereas in our striving for cohesiveness, the incompletion is not restricted to the 
lacunae of thought; at every point, at each point, there is the impossibility of the final 
state. 
~ George Bataille, Theory of Religion 
 
Of course, we all knew that Althusser or Gramsci existed, but we felt that the level at 
which they approached things left out the revealing and significant details of the real 
world. 
~ Paul Rabinow, Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary  
 
 
In 1995 Trinidad elected its first Indo-Trinidadian prime minister. Indo-Trinidadians 
were jubilant. A sense of triumph over the odds reverberated throughout the community. 
For many Indo-Trinidadians, their day as a political force in the country had arrived. But 
the election was not without controversy, drama, and threatening grandstanding by the 
People’s National Movement (PNM), now the opposition party in Parliament. As with 
nearly all major elections in Trinidad, ethnic tension between Afro- and Indo-
Trinidadians reached a fever pitch, fomented in large part by the PNM and its supporters 
(Ryan 1996; Munasinghe 2001: 5). Animosity between the groups was at a historic high, 
and solidarity at a new low. BBC journalists covering the election predicted inter-ethnic 
violence, rioting, and possibly small-scale civil war1.  One journalist from the BBC was 
in contact with Raviji, a prominent leader in Trinidad’s Hindu community, throughout the                                                         1 Of the equally acrimonious election of 2002, one BBC journalist writes, “Some people 
fear Trinidad could become another Bosnia, Fiji or Northern Ireland” (Goldsmith 
2002).In a characteristic flourish of journalistic hyperbole, she reports that ethnic 
relations in Trinidad were “becoming increasingly bitter and factionalized.” 
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tumultuous election of 1995. Recounting the event for me one afternoon, Raviji 
remembers the journalist asking him if he believed the tension would erupt into violence. 
He recalled telling him, “to all appearances it looks like there will be violence, but I don’t 
think there will be.” He elaborated further, “Trinidadians aren’t like that. An Indian may 
not like an African. He may talk racial (racist) things about him. But if he sees an African 
man coming in his car he’ll let him pass. And the African will do the same for him.”  
 On May 26, 2010 Kamla Persad-Bissessar was sworn in as Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago, becoming Trinidad’s first female prime minister and second Indo-
Trinidadian. The event was remarkable for its anticlimax. There were no boisterous 
protests or marches in the streets. The University of Woodford Square, a small plaza in 
downtown Port of Spain across the street from Parliament’s Red House and the site of 
many political rallies, was tranquil as usual, populated by people on lunch break, soda 
vendors, the text book hawkers whose merchandise is splayed in disorganized piles on 
large sheets of strained plywood, and assorted others finding respite in the shade of the 
park’s many trees. The local news stations covered the election and Kamla’s cabinet 
posts, but nothing riotous among the electorate. Absent also were acrimonious letters to 
the editor in the three dailies decrying the graft of the United National Congress (UNC, 
Kamla’s party2) and the inevitable calamity they will bring down on Trinidad and 
                                                        
 2 Though the UNC remains Kamla’s primary party, she and her party were aided to 
victory by the People’s Partnership, a coalition consisting of the United National 
Congress (UNC, 21 seats), Congress of the People (COP, 6 seats), Tobago Organization 
of the People (TOP, 2 seats), the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC, formed in the 
1970’s, incidentally, by the radical Makandal Daaga to challenge Trinidad’s first Prime 
Minister Eric Williams), and the Movement for Social Justice (MSJ). Emicly, the UNC 
has long been cast as the “Indo-Trini” party, while the PNM is often regarded as the 
“Afro-Trini” party, both dubious and problematic generalizations, but not without some 
degree of historical accuracy (see Ryan 2009). Though more research remains to be done 
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Tobago. I saw no protest signs, no anti-UNC or Kamla propaganda. Surprisingly, 2010’s 
post-election vitriol was in short supply.  
 As a socio-political event, Kamla’s uncontroversial election signals recent shifts 
in Trinidadian public culture that are the focus of this thesis. Employing what Rabinow 
(2008) and others (see Faubion and Marcus 2009; Augé 2007) have called an 
“anthropology of the contemporary”, I argue that the categories of knowledge and 
cultural patterns concerning race and ethnicity left by the colonial regime are yielding to 
new sets of concerns inaugurated by ideological changes in global, neo-liberal capitalism. 
Centering on a small but active community of Hindus in Central Trinidad, my work 
attempts to describe and analyze how this community negotiates contemporary local and 
global cultural terrains through the study and performance of sacred texts, primarily the 
Ramayana, and modified Hindu practice. The community, called the Hindu Prachar 
Kendra, located in Central Trinidad, about 10 miles east of the bustling city of 
Chaguanas, acts as a mandir (temple), a community center, and a summer school 
program focusing on the study and performance of the great Hindu epic The Ramayana. 
This thesis focuses on the Hindu Prachar Kendra (called locally ‘the Kendra’) and the 
community it serves, analyzing how they interpret both Trinidadian and global public 
culture in light of their success oriented goals.   
In the five years I have been working with the Kendra community, talking with 
the teachers and program designers, meeting with parents, and observing classroom 
lessons, the theme that most conspicuously emerged was one of discipline. The teachers 
                                                                                                                                                                     
on this point, on the surface, it appears that the People’s Partnership is one of, if not the 
most, ethnically diverse parties/coalitions to win Parliament with 29 seats of 41, or 59 
percent.     
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and parents uttered the word countless times a day, insisting that without it, today’s 
generation would be lost in a cultural morass of decadence and self-indulgence. Shrutiji, 
one of the head teachers at the Kendra, routinely raised the specter of failure for those 
who cannot learn discipline, evoking dark images of a lawless Trinidadian culture that 
lures the young into a life of meaningless hedonism. Discussions and admonitions about 
discipline were nearly always broached in conjunction with competition. As we will see 
throughout the rest of this thesis, the parallel themes of discipline and competition are the 
axis mundi of Kendra discourse and animate the whole of their pedagogy. I argue that in 
the face of an increasingly competitive and individualistic economic ethos, concerns 
about identity maintenance are giving way to other sets of anxieties, namely, professional 
success. Though ethnic and religious identity maintenance remain salient features of 
Kendra programs, their curriculum attempts to foster values and attitudes commensurate 
with the demands of contemporary professionalism. As Shrutiji told me, “Today’s youth 
have too many distractions. They do not want to learn. They have no respect for their 
elders. So they must be taught these things. You cannot be successful without discipline.”  
This thesis explores the ways in which the Kendra and its related programs interpret the 
values, practices, and ideologies circulating in local and global public cultural spaces. I 
focus specifically on their interpretation of both local and global popular culture texts and 
practices such as music, film, video games, fêtes (dance parties), and advertising. Their 
complex, often paradoxical, relationship to these texts underscores changing knowledge 
patterns and an increasing focus on discipline and professionalism.  
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The Shifting Valences of Ethnic Identity  
I made a point of bringing up Kamla’s victory with everyone I could, curious to get a 
sense, even if anecdotal, of how Trinidadians felt about Kamla (as she is called locally). 
Nearly everyone I talked to liked her. Some were genuinely enthusiastic about her 
potential to reform Trinidad after years of corruption and desultory leadership under 
Patrick Manning and his PNM party. A few expressed excitement about having a woman 
lead the country for the first time in history. Others thought that it was the UNC’s turn to 
try their hand at governance after nearly 40 years of PNM hegemony. And many of my 
respondents were simply glad that Manning was gone. At the worst, a few comments 
bordered on outright indifference to the whole election ordeal, but none expressed any 
hostility toward Kamla (toward the UNC, certainly, but Kamla, at least at the time, was 
mostly safe from stinging criticism and scorn). The general mood at the time could be 
characterized as accommodating. Stalwart PNM supporters notwithstanding, the attitude 
of most Trinidadians sounded something like, “let’s give her chance and see what she can 
do.”  
 Just three years before Kamla’s historic victory, Indo-Trinidadians were 
complaining bitterly of their poor performance in electoral politics, blaming their futility, 
in part, on Government’s misuse of resources to garner votes3. Indo-Trinidadians 
declared that it was their turn to run the government and that if put in office they could be 
trusted to run the country more evenly and fairly than many of their Afro-Trinidadian 
predecessors had. Some Afro-Trinidadians fired back that because of their unwillingness 
                                                        3 This included accusations of gerrymandering and “buying votes”, involving new low-
income houses being built in PNM strongholds, typically the urban areas around Port of 
Spain.  
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to participate in “Trini culture”, that is, to creolize, they could not be relied on to help 
anyone but themselves. A prototypical example of this kind of stereotype can be seen in a 
letter to the editor of The Daily Express, one of Trinidad’s three dailies, titled “Stroking 
the egos of Indo-Trinis”. The writer, Lynette Joseph, uses biting sarcasm to state that 
Indo-Trinidadians have no right to complain that they have not held government but for a 
short time as they have only themselves to blame. The letter is long, taking nearly four 
columns, but worth quoting at length as it touches on many of the problems I wish to 
address throughout this thesis. 
 This rushing to placate the egos of our Indo-Trinidadians is becoming somewhat  
 boring. Why are we allowing the rest of the population to be taken on this “guilt  
 trip”? What “discrimination”? What “inequality”? They know, we know, and the  
 discerning visitor can see that the Indo-Trinbagonian (Trinidadian/Tobagonian) 
 is very well financially and socially placed. There is no need to alert Amnesty  
 International, the United Nations and other such agencies to oversee their  
 remarkably comfortable “plight”. I don’t believe myself to be exaggerating.  
 Discrimination for them really means no matter what they try politically, they are 
 unable to win control of government. And they want us to believe this is our fault.  
 Not theirs. I have noticed that, creeping insidiously into the media, reporting of  
 the following (sic): “it is our time to be in government. Look how long the PNM  
 has been there. It’s not fair that one political party should dominate the elections.”  
 Again, whose fault is that? This is a silly reason to give for their non-performance  
 at the polls. Politics is not a game of hop scotch. There is no “taking turns”  
 embodied in the Constitution. The governing of Trinidad and Tobago remains  
 elusive to the collective opposition as they have limited their strategies to merely 
 “getting enough seats”,  to defeat the PNM. That is taking a narrow view of what  
 a sophisticated Trinidad and Tobago needs to make a mark on the First World as 
 well as play a pivotal role in the Caricom4 states. There is a dire necessity that  
 they remove themselves from their “cultural bubble”. You are not being asked to  
 betray your religion and to forget Mother India. You are asked to become  
 “unencumbered” of the feelings of inferiority. This is emancipation week. We are  
 supposed to be celebrating our African heritage. Our Indo-brothers and sisters  
 appear to still see themselves as (psychologically) indentured persons. This                                                          4 Caricom is a contraction of Caribbean Community, a cooperative trade arrangement 
between participating Caribbean states born from the ashes of the failed federalist 
program of the 1950s and 60s that sought to create a unified economic collective between 
the former British colonies. Caricom currently has fifteen member states, modeled 
loosely on the European Union.  
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 separation of thought is what prevents the voting public taking a chance to vote  
 outside their usual boxes. (...) It is desirable that the collective opposition send a  
 message of “racial inclusiveness”. They have barricaded and limited themselves.  
 (Tuesday, July 28th, 2009) 
 
The letter goes on, stating that accusations of inequality only suppress “upward 
mobility” of opposing groups and that this Emancipation week should be a time of 
collective celebration with “a clear heart.” The letter is one of the clearest distillations of 
a number of stereotypes plaguing what first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Eric 
Williams, in a fit over his failing attempts to forge a unifying nationalism, once termed 
“the recalcitrant minority” (Ryan 2009: 170-184; also Yelvington 1993: 13). The author 
of the letter, Lynette Joseph, understands Indo-Trinidadians’ problems at the polls not as 
stemming from entrenched racism but rather as a natural consequence of remaining 
“barricaded” inside a “cultural bubble.”  Joseph obliquely collectivizes all Indo-
Trinidadians as Hindus (roughly eighty percent are so) and assumes that their allegiance 
is to India and Hinduism first, and that cultural/political investment in Trinidad need not 
amount to betrayal. In an interesting bit of sleight of hand, Joseph takes the conservative 
imperial critique of former slave colonies as those still living with a “slavery mentality” 
and applies it to Indo-Trinidadians, claiming they still labor under a psychological 
illusion of being, “indentured persons.” Just as conservatives from the industrial powers 
lay blame for problems of economic development on the “slavery mentality” of the 
former labor colonies, so too does Joseph locate Indo-Trinidadians’ political woes in an 
indentured mentality. She does not clearly define what she means by this term, but 
alludes to the fact that Indo-Trinidadians still see themselves as repressed. That they see 
themselves as repressed is what accounts for their political failure, despite their success in 
business that offers them a “remarkably comfortable ‘plight.’” For Joseph, as for many 
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others in Trinidad, Indo-Trinidadians’ struggles at the polls is a symptom not of racially 
divisive social and electoral politics inaugurated by the colonial regime lingering even 
after Independence in 1962, but rather by their purported reluctance to serve anybody but 
their own community. As we will see in later chapters, the “recalcitrant minority” has not 
only been active in social politics since the late 19th century and in electoral politics since 
the 1920s, they have become fully integrated into Trinidad’s social fabric. 
  Though there is much more to be said about this letter, the final point I would 
like to make about it for now pertains to Joseph’s concern about “a sophisticated” 
Trinidad and Tobago’s potential to “make a mark on the First World.” As we will see in 
later chapters, Joseph, perhaps unwittingly, shares a concern with making a mark on the 
First World, as she has it, with many of her “Indo-brothers and sisters.” For the Hindu 
community I worked with for this project, a central concern of theirs is reshaping 
Trinidad’s infamously relaxed party culture into a more disciplined one able to compete 
in the global economy with the northern metropolitan powers. The notion that Trinidad 
needs to project an aura of disciplined professionalism to the broader global community, 
and its subtextual implications that at present it is not doing so, forms a large of part of 
present nationalist discourse by certain members of both the Afro- and Indo-Trinidadian 
community.  
Joseph’s letter neatly captures many of the lingering tensions between Afro- and 
Indo-Trinidadians that emerged upon Indians’ arrival in 1845. The long history of mutual 
suspicion between the two groups and the stereotypes they carry is clearly evident in the 
content and condescending tone of the letter. Anthropologists of Trinidadian ethnic 
relations and the country’s varied micro-nationalisms have convincingly linked such 
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suspicions and essentialist racial discourse to governing technologies implemented 
through colonial hegemony (Khan 2005; Munasinghe 2003; on hegemony see Williams 
1991). The policies and discourse that issued from the colonial office in Trinidad built a 
social structure of distance, mistrust, animosity, and intolerance. Relations between Afro- 
and Indo-Trinidadians, as many scholars have shown and as Joseph’s letter indicates, are 
still marred by the discursive categories the imperialists left behind. Yet at the same time 
there are ruptures, cleavages, and disjunctures in the continuity and totality of imperial 
discursive forms. The anthropology of colonialism and its aftermath have effectively 
shown us how the vestiges of colonial history continue to inform race relations and petty 
nationalisms in post-colonial societies. However, Paul Rabinow has effectively, if 
controversially, argued that history is not the only and final determinant of contemporary 
social practice. Rabinow’s recent work in what he calls the “anthropology of the 
contemporary” challenges ethnographers to explore the “micro-practices” of the everyday 
that subtly shift, rework, and re-interpret discursive formations (2008; 2003; see also 
Faubion and Marcus 2009). While Joseph’s letter is a stark example of the tenacity of 
imperial categorical logics, it is also a lesson in their tenuousness. It is instructive that 
Joseph avoids the kinds of essentialist tropes one would expect from such a missive. Her 
discussion of Indo-Trinidadian patterns is almost exclusively couched in constructivist 
terms. That is, she recognizes, even if only implicitly, that those behavioral patterns are 
not fixed but rather entrenched path dependencies that can be “given up”. Read in 
conjunction with Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s uncontroversial, landslide victory (59 percent 
to Manning’s 39), we can see shifts, or ruptures, or turns in social logics whose genesis 
lies less in entrenched historical patterns and more in the transnational flow of 
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imagination. My work hinges on the immediacy of these kinds of micro-practices and 
argues that global flows of ideas, representations, style, ideologies, knowledge categories, 
can shift, often quite rapidly and radically, local imaginative spaces and social logics.  
  Building on the work pioneered in the discourses of public culture (Appadurai 
1993; Hannerz 1990) and cultural studies (Storey 2009; Hall 2007; Williams 2007), I 
focus on how the Kendra (re)imagines its future through the use of Hindu practice and in 
a rapidly changing local and global public culture. My work with a small community of 
Hindus in central Trinidad focuses on the way in which they imagine the future and the 
practices they create and implement in their teaching programs to realize that future. 
What I argue is that we need to jettison overdetermined categories like “nationalism”, in 
many cases, in favor of more nuanced analyses that take account of the creative processes 
at work in everyday micro-practices. The members of the community I work with, called 
the Hindu Prachar Kendra (or simply, the Kendra), are too consciously constructivist, too 
creative with reimagining tradition, too linked to global cultural flows to be 
unproblematically labeled as nationalists.  
As a descriptor of ethnic behavior, particularly in regards to the politics of ethnic 
identity, nationalism is a problematic term because it generates its own kind of discursive 
hegemony. In other words, social scientists enamored of the term and its attendant 
assumption of primordialism, are too easily coerced into finding its signs rather than its 
dissolution, recreation, or re-imagination. As an interpretive category, nationalism fails to 
adequately address many of the other reasons certain groups, in this case diasporic 
Hindus of the West Indies, might seek to maintain certain traditional features, practices 
and forms. Furthermore, it may overlook the creative, sometimes subtle sometimes 
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radical, recreations of traditions for ends that may have little to nothing to do with 
identity maintenance. Throughout this thesis I will attempt to identify, document, 
describe, and analyze how the Kendra uses, re-interprets, and imagines Hindu practice 
not to maintain a distinct ethnic/cultural/religious identity but to fashion futures that 
compete in a radically changing global economy. Using Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) 
term, my work is the study of the invention of tradition, with the key difference being that 
I would add “conscious” to the phrase. The Hindus I work with are fully aware of their 
invention of tradition practices, thus there is no primordialist lid to blow off (see Handler 
1989; Linnekin 1985). The Kendra re/creates Hindu practices as the needs of the 
community dictate, which is why the founder of it can casually say to me, “I prefer being 
Hindu in Trinidad than India.”  
 
Imagination, Contingency, and the Contemporary  
Arjun Appadurai’s landmark book Modernity at Large makes a compelling case for the 
radical shifts in social logics and imaginative spaces opened up by global media (1996; 
see also 1990). Expanding on Anderson’s (1984) concept of nations as imagined 
communities, Appadurai urges ethnographers to consider the role of imagination in 
shaping cultural forms and the influence transnational flows of ideas through popular 
media have on imaginative processes. If anthropology is the study of “lived actualities”, 
as he accurately phrases it, then the work of anthropologists is to challenge facile 
conclusions and sweeping generalizations that overlook those actualities (1996: 11). 
Influenced mightily by the cultural studies tradition that emerged in England in the 
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1950s, Appadurai draws our attention to the idiosyncratic processes inherently involved 
in reading the texts of popular media. He states that, 
More consequential to our purposes is the fact that the imagination has now  
acquired a singular new power in social life. The imagination – expressed in  
dreams, songs, fantasies, myths, and stories – has always been part of the  
repertoire of every society, in some culturally organized way. But there is a  
peculiar new force to the imagination in social life today. More persons in more 
parts of the world consider a wider set of possible lives than they ever did before. 
(emphasis added 1996: 53)    
  
 As we will see in the following chapters, the Hindus of the Kendra shape their 
pedagogy and interpret their central text (the Ramayana) in light of their imagined future. 
That future is one that is unquestionably influenced by, responds to, and actively 
participates in, global and localized flows of imagination. The ability of social agents to 
“consider a wider set of possible lives” is evident in the cultural logics and interpretive 
practices of the Kendra’s leaders as they use ancient practices and texts in distinctly 
contemporary ways. But it would be a mistake to see their contemporary interpretation 
and use of Hindu traditions as merely tools by which to contend with modernity. Rather, 
their interpretive processes are also informed by futures imagined, in part, through 
representations in popular media. Put otherwise, the logics that underwrite Kendra 
pedagogy and practice are contingent on the Kendra leaders’ engagement with and 
interpretation of events, representations, and ideologies circulating in transnational and 
localized media. Thus, their interpretation of Hinduism and their practices of subject 
formation may be seen as an integral aspect of Trinidadian public culture.  
Judith Butler’s rich exploration of the concept of contingency, coupled with her 
mobilization of Hegel’s understanding of the universal, helps us neatly capture the 
process by which imaginations, and thus local cultural logics, are continually 
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transformed. As chapters two and four deal more extensively with Butler’s work, I will 
only briefly discuss here the importance of her treatment of universality and contingency 
and how these concepts inform my interpretive process.  
 If there is a core concept that can be said to bind nearly all of Judith Butler’s work 
it is the notion of contingency, or looked at slightly differently, transformation, or even 
instability. What Butler is concerned to communicate are the contextual limitations of 
discourse and thus the instability of knowledge. Her reading of Hegel’s articulation of 
universality rests on the assumption that subjects are repeatedly altered, if only slightly, 
by the phenomena they encounter. I share this assumption. If there is a universal, Butler 
wants to say, it is forever in the process of being re-imagined, or restaged, and is 
therefore unstable. In other words, if the universal has an essential quality, that quality is 
continual renewal, transformation, contingency. In her terms, “the knowing subject and 
the world are undone and redone by the act of knowledge” (2000: 20)5.  She goes on to 
point out that “[knowledge] categories are shaped by the world [each individual] seeks to 
know, just as the world is not known without the prior action of those categories. And 
just as Hegel insists on revising several times his very definition of ‘universality’, so he 
makes plain that the categories by which the world becomes available to us are 
continually remade by the encounter with the world they facilitate” (2000: 20). The 
Kendra, I will propose, continually remakes “the categories by which the world becomes 
available”, or even intelligible, in often very conscious, strategic ways.    
                                                        5 Rejecting Eurocentric models of the universal, Martinican poet Aimé Césaire arrived at 
a similar conclusion stating, “I have a different idea of a universal. It is of a universal rich 
with all that is particular, rich with all the particulars there are, the deepening of each 
particular, the coexistence of them all” (cited in Kelly’s Introduction to Césaire’s play A 
Tempest 1992: xiii). 
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Butler’s work on contingency and Hegelian universality combine well with 
Appadurai’s thesis on imagination and Rabinow’s concept of the contemporary, dealt 
with more fully below. Considered in conjunction, Appadurai’s study of imagination and 
Butler’s work on contingency demonstrate a variable process by which imaginations, and 
subsequently cultural/social logics, are re-imagined by the flows of ideas represented in 
popular texts. Put in a combination of Butler’s and Appadurai’s terms, the profusion of 
phenomena, in this case creative media, interpreted and later restaged by the subject, 
radically alters knowledge categories more rapidly than ever before6. The aim of my 
research is to identify, document, and analyze, to use Tobias Reese’s triad (in Rabinow et 
al 2008: 58), the features of Kendra logic and practice that directly respond to and are 
influenced by popular media flows. The aspect of imagination I want to explore among 
this small community of Hindus is how they imagine their future and the means by which 
they attempt to realize that future through their instructional practices that work to shape 
subjectivities.  
 
Operationalizing an Anthropology of the Imagination: Fieldwork Methods and Their 
Limitations  
 
Putting the study of imagination, contingency, subjectivity, and the contemporary into 
operation requires attention to what Kristin Peterson (2009: 37-51) calls “phantom                                                         6 On this point Appadurai adds a disclaimer that the “importance of media is not so much 
as direct sources of new images and scenarios for life possibilities but as semiotic 
diacritics of great power” (1996: 53). It is not altogether clear what he means by 
“semiotic diacritics of great power” (dialectics?), a disclaimer made even more baffling 
by the next paragraph which opens with an unequivocal claim that it is the procession of 
media through “cinema, television, and video technology” that energize both older media 
and the imagination.  
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epistemologies”, or lines of indirect evidence. Though more traditional ethnographic 
methods such as interviews and participant observation constituted a large part of my 
data collection techniques, more important were strategies that allowed me to read much 
of the subtext of Kendra and HSS practices and logics. Similar to Peterson, George 
Marcus states that “Fieldwork does not just consist in taking interviews. It consists just as 
much in attending to the unspoken” (in Rabinow et al 2008: 95). Because my work is not 
after the identification of “concrete wholes” such as nationalism, but rather seeks to 
understand the linkages between transnational flows of fantasy, myth, and ideology and 
local interpretations and imaginaries, traditional ethnographic methods offered less rich 
insight. Phrased in Weber’s terms, the object of analysis in my work is “singularities, not 
totalities” (Rabinow 2003: 43). Through informal conversations with teachers and 
parents, sitting in on conversations between teachers and parents or teachers and students, 
attending classes, decomposing, as Reese (in Rabinow et al 2008: 58) has it, the rumors 
and gossip and critiques of other groups and their strategies, I was able to collect data that 
drew out “lived actualities”. “Phantom epistemologies,” Peterson writes,  
do not seek out parts in order to fit into a whole that is imagined to exist out there 
somewhere. Rumor, anecdote, stories, evasiveness, and not being able to ever 
know are their own sets of data and knowledge. They point us not in the direction 
of desired concreteness, as in “facts”, but rather offer an analytical opening to 
something just as fascinating and analytically provocative as a traditional sense of 
the empirical.  (2009: 41)  
 
That “something” that is just as fascinating and analytically provocative as traditional 
epistemologies is, for my project, insight into an imagined future of Trinidadian Hindus 
as it is shaped by connection with global flows of fantasy, ideology, mythology, and 
practice. Put in Rabinow’s terms, my work seeks to uncover “the contingencies of the 
present and their genealogical lines” as they emerge from and respond to contemporary 
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events, trends, and practices (2008: 55). The Kendra’s strategies for shaping professional, 
disciplined, hard working, dutiful, and respectful children can be genealogically traced to 
Hindu practices and pedagogies that are centuries old. What my work attempts to 
accomplish here is a genealogy of these strategies understood as linkages with global and 
localized flows of public culture. 
  The Kendra is a small mandir (temple) and community center located in central 
Trinidad, just outside the bustling little city of Chaguanas. Raviji, the founder of the 
Kendra, built the mandir in the early 1980s after returning from ten years of study in 
India. The mandir, he says, was built with the community in mind, as a place for the 
instruction and promotion of Hindu worship, study, and practice. Since its founding in 
1981, Raviji has adapted and innovated various programs to meet the needs not only of 
local Hindu communities but, equally as important, the needs of all of Trinidad. 
Throughout most of the year the Kendra operates primarily as a mandir, a meeting place 
for weekly satsang (worship service) or evening yoga sessions. During the summer, 
however, it becomes the site of the Bal Ramdilla Summer Vacation Camp where roughly 
60 students ranging in age from 4 to 17 gather to study, practice, and ultimately perform, 
the ancient Hindu epic Ramayana. Though the Kendra is geographically rather isolated, 
set in a quiet rural area and surrounded by small farms, the mandir is well known for its 
many programs and celebrations held throughout the year. Mostly, however, the Kendra 
is known for its elaborate production of the Ramayana, a play adapted from the epic 
poem narrating the adventures of the god Rama as he attempts to regain his abducted 
wife from the destructive demon king Rawana and restore the dharma (Hindu morality) 
to earth. The play (lila, locally leela) is produced and performed in Hindu communities 
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throughout the world and by several others in Trinidad as well (Vertovec 2010). For the 
Kendra though, the play is more than another celebration to observe on the Hindu 
liturgical calendar, or simply offered as a local cultural attraction for tourists, as it is in 
Bali. The Ram Lila (creolized to Ramdila in Trinidad) is the centerpiece of the Kendra’s 
pedagogy and the means by which they attempt to instill timeless Hindu values into their 
children. The Kendra’s instructors, as I will describe later, instill these values not so 
much to maintain a distinctly Indian or Hindu identity, or to avoid creolizing or “mixing” 
as Khan (2004) has it. Rather, Kendra instructors, like Lynette Joseph, are deeply 
concerned about the future of Trinidad and its ability to compete in the cutthroat 
environment of modern global economics. On a more local level, they worry that their 
children will be swept into Trinidad’s culture of gluttony and carelessness and will be left 
behind by more professional, disciplined, and competitive students. The sense of 
discipline, order, respect, and public leadership they attempt to promote in their students 
through the study and performance of the Ramayana is, I argue, less about nationalism 
and ethnic identity and more about effective competition in local and global politics and 
capitalism.   
 I visited the Kendra on and off for five years, living on their compound for part of 
a summer. During that time I observed and often participated in the many activities they 
do throughout the day. From the morning mantra ritual, called Prarthana, conducted in 
five militaristically straight lines, to the afternoon Ramdila performance practices, I 
observed, participated in and photographed the numerous activities and lectures of the 
Kendra. Every morning I stood in the teachers’ line, reciting the Prarthana with my hands 
pressed against each other and elbows out facing the devasthaan (shrine area), bowing in 
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obeisance to the devas (gods and goddesses). After the Prarthana, the classes began – one 
for the 5-7 year olds, taught by Judyji, one for the 8-10 year olds, taught by Meenaji, and 
the ‘Ramayana theory’ class for the 11-17 year olds, taught by Shrutiji. The interns, three 
seventeen year old young women, were given special instruction by Raviji on the 
Ramayana that included the study of Sanskrit and Awadhi, the language of the Tulsidas 
Ramayana. I sat in on every class several class numerous times and was even entrusted to 
teach Judyji’s 5-7 class and Meenaji’s 8-10 year olds. Though I cannot report tremendous 
success at classroom management in either case, I did learn a lot about the logic that 
underwrites the teaching practices of the Kendra. Perhaps more importantly, it was an 
honor of the highest order that teachers would call on me to take their classes when they 
were absent. It signaled a level of trust that upon first request took me by surprise. The 
benefits both to my fieldwork and, infinitely more importantly, to my relationship with 
the people who invited me into their community, are immeasurable. Here, however, I’ll 
deal with the former. 
 After a time (I cannot remember precisely when it happened), I ceased being that 
awkward guy taking notes on everything and became Aaronji, part of the teaching staff, 
albeit in a modified sense. Unquestionably I had the easiest job of the lot. Though I was 
treated, to some degree, as a teacher (the ‘ji’ at the end of names is a marker of respect, 
often reserved for teachers), I was not expected to discipline or order the children. I got to 
play their games with them, participate in acting practices with them (usually involving 
hastily improvised skits and much silliness), and occasionally teach their classes. The 
kids warmed to me quickly, which allowed me not only to understand in richer detail 
Kendra pedagogy, but also to get to know their parents and their motivations for sending 
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their children to the Kendra. Most of the parents grew comfortable with me as well, 
accustomed to seeing me as a fixture at the Kendra day in and day out for the duration of 
Bal Ramdila, and happily entertained my prying questions.    
 In the late afternoons, when the parents would turn up to retrieve their children, I 
would often be introduced to the parents by some of the students. In this way I got to 
know most of the parents, many of which shared their thoughts about the Kendra and 
their concerns and hopes for their children. Some of the discussions were formal 
interviews, others short conversations standing in the parking lot before they drove home. 
In most cases, however, the conversations were ongoing dialogues that lasted the duration 
of the Bal Ramdila Summer course. I got to know some of the parents quite well, 
particularly those who volunteered regularly at the Kendra. As with the teachers, a 
critical function of the Kendra for the parents is its ability to promote which instill 
discipline and diligence in their kids. Through observation, dialogue, participation in 
nearly all activities, teaching, interviews, and informal conversations (liming) I was able 
to discover patterns in the community’s concerns that resulted in this thesis.  
In many ways, the Kendra’s strategies for shaping disciplined subjects are not 
wildly unique or unconventional. Like many other religious groups they use heroic, often 
selfless, mythical characters as models of orthodoxy and morality and, in contrast, 
villainous, typically greedy, gluttonous, and destructive characters as examples of 
spiritual corruption. The Kendra requires intensive study of sacred texts and the 
memorization of key passages. They expect the students to be orderly, respectful, 
courteous, deferent, and professional. Their students must follow all guidelines and apply 
themselves vigorously to all of the programs and lessons given throughout the day. In 
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short, they are expected to behave like the models of morality they study every day in the 
epic Ramayana.  
 In several other ways, however, the Kendra’s strategies are entirely unique. Their 
strategies and their implementation of them are distinctly Trinidadian, revealing local 
logics and approaches to knowledge at work. Their interpretation of Hindu practice, 
scripture, and history are, in some cases, clearly shaped by their century and a half-long 
presence in a heavily creolized, post-colonial, New World state. Their concern with 
discipline, and Trinidad’s perceived lack of it, permeates nearly aspect of Kendra 
pedagogy and discourse. And their techniques, or technologies (Foucault 1990; 2003; 
1999), of subject formation reflect links with Trinidadian assemblages and recurring 
logics. The Kendra’s heavy use of rote memorization, their insistence on order, and their 
adoration of rules (which, curiously, can change rather suddenly, or are enforced 
capriciously), reflect an interpretation and practice of Hinduism in part shaped by local 
cultural assemblages and logics, even as they attempt to influence those logics7.  
 A richer understanding of Kendra pedagogy and how it is received by its students 
could be realized through interviews and focused discussions with the children. Though I 
was around, worked with, and talked to the children on a daily basis, given the limitations 
of time and my concern to keep the thesis from sprawling, I never sought IRB approval to 
formally include the children in my study. Gaining insight into how the students perceive 
their futures and the ways in which the Kendra helps or possibly even hinders their 
                                                        7 Neil Lazarus (1999) suggests that the British attempted to instill their love of law and 
order in their colonial subjects as much through games as any other educational medium, 
hence the widespread popularity of soccer and, more importantly, cricket, in the 
Commonwealth colonies (see pages 144-95).  
 
  21 
efforts would be extremely instructive. Have the children imbibed the message of 
discipline as the teachers intended? In what ways have they interpreted Kendra lessons 
and the narrative arc of the Ramayana?  Have they grown as anxious about their future as 
their elders have? How might the Kendra be preparing them for adulthood? By focusing 
only on the adults I gained a sense for the anxieties that animate Kendra programs and 
participation. However, what the study misses is how those anxieties and the programs 
attempted to allay them are interpreted and made sense by the students. Further studies 
will address this limitation. 
 
Analysis of Data   
Analysis of the Kendra’s programs, discipline regime, and discourse hinges on linking 
these practices to global and localized flows of assemblages, understood as “a distinctive 
type of experimental matrix of heterogeneous elements, techniques, and concepts” 
(Rainbow 2003: 56). Rabinow identifies three types of catalytic historical-social events, 
all drawn from Foucault’s work on discourse, that determine logical trajectories and 
provide the contours for normative processes. I will deal with just two of Rabinow’s three 
events. Problematizations, he asserts, are points in history that present problems to be 
worked out over time and through logical and ethical practices. For example, the 
bourgeois revolution presented the problem of governance in a post-feudal, democratic, 
humanistic social environment. New strategies, technologies, and knowledges were 
required both to understand and address the historic shift. A problematization, in 
Foucault’s terms, is a heterogeneous event that is a “transformation of an ensemble of 
difficulties into problems to which diverse solutions are proposed” (cited in Rabinow 
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2003: 19). In Rabinow’s articulation, we can understand a problematization as “both a 
kind of historical and social situation – saturated with power relations...as well as a nexus 
of responses to that situation” (2003: 19). For my work, I understand the rise of neo-
liberalism throughout the Reagan-Thatcher years of the 1980s as constituting a 
problematization, or a shift in historic-social relations that would, and do, have global 
implications. The radical shift inaugurated by the neo-liberal problematization is one of 
extreme competition (Chang 2008), of the profusion of transnational media reaching 
further into more people’s lives, and of a more widespread longing for local realizations 
of the bourgeois revolution. My work does not seek to critically interrogate the neo-
liberal problematization. Rather, I understand the historical shift as contingent and 
variously responded to, interpreted, and practiced. What I wish to do is describe and 
analyze practical events and lived actualities of the Kendra’s members as they negotiate 
this contemporary-historical terrain. In other words, I trace the genealogy of many of the 
Kendra’s programs and the structure of their pedagogy to the recent history of changes in 
late-capitalism.  
 The second event Rabinow identifies is, as I’ve already mentioned, an 
assemblage. Assemblages are related to problematizations as a congeries of techniques, 
practices, and concepts that are shorter lived and thus more contemporary than 
problematizations. Applied to my research, assemblages are the concepts and techniques 
of late capitalism whose origins are Euro-American (more American, however, than 
European) but which are formed (and normed) locally. In more concrete terms, the 
assemblages I identify and analyze here are the practices, logics, and concepts in 
currency at the Kendra as they emerge from and respond to their global flows. The 
  23 
Kendra’s intensive focus on discipline as a means of effective competition in a changing 
local and global economic-social order is the most salient example of how I understand 
and apply assemblages as an interpretive category. The concept of discipline is one that 
emerges from neo-liberal discourse as a moral attribute necessary for success. Kendra 
instructors have imbibed this discourse and created from it techniques, technologies, 
practices, ethics, and moral norms (assemblages) that localize and respond to 
contemporary needs of discipline.    
The few studies on Hinduism in Trinidad have either been studies of the religious 
practices of that community and their similarities or differences with Hindu practice in 
other diaspric communities (Vertovec 1992; 2001; 2010) or with India (Klass 1988), or it 
has been subsumed under projects investigating instances of ethnic nationalism (Khan 
2004; Munasinghe 2005). These studies all start from the assumption that historical 
processes left residues that continue to inform discourse, ideology, knowledge, and 
practice. While my work seeks in no way to minimize the social effects of colonialism, I 
agree with Rabinow that given the rate of global cultural change we cannot assume that 
history is the primary determinant of contemporary norms and forms of societies (2008). 
Rapid shifts in technology, communication, aesthetics, and values must certainly have a 
strong and thus analyzable effect on local cultures. My study seeks to move away from 
pure historical determinism and toward analyses of contemporary cultural norms and 
forms responding to, accommodating, resisting, the global flow of cultural, political, and 
economic logics. That is, this is an attempt to write what Rabinow would term “an 
anthropology of the actual, or an anthropology of the ‘near future and recent past’” 
(2003: 55). Surprisingly, there has yet to emerge an analytical ethnography of the ways in 
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which Hindus in Trinidad, or in other diasporic communities, interpret their texts and 
traditions to understand and negotiate the rapidly changing modern world. My research 
aims to expand discourse of Hindu diaspora studies beyond the historical forces that lend 
them their present shape and into how interpretations of texts, practices, rituals, and 
folklore are influenced by their position in a global matrix of rapidly changing norms and 
forms. Necessarily then my work also challenges paradigmatic field methods situating 
historical events and discourse as the primary determinants of contemporary practice. 
What I hope to demonstrate is the interconnected and influential relation between religion 
and certain features of global culture, making Hindu subject formation "visible [as] a 
singularity at places where there is a tempation to invoke a historical constant, an 
immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all" 
(Foucault, cited in Rabinow 2003: 41). I do not wish to argue that legacies of colonialism 
are irrelevant. However, I do wish to challenge the practice of viewing colonialism as a 
"historical constant" and to assert that (post)modern transnational flows of ideas, 
fantasies, practices, texts, mythologies (Barthes 1972), and ideologies exert an observable 
and analyzable effect on religious subject creation, textual interpretation, and means of 
negotiating the contemporary.  
The term 'discipline' lies at the crux of my research. Through the numerous uses 
and articulations of this term one may read the urgent concerns of a community 
competing at both micro- and macro-political and economic scales. Reverberating out 
from the concept of discipline are assemblages of ideas, values, concerns, and aspirations 
that form linkages with interpretations of the past, with present local and international 
trends, and with contemporary trans-national ideologies. Polyvalent and layered with 
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complexity, discipline operates as the avenue through which to analyze how key social-
political-economic concerns give shape to textual and performative interpretation and the 
creation of Hindu subjectivities. The way in which instructors of the Baal Ramdilla 
course interpret and apply study and performance of the Ramayana is informed in turn by 
interpretations of past and contemporary events as they stand in relation to the Hindu 
community. For example, a common Indo-Trinidadian interpretation of the indenture 
program, which brought Indians to the West Indies from 1838 to 1917 to work the sugar 
cane and cocoa fields, paradoxically situates Indians as resistant to colonial hegemony 
yet also equal with imperial cultures (Khan 2004; Munasinghe 2001; Niranjana 2006). 
Similar complex and often ambivalent, paradoxical relationships with Trinidadian and 
global mass culture persist in which resistance, accommodation, re-creation, share space 
in the community imaginary. It is important then to situate Trinidadian Hinduism as a 
creole Hinduism, as a uniquely Caribbean complex, and to analyze its local, regional, and 
global linkages (cf. Klass 1988). Just as Afro-Caribbean creole communities forged 
creative new cultural forms from fragments of African, European, and Indigenous 
societies (Knight 1990; Harris 1998; Benitez-Rojo 1998), so too have Hindu Indo-
Trinidadians forged communites from the fragments of diverse religious practices from 
throughout India within an already creolized milieu (Samaroo 2006; 1985 Selvon 2006). 
In sum, my work seeks to decompose the constituent parts of Trinidadian Hindu subject 
creation and to document and analyze them in a local and transnational context.  
If anthropology is at the point of reconsidering ‘givens’ both interpretive and 
methodological, then it is important I believe to reconsider and rigorously interrogate the 
given of nationalism as a cultural form. Nationalism an overdetermined category whose 
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mobilization forestalls identification, documentation, and analysis of other cultural 
patterns, constructs, and reactions to global shifts in imagination and conceptualization of 
life rapidly circulating in modernized societies. This study hinges on imagination as 
studied through interpretation, that is interpretation as an act of imagination that has 
social-political implications as well as theoretical ones that challenge the discursive 
hegemony of nationalism as an interpretive category. As with Rabinow my focus is on 
everyday politics and power dynamics that profoundly shape worldviews, subjectivities, 
and the larger abstract cultural forms with which we are in constant negotiation (this is 
justification for influence in work from cultural studies). Efforts of the Trinidadian Hindu 
community extend beyond mere identity politics and cultural preservationism, efforts I 
will argue that warrant analysis of cultural contingency, performativity, and interpretation 
that require agency based theoretical models of the kind emerging out of cultural studies 
and the work of post-structuralist thinkers such as Butler, Marcus, Rabinow, and 
Appadurai. The multiple lines of indigenous interpretation I seek to identify, document, 
and analyze – their interpretation of Trinidadian history and the Hindu place and role in 
it; their interpretation of contemporary Trinidadian and global forms of popular culture; 
and their interpretation of Hindu scripture and lore – is best served by post-structuralist 
and cultural studies analyses for their emphasis on and recognition of the complexity of 
individual and group interpretive practices and the numerous contingencies that color 
such a process.  
Since Brackette Williams’ richly documented landmark study of ethnic 
nationalism in Guyana (1991), Gramscian notions of hegemony have dominated ethnic 
studies in the Caribbean (Khan 2004, Munasinghe 2001; Niranjana 2006). Gramsci’s 
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model has been influential in studies of colonial and post-colonial studies of ethnic 
nationalism, as well as in cultural studies, for its attendance to the subtleties of social and 
political power dynamics. Gramsci’s articulation of power sought to move Marxism 
toward analyses of the participatory nature of hegemony, highlighting, even if through a 
lens of ideology coercion, the (limited) agency of the working classes. His recognition 
that all members of each class and trade are intellectuals in their own right and from 
which emerges leaders capable of distilling that class or interest group’s needs, what he 
calls the “organic intellectual”, underscores articulations of power, or hegemony in his 
terms, that situate the masses as active cultural agents (2009: 78; 1971). However, like 
most other Marxists, his model rests on the mobilization of ideology as a coercive 
technology that blinds the working classes to their own repression (see Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1998; Barthes 1972; Althusser 1995; Jameson 1999). Though a Gramscian like 
Laclau (1985; 2000) might take exception to my reading of Gramsci’s staging of power, 
his model fails to capture the agile, contingent, and ultimately unstable process of 
interpretation that all subjects experience. Butler’s careful attendance to the subjective 
experience of hegemony and thus the universal I believe draws the relation between 
subject and form in sharper relief. Her attendance to critical questions of the contingency 
of knowledge and identity (2006; 2009) and her treatment of belonging and translation in 
political and ontological states (2007) helps me analytically address the micro-practices 
of a community contending with global modernity.   
My work here, then, is an attempt to write an ethnography “that is not so 
resolutely localizing” (Appadurai 1996: 55). In other words, how might we locate the 
Trinidadian Hindu community as more than shaped by and responding to local contexts 
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but rather, given migration patterns and the globalization of entertainment and news 
media, how they are situated as critical consumers and active agents within a broader 
matrix of symbolic, ideological, material processes? This question is especially relevant 
to Trinidad in light of its massively mobile population (Scher 2003) and extreme 
influence by American popular culture (hence the influence in my work of certain 
cultural studies scholars).  Appadurai states that, 
There is, of course, much to be said for the local, the particular, and the 
contingent, which have always been the forte of ethnographic writing as its best. 
But where lives are being imagined in and through realisms that must be in one 
way or another official or large scale in their inspiration, then the ethnographer 
needs to find new ways to represent the links between the imagination and the 
social life. (1996: 55)   
 
This project can thus be viewed as an attempt to represent links between Trinidadian 
Hindu imagination as it responds to global shifts, and the social life they seek to shape in 
and through a localized globality.    
 
Culture, Cultural, and Cultural Logics: A Brief Definition of Terms  
As an interpretive category, culture has become a largely meaningless concept, an empty 
signifier. In its attempt to capture nearly every aspect of a community’s social life, it ends 
up capturing nothing. In other words, if it is everything it also nothing. I cast my lot with 
certain contemporary thinkers who find the term problematic because of its inevitable 
opacity, its ambitious claim to totality. Appadurai seeks a way around the problem by 
understanding culture to mean “the process of naturalizing a subset of differences that 
have been mobilized to articulate group identity” (1996: 15). For Appadurai then, culture 
is a processual event involving the movement and mobilization of diverse elements 
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toward the evolving formation of group identity. Lest he be labeled a primordialist 
cloaked in different cloth, Appadurai is quick to point out that his definition rests on the 
assumption that culture/ethnic groups do not draw on an “existing repertoire of emotions” 
that are moved into a larger arena of ethnic politics, as the older models suppose, but 
rather imaginatively draw on larger social forms, such as cricket, that are then “inscribed 
on the body through a variety of practices of increasingly smaller scale” (1996: 14). His 
ambiguous terminology notwithstanding (by “body” is he referring to the social or 
individual body?), if I understand him correctly Appadurai is attempting to attend to the 
micro-practices in constant motion among a group unified, to some degree, by the logics 
that guide that process. Appadurai’s understanding of what culture is, or perhaps more 
accurately does, moves us further from the tedious inventory of attributes and deeper into 
the realm of process, in his case, the process of identity formation and mobilization.  
In his groundbreaking essay “Notes on Deconstructing the ‘Popular’” (2007a 
[1981]), Stuart Hall arrives at a similar conclusion, viewing culture as a process that 
involves the struggle to resist dominant culture hegemony and the inevitable containment, 
or acceptance, of certain dominant culture forms. Like Appadurai, Hall is critical of 
cultural models that dismiss the creative work of culture groups (in Hall’s case class 
groups) as they consume dominant cultural forms. “Everything changes”, he reminds us, 
“- not just a shift in the relations of forces but a reconstitution of the terrain of political 
struggle itself” (2007: 65). In his interrogation of theoretical models that attempt to 
explain the workings of popular culture, Hall is suspicious of those that assert the 
presence of an authentic working class culture tainted by the vapid creations of a 
dominant culture industry (see, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno 1998). Such a 
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view, he holds, fails to do justice to the creative, sometimes resistant, sometimes 
accommodating, acts of popular culture consumption. Rather than viewing culture as a 
space dominated by one group over another, we should view it instead as a process in 
constant motion “in the complex lines of resistance and acceptance, refusal and 
capitulation, which makes the field of culture a sort of constant battlefield. A battlefield 
where no once-for-all victories are obtained but where there are always strategic positions 
to be won and lost” (2007: 67). Like Appadurai, Hall urges us to attend to the small acts 
of imagination that continually reshape cultural form and expression.     
In a four-way conversation about the history and direction of anthropology, Paul 
Rabinow, George Marcus, James Faubion and Tobias Reese (2008) agree that the term 
culture is problematic and prefer to jettison it in favor of the more process oriented and 
active term ‘cultural’. Like Appadurai, the group finds that whereas culture tends to 
signify bounded totalities, fixed structures, or organized systems, cultural opens the field 
of ethnographic inquiry to classic Malinowskian projects such as idiosyncratic logics and 
patterns while recognizing the active movement of local forms and norms (2008: 106-
110). Tobias Reese states the problem neatly by pointing out that we “[are] not studying 
islands of culture. Instead, in my case anyway, we’re studying emergent rationalities or 
technologies” (2008: 107). George Marcus agrees, stating that though anthropologists 
rely on the concept of culture, its conceptual terrain must be re-imagined in order to 
identify and analyze different processes and sets of problems. “Conceptual substitutes for 
older ideas of culture – based on geographical referents, totalities, holism, tied to forms 
of life – called for in work in environments of fragmentation and partialities like 
hybridity don’t serve us very well because they were designed for research problems 
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related to identity, the centrality of which I think all of us here think we should be trying 
to move away from” (2008: 108).   
The term ‘culture’, just as the thing the it attempts to identify, is dynamic, fluid, 
contingent, processual, at times ineffable, and riddled with nuance. Substituting the 
concept of the cultural for the more static term culture moves us further from descriptions 
of bounded totalities, monolithic systems, or, in my case, hegemonic structures, and more 
toward the identification and analysis of everyday processes that demonstrate localized 
linkages with globalized flows of knowledge and practice. My work with a small 
community of Trinidadian Hindus underscored for me their link with contemporary flows 
of globalized cultural practice and the ways in which they conceptualize and interpret 
certain features from those flows. The instructors of the Kendra, as well as the parents 
that send their children there, imagine for themselves and their community a future 
within, and even through, this rapidly changing global process. By conceptualizing the 
logics and practices of this community as cultural, rather than representing a bounded 
group shaped by historical hegemonic structures, I hope to analyze the imaginative 
micro-practices evident in their programs that show signs of linkages with broader global 
processes. In this context then, the concept of cultural logics helps us identify imaginative 
processes that respond to larger, more transnational movements. 
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CHAPTER II 
RAM LILA: PERFORMANCE, PERFORMATIVITY, 
PRACTICE 
 
 
Discipline is a political anatomy of detail. 
               ~ Foucault, Discipline and Punish  
  
One of the reason we don’t have leaders all over the place is we afraid to get up in front 
of people. 
               ~ Raviji, to class after dance performance practice 
 
 
The Ram Lila (Leela in Trinidad) is a very specific type of performance. It is not exactly 
a musical, not exactly an ordinary play, and not operatic. It is a bit of all those, and 
something else besides. On the surface, the play is the story of Rama’s defeat of 
immorality (adharma) as he restores Raja Dasharatra’s kingdom to order and rescues his 
wife Sita from the troublesome demon-god Rawana. The play, however, is also 
exemplary and didactic. It is intended to communicate something beyond the quotidian 
social politics that consume our day-to-day lives, instead articulating the ideal moral and 
behavioral models God expects us to follow. Ram Lila is literally translated “the play of 
God”, which Shrutiji tells me is a double entendre; it is a play demonstrating an important 
event of God’s participation in human life (that is, Vishnu’s incarnation as Rama in 
Ayodhya) as well as how God plays, or acts, in our lives. The cosmological play is what 
lends the Lila performance what one observer described to Shrutiji as a “mythic” quality. 
Every movement and gesture are to communicate incomprehensible stretches of space 
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and time as God, in the form of the super human Rama, and his companions wage an epic 
battle against the destructive forces of greed, hatred, and selfishness.  
 The students of the Kendra must learn how to perform the mythic qualities of the 
epic through countless drills and improvisations each day. On some occasions they move 
around the room together, stretching their arms gracefully as their feet do a skip-walk to 
move them through time and space in epic fashion. They learn to vocalize forcefully, 
making certain to face the audience while gesturing dramatically. They practice moving 
around the stage in a way that “takes up space”, as Raviji puts it, in order to fill the stage 
and create a sense of motion and progress. Or they might rehearse being stationary, as a 
tree, but in an expressive fashion that captures the importance of Ramayana theater. As 
Walter Benjamin has aptly illustrated in his essay What is Epic Theater?, the purpose of 
epic productions is not to elicit empathy from the audience but more importantly to elicit 
astonishment “at the circumstances under which [the characters] function” (1968: 150). 
But even more essential is that the production is not primarily for the benefit of the 
audience. Benjamin’s claim that epic, didactic theater is “in every instance...meant for the 
actors as much for the spectators” could not be more accurate in this case (1968: 152). 
The Kendra does not perform the Ram Leela in front of large crowds of tourists dazzled 
by the elaborate costumes and impressive displays of pyrotechnics as they do in Bali. Nor 
do they even perform for large local audiences. The audience is modest and appreciative 
of their work, but certainly not the centerpiece of the Leela. The production is for the 
actors who must live the astonishing circumstances of Rama’s life. As Victor Turner 
(1990) sees it, playing out crises in the abstract of theatrical performance, what he calls 
“life-crisis rituals”, allows a society’s members to confront and resolve more easily 
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difficult situations that arise in the real world. Performing the crisis of Rama and Sita is 
therefore an opportunity to rehearse in the safe space of the Kendra life diffilcuties the 
students are certain to confront as they mature and take on “the milling, teeming” (Turner 
1990: 11) social world by themselves.   
As with the line formation drills, the music lessons, lunch protocol, and the 
myriad other ritualized practices at the Kendra, the kids are challenged to perform each 
drill to perfection. But it is not only Raviji who will critique them and demand 
excellence, they are also judged by their peers. After the post-lunch rest period students 
gather in the central meeting room under Raviji’s guidance to practice theater techniques. 
Operating in small groups of about five to seven, the students are either given a short 
scene from the Ramayana to condense, rehearse, then perform for their audience of peers, 
or are asked to design a skit of their choosing for improvisational theater. After each 
performance the students reconvene in a circle and one by one stand up and offer their 
critiques or praise of the performances, concluded by Raviji’s observations and advice. In 
characteristic fashion, Raviji playfully mocks students who offer vague and meaningless 
feedback. “It was goooooood,” he says, drawing out the word “good” in exaggerated 
mimicry. “It was very goooood,” he repeats, eliciting laughter. “It was very, very, 
goooood,” to even more laughter.  
 Raviji will not accept shyness as an excuse for failing to speak boldly before the 
large group. Students that mutter, mumble, or speak to the floor are corrected, then asked 
to repeat themselves until they can be heard clearly by everyone. Likewise the students 
must speak creatively, articulately, and accurately, avoiding clichés involving overused 
adjectives such as ‘good’, ‘nice’, or ‘interesting’. Students that manage to speak to 
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acceptable standards are lauded with praise, held up as an example of ideal vocal 
performance. Students that fail are often playfully mocked then encouraged to continue 
working at public performance.  
 For Raviji, performing Ramayana is less about showcasing Hinduism’s legacy of 
literary of achievements and more about the performativity of confidence in a Hindu way. 
My phrasing here is important because I want it to be clear that Raviji is not dictating a 
specific brand of Hinduism, hence the reason I state that performativity of confidence is 
done in a Hindu way rather than the performativity of Hinduness. The distinction may be 
slight, but important because the phrasing “in a Hindu way” more accurately captures 
Raviji’s approach, implicitly suggesting that his method is one means among many of 
encouraging confidence through religious practice and public performance. Central to the 
Kendra’s project is building the confidence of its students, and the Ramayana happens to 
be the means by which they attempt to accomplish that goal. To state that the 
performance of the Lila is incidental is not to say that it is not important, but rather that 
its importance lies not so much in its place in the Hindu canon but in its role as medium 
through which to shape strong, confident individuals. Again it needs to be clear that my 
phrasing here is intentional. I use the open-ended ‘individuals’ rather than ‘Hindus’ or 
‘Indo-Trinidadians’ because, although most participants are Indian (by my count 98 
percent), not all of the students are or must be Hindu. Yet Raviji is clear to me, and often 
to his students, that the problem he sees with Indo-Trinidadians is that they are afraid to 
speak out in public settings, that they avoid confrontation that would right an injustice, 
and that they prefer silence to outspokenness. On the one hand then, the Kendra’s project 
is one that seeks to promote Hindu traditions and texts within their diasporic context. On 
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the other hand, their project is also recognized explicitly as a creolized form whose 
purpose is the promotion of values and practices that will help the community succeed in 
a competitive, capitalist milieu.  
 This chapter then will explore the relationship between performance, as a form of 
ritualized theater, and performativity, that is, the embodied daily performance of specific 
sets of community values, logics, and biases about appropriate behavioral practice. There 
is a strong and perceptible link, I will argue, between the Ramayana performance that 
Kendra students rehearse throughout the summer months and the performativity, or 
practice, as Goffman puts it, of self (1973). Practicing for the Ramayana is also a means 
of practicing the self as Kendra teachers believe it should be performed and practiced. It 
is within this rehearsal of the Lila and the self that we most clearly see local technologies 
of subject creation. 
 
Performing the Hindu Self 
 On the first day of the Bal Ramdila Vacation Course Shrutiji asks the students to sit after 
the Prarthana as she covers her expectations for appropriate behavior. Usually the first 
expectation is that students wear appropriate attire, which means wearing “Indian 
clothes”. After a short lecture on the inappropriateness of “western clothes like jeans and 
t-shirts”, she put the question of correct dress to the class. “Why do we wear Indian 
clothes?” A girl of about seven answered, “Because we’re in a mandir”. “Yes, that’s 
true,” Shrutiji replied, “but why else?” “Because we’re Indians,” offered another girl. “To 
show respect,” suggested a high school boy. “Those are all good reasons, but what is the 
most important reason we wear Indian clothes?” The class was silent, clearly stumped by 
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the question. Shrutiji smiled her wide smile as if to say “Isn’t it obvious?” then reminded 
them that they wear Indian clothes “because it demonstrates Hinduness. It shows that we 
are Hindus.” That the obvious had so readily eluded us as we sat cross-legged in our neat 
lines brought a collective nod to the group. Before concluding the dress portion of her 
lecture Shrutiji reminded the students that appropriate clothing was a requirement of the 
Kendra and that Indian clothes meet that requirement. Evidently, the requirement is a soft 
one, because that day I counted a total of 54 students, 36 of whom were wearing what 
Shrutiji would consider Indian clothes (roughly 67 percent). Over the next few weeks of 
the course that number hardly fluctuated, and I noticed that certain kids (almost always 
boys) seldom wore Indian attire. For that summer, the lecture was never repeated and I 
never heard Shrutiji bring it up again in any other context.  
 Important to any theatrical performance are the costumes that signify the 
personalities and class position of its characters. Costumes in theatrical performances 
function as semiotic signs that communicate to the audience something about the 
character donning them. We also learn about personality and class types by the attire of 
each character in a performance. In everyday life there is little difference between how 
theatrical characters are delineated through dress and how ordinary people delineate 
themselves through their choice of costumes. Shrutiji’s insistence on Indian dress at the 
Kendra is one clear way of delineating members of the Kendra specifically, and of the 
Hindu Indo-Trinidadian community more broadly, from those of other communities. But 
more importantly, it signals not merely an identity marker as Indian or even as Hindu, but 
rather a level of dedication to the principles embodied and expressed through Hindu 
practice. The donning of Indian attire is tantamount to a declaration of commitment to a 
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set of principles and guidelines that are distinct from those that operate in the broader 
social/cultural setting of Trinidadian life. That is, Kendra leaders, as with those of related 
Hindu organizations, view their values and aspirations as different from many of the 
popular forms circulating in public culture. As I have indicated elsewhere, this perceived 
difference in values and priorities is complicated by a paradoxical longing to participate 
more fully in the shaping of public imaginary spaces. Thus, the wearing of Hindu clothes 
should be seen as more than cultural nationalism, but also as an attempt to legitimize an 
alternative praxis that seeks space at the banquet of forms, worldviews, and styles offered 
through public imaginary spaces.  
 The performativity of Hinduness through the semiotically rich medium of 
costume is one of many ways in which the public performance of Hinduness reifies the 
category ‘Hindu’ as legitimate. In other words, the performance of Hinduness through 
attention to dress is one of several technologies of subjectivity community leaders use to 
promote their Hindu-derived values. As Judith Butler has proposed, the stabilization of 
social categories, in her case gendered ones, is dependent upon their routine performance 
in narrowly prescribed, meticulously circumscribed ways (2007). She states that “acts, 
gestures, enactments” of gender categories “are performative in the sense that the essence 
or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and 
sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means” (2008: 185, emphasis in 
original). The reality of gender categories, which we might easily extend to any socially 
inscribed category such as race, ethnicity, class, religion, are constituted through the 
numerous acts, gestures, enactments naturalized around and through them. Of course, 
there important differences between gender and religious categories, perhaps the most 
  39 
central being that the gender binary female/male and its discursive corollaries 
femininity/masculinity are naturalized to a hegemonic degree such that the ‘”integrity” of 
the subject’ is called into question when performance of the category fails to match its 
prescribed behaviors (2008: 185). A Hindu’s integrity as a Hindu is not likely to be called 
into question if she is not wearing a sari or he is not wearing a kurta. Certainly, that 
integrity may be suspect if certain other expected behaviors of Hindu religiosity are not 
apparent, but because few non-Hindus would assert that they know what it means to be 
Hindu, such integrity may safely remain intact. This is not true of gender, where cultural 
consensus about gender categories is typically high. That distinction notwithstanding, 
Butler’s performativity model is helpful for the light it sheds on practices, rationalities, 
and acts, that produce and re-inscribe social categories. The apparently simple act of 
wearing Indian clothes inscribes behavioral codes and helps define the parameters of the 
indigenously interpreted category ‘Hindu’.   
The emphasis on Indian clothes also belies an unmistakable element of 
essentialism. A good many Hindus, even in India, do not routinely wear Indian clothes. 
The globalization of western fashions, particularly of slacks and jeans for both men and 
women, is as noticeable in India as it is in Trinidad. Wearing Indian clothes is no more a 
marker of piety for Hindus than wearing a cross is for Catholics. But within the symbolic 
economy established at the Kendra, and I suspect at several other ideologically and 
theologically aligned Hindu community centers, wearing Indian clothes not only 
outwardly signals to others that one is Hindu but, more importantly, acculturates the 
children into moving and behaving in the Hindu way as Kendra leaders interpret that 
category. In other words, it is a way of wearing Hinduness that embodies Kendra 
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ideology. As a practice of embodied knowledge, wearing Hinduness through traditional 
Indian clothes encourages Kendra students to appear and self-identify as Hindu, the 
inverse of which is not to appear western or American. The attempt of uniformity at the 
Kendra is an attempt to embody the disciplinary values viewed as inherent in Hinduism 
and lacking in certain features of European and American popular culture. According to 
Kendra logic, the baggy jeans and lazily sagging t-shirts popular among the youth could 
not possibly help promote the discipline necessary to succeed in a competitive economy.     
 Other forms of embodied practice involve eating, resting, and speaking in an 
appropriately Hindu way. Lunch, for example, is an important ritual of embodied 
Hinduness. The first ringing of the large brass hand bell during Ramayana instruction 
signals to students and teachers that ten minutes remain before lunch. The anxiousness of 
the students is palpable, but they remain admirably composed until the ringing of the next 
bell, communicating it is time to clean up and prepare for lunch. Chairs are stacked, 
tables folded and tucked away, and hands washed before everyone gathers in an orderly 
fashion to line up for lunch outside under the cover of a large corrugated tin roof. No 
rowdiness, pushing, arguing or even loud talk is permitted during line or at lunch, and I 
never witnessed any such behavior to see what the consequences would be in the case of 
their violation. Quiet talking is permitted during line up and at lunch, except for 
Thursdays, which, save for the lunchtime mantra, is a day of eating in absolute silence. 
After the children and teachers have collected their food, served by the volunteer cooks, 
they sit down at a long grey painted table, waving flies from their food and waiting for 
one of the older students, interns, or teachers to come around to pour a spoonful of water 
into their upturned hands that will bless the food after the mantra. When the mantra is 
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complete and Raviji, the guru, has taken his first mouthful, the students may begin eating. 
Conspicuously absent from the place setting is flatware of any kind. Before the students 
is a plate with a modest portion of Indian and creole foods and a cup of either water or 
characteristically over-sweetened juice. On the first day of camp one of the teachers, 
usually Shrutiji but possibly Meenaji, must remind students that eating is to be done with 
hands, which she kindly demonstrates for the new kids. To remind the students how to 
eat properly Shrutiji says, “We eat with our...” which cues the kids to respond in unison, 
“right hand”.  
 During the first few weeks I spent at the Kendra, awkwardly unsure of where I 
should sit, I decided to eat with the students. They seemed intrigued by the novelty and 
happily shared information of all kinds about appropriate customs at the Kendra while 
politely correcting my misdeeds. Sitting with different kids every day, I often asked how 
many of them routinely ate with their hands at home. They typically laughed when I 
asked that and reported, except for one student, that they only eat with their hands at the 
Kendra. Like the loose requirement to wear Indian attire, eating with the right hand 
underscores how Indian customs are recreated in Trinidad in a quest for authenticity. The 
quest for authenticity animates much of Kendra pedagogy and demonstrates how 
embodied Hinduness is a central feature of their symbolic economy. By learning to eat 
with their hands Kendra students are performing Hinduness in ways they would not 
outside of the Kendra. It seemed to matter little that nearly everyone in India – Christians, 
Muslims, Jains, and others – eats with their right hand. What matters, rather, is that 
students embody the values associated with India and participate in an authentic ritual of 
perceived Hinduness. The lunchtime rituals then serve, like the wearing of traditional 
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Indian clothes, as a recreative event that draws the students closer to their Indian heritage, 
which also, by extension, draws them closer to Hinduness.  
 After lunch the students are provided a short period of rest. Having taken their 
plates and cups to the kitchen and washed their hands, they retrieve their yoga mats 
(usually a beach towel) and spread them carefully on the floor to prepare a personal 
resting spot. Raviji reminds the students as they lie down that they are to do so on their 
left sides. When I asked Raviji why the left side he gave me a puzzled look and replied, 
“I don’t know. I never thought to ask.” 
 
Performativity and Language 
The recitation of texts, usually from the Ramayana but sometimes from other texts such 
as the Bhagavad Gita, is one of the most important single practices of the Bal Ramdilla 
summer course. The Prarthana, as I have already described, is memorized by children as 
young six years old. And Shrutiji is very particular about the pronunciation of key words, 
a particularity not necessarily spared because of age. But the Prarthana is one of many 
memorization and recitation rituals encountered throughout the day. Following the 
Prarthana and the morning announcements and reminders students retrieved their yoga 
mats to do chanting (praise hymns) and sun salutations (surya namaskar) with 
Damanandaji. Sitting in a meditative pose, the students chanted the eight line surya 
namaskar in Sanskrit four times. Like Shrutiji, Damanandaji would correct 
mispronounced words or phrases at the end of the mantra and ask students to repeat it 
with him in unison until he was satisfied with their effort. 
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 On several occasions we gathered in groups of about eight to ten to practice lines 
from the Ramayana in Awadhi. These sessions seemed to follow no predictable time 
schedule but were routine enough that students knew what to expect when Shrutiji 
ordered them. Sitting in a circle on the floor of the main hall, students would practice 
repeating the phrases with the help of Shrutiji or one of the three interns. Already quite 
familiar with Shrutiji’s teaching style, I typically sat with one of the interns to see how 
she approached the lesson and dealt with pronunciation problems. I sat with the same 
group for several days in a row, curious to see the progress of the students who ranged in 
age from nine to thirteen (students showing signs of maturity and acuity, such as nine 
year old Vishala, are often bumped up from the younger classes into the older ones). The 
intern would start the lesson by reciting a line from a verse (caupai) of the Ramayana as 
it is supposed to be read in Awadhi or Sanskrit. She would then start from the first word, 
having the students repeat after her in unison. After several repetitions we would move, 
always clockwise, around the circle and one by one repeat the word the intern 
pronounced for us, “atulitabaladdhamaṃ” careful to emphasize every third syllable in 
order to preserve the correct cadence. Students of Shrutiji, the interns are as particular 
about pronunciation of the terms as their teacher, if a bit more forgiving. Students that 
failed to aspirate the dha or nasalize the final syllable ṃ, had to repeat the term until they 
got it right. Many students struggle with the aspirations, a flaw of minor consternation for 
Shrutiji who sees the true apprehension of Hindu philosophy linked to the ability to 
pronounce Sanskrit, Awadhi, and Hindi correctly. Indeed, it was during a training session 
for Hindi educational materials by an Indian currently living in Boston that I began to 
understand why pronunciation is so important for Kendra teachers, particularly Shrutiji. 
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Subashji makes his living selling educational materials for Hindi language 
instruction. His proud invention is a plastic refrigerator magnet set of Devanagari (Hindi 
alphabet) that he sells to places like the Kendra that want to begin teaching Hindi. 
Subashji had offered to come to the Kendra one afternoon to demonstrate his teaching 
program for Kendra instructors who had begun of late considering more serious and 
sustained Hindi language lessons for their students. A short, rotund man with slicked 
back balding hair and a waddling gait, Subashji claimed that his program was ideally 
suited for teaching children of all ages, but because of the inclusion of “toys”, it was 
especially effective with the younger audiences1. Subashji began the lesson by teaching 
us syllables and phrases in Hindi, showing us pictures of the Devanagari in bright letters 
from his accompanying booklet. The lesson, however, quickly turned into much more 
than language instruction. He puncuated the anguage and pronunciation instruction with 
history, culture, religious, and even science lessons, all revolving around the holistic 
completeness of the Hindu complex. “Speaking Hindi”, he claimed, “creates healthy 
enzymes in the mouth.” He also stated that Devanagari is the mother of all Indo-
European languages, which he would remind the world of by creating a Devanagari 
theme park where patrons could play and learn Hindi at the same time. Subashji also 
spent considerable time comparing Indian thought and culture systems to the West, which 
invariably came out on the bottom. He also took the time to remind us that other language 
programs, particularly Berlitz and Rosetta Stone, were inferior for their failure to focus 
on pronunciation. “As Indians, as Hindus, you know the importance of proper 
                                                        1 The toys, as it turns out, were simply his refrigerator magnets, which he said could be 
arranged to spell Hindi words. I was mystified by his approach, struggling to understand 
how his system of constant repetitions differed from any of the programs he disparaged.   
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pronunciation.” Shrutiji concurred, stating that the philosophy of Hinduism is intimately 
linked with language.  
 A one man lesson in Hindu nationalism, Subashji provided an insightful contrast 
with the Kendra’s instructors. Subashji had no trouble linking Hindi to Hinduism, though 
many millions of non-Hindus in India speak Hindi. He routinely invoked Hindu 
intellectual advances, situating India as the birthplace of various philosophical, 
mathematic, scientific, linguistic, literary, and spiritual discoveries. Subashji’s India as 
Mother Culture narrative, not just for Hindus but many other culture groups besides, 
recalls for me the heliocentric theories of Diffusionist anthropology that situated Egypt as 
the provenience of all major cultural forms (see Boas’s critique of diffusionism in 2001). 
Similar to the Diffusionists, Subashji sees India as a kind of cultural axis mundi out of 
which radiates the practices of many other culture groups. Like Shrutiji, he also 
expressed irritation with the British, and the West in general, for failing to credit India for 
its own advances. “The British come to India, take everything, and don’t give credit,” he 
said, smiling and nodding as if to add, “but we all know the truth, don’t we?” Despite a 
few areas of overlapping concern, such as the protection of intellectual property rights of 
India from the pilfering West, it was clearly evident that Subashji was after something 
very different than his Trinidadian counterparts. The thread that bound Subashji’s 
narratives and efforts was the promotion of Hinduism as a logic system equal with 
anything produced in the West, or anywhere else. Further, not only is Hinduism’s 
operative logic equal to any other system, it is also in many cases the unacknowledged 
progenitor of those systems. When I first came to the Kendra I expected to hear more 
narratives like Subashji’s, and without question I did from some parents. But Subashji’s 
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visit threw in stark relief for me the differences between what the Kendra, and its 
affiliated groups such as the HSS, are doing compared with what Hindu nationalists in 
and from India are doing. The Kendra is not simply promoting Hinduism purely for its 
own sake, as if to finally prove that Hinduism can not only measure up to other systems, 
but in fact is the measure of them itself. I think I would be overstating my case to say that 
such strands are non-existent in Kendra narratives and pedagogy. But their focus is 
clearly more centered around success and the use of Hindu texts and practices as a means 
of achieving that success than it is with pushing an extremist nationalist agenda.  
For Kendra instructors, the promotion of Hinduism for its own sake must compete 
against concerns emerging from their historical context in Trinidad. As an indentured 
community, sequestered on plantations in the hinterlands and struggling to adapt to new 
customs, Indo-Trinidadians’ concern with competition is a long-standing one. The luxury 
of promoting Hinduism for its own sake or of fighting ideological battles were projects 
the indentured laborers, peasant and working class Indo-Trinidadians could ill-afford. 
Basic needs such as proper nutrition, functioning sanitation systems in the villages 
(Brereton 1985), education (Laurence 1985), domestic violence problems (Trotman 
1986), and access to the legal machinery (Samaroo 1985) trumped the more bourgeois 
concerns of theology and epistemology. The post-Indenture peasant and working classes 
were absorbed with a more concrete set of problems, chief among them the agitation for 
better pay and working conditions (Haraksingh 2006; for a similar study on Guyanese 
resistance and agitation see Ramnarine 2006). As the Indian community became settled 
in Trinidad and more and more Indians chose Trinidad as their permanent homes, access 
to mechanisms of class mobility became increasingly salient. If the new Indo-Trinidadian 
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community, that is, the second generation and later Indians, were to make Trinidad their 
home, they would have to do more than adapt their customs and language to the dominant 
Creole logic. They would need to compete in the economic and political arenas for 
resources to improve their lives and allow their children opportunities they would never 
have.  
When I asked Raviji about this aspect of Indo-Trinidadian history, he confirmed 
its salience, reporting that even as a child, most of his friends and extended kin from his 
village were illiterate as late as the 1940s, many having hardly stepped foot in a school. 
Census statistics confirm his memory. By 1971 a full 26 percent of Indo-Trinidadians had 
had no education at all, compared with 2.5 percent for Afro-Trinidadians, .2 percent for 
whites, and 4.9 percent for all other groups (Dookeran 1985). Almost 80 percent of 
Trinidadian schools at this time were urban, meaning severe educational neglect and class 
perpetuation in the former plantation communities. It was the slow pace of development 
and attendance to rural Indo-Trinidadians’ needs that prompted Raviji, among many 
others, to found a mandir that tended both to the religious instruction of the community as 
well as, and perhaps more importantly, to its educational needs. For Raviji, however, the 
focus is not traditional education, which he leaves in the hands of trained instructors in 
the formal education system. Rather, Raviji wants to address the means of self-
actualization long denied rural Indo-Trinidadians by an urban centric, bourgeois 
dominated political system. Practicing and performing Ramayana is tantamount to 
practicing and performing life. Voicing one’s critique of another’s performance amidst a 
sea of watching eyes, standing up and reciting Ramayana in Awadhi before one’s peers 
and teachers, performing a skit devised in mere minutes in front of classmates and 
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friends, all contribute, according to Raviji’s logic, to building a generation of Indo-
Trinidadians unafraid to compete in an uncertain economic setting and to speak up for 
their community in a tensely contested political setting. Viewed in this light, the 
performativity of Hinduism observed in various Kendra rituals such as the textual 
recitations, eating rituals, resting posture, and the wearing of Indian clothes is at the same 
time a quest for authenticity and an attempt to promote and instill a set of disciplinary 
values and practices that will lead to success in the social politics of competition. The 
question of whether the Kendra is striving for authentic Hinduism is worth exploring in 
relation to performance as it helps illuminate the motivating logics of their programs.  
 
Constructing Authentic Creole Hinduism 
What holds true for many anthropological observations of social constructivism, and in 
some instances in the areas of ethnic nationalism (Handler 1998; 1997; Linnekin 1990) 
and historical re/creation societies, holds true in most ways for the Kendra. 
Anthropologists interrogating the politics of authenticity have noted that the quest for it is 
an elusive one. In the case of ethnic nationalisms, authenticity, Handler shows, is 
typically a question of who is defining its parameters and their ideological and political 
agendas. Truth and accuracy as descriptors of cultural traits are as ephemeral as the thing 
they attempt to describe. Put another way, how does one identify a true or accurate 
cultural trait within a system that is itself in constant motion? How is true culture 
preserved or re/created and, more to the point, what features, practices, traditions are 
considered true and who decides what those things are? In the case of Handler’s work, as 
with other social constructivists, cultural preservation is often in the hands of those with 
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the greatest social and political capital, thus, what is preserved is typically biased toward 
a normative bourgeois culture. The assumption among those preserving, or attempting to 
preserve, true culture is that the culture they wish to preserve is the true culture. In other 
words, the ethnic nationalists who attempt to (re)construct true national culture do not see 
their work as such. Preservation or maintenance are their keywords, not constructivism or 
creation. It is here that the Kendra, and its main architect, Raviji, stand apart from other 
ethnic nationalists attempting to preserve culture. Raviji is an admitted constructivist, 
speaking routinely in very sophisticated and self-conscious ways about the culture he is 
attempting to fashion. His work, he often says, is more about creative response to 
community needs, and less about preserving Hindu culture. Raviji’s candidness about his 
project and his awareness of it as a kind of pastiche, points up the need for an 
anthropology of contemporary micro-shifts in cultural practice. The notion that 
community leaders often act as architects of a social system infused with their ideology is 
one no longer wielded by academics who use it to cleverly debunk false prophets of 
cultural authenticity. In distinction to many of the conservative Hindu societies he 
worked with, Raviji is well aware that his project is one of bricolage, that he is cobbling 
together a culture from various sources to meet local needs. Yet at the same time, he 
requires students to eat with their right hands, rest on their left sides, memorize Sanskrit, 
and perform puja correctly. In short, he wants authentic Hindu practice in his mandir. 
What more anthropology needs to explore, and what I wish to examine here, is how 
groups like the Kendra negotiate a longing for authenticity while also consciously 
constructing traditions. The question I will explore here is, how is the Kendra able to 
negotiate the quest for authenticity while admitting to social constructivism?   
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Observers of Hinduism in Trinidad have noted among its members a certain 
longing for authenticity (Niranjana 2006). The strict policing of appropriate Hindu 
behavior throughout the Bal Ramdila course, from clothing to speaking styles, illustrates 
not only many Hindu leaders’ concern with competition and success but also a longing 
for preserving authentic Hindu forms. At the same time that Raviji can state that he is 
more interested in cultivating creativity and promoting empowerment among the children 
in his community than preserving an unadulterated Hinduism, two of the Kendra’s head 
teachers have studied extensively in India. Both are fluent in Hindi, one also in Sanskrit, 
and both have had trainings on Ramayana performance. Afternoon raga lessons, the 
proposed introduction of Hindi lessons, morning yoga drills (dreaded by most of the 
students), eating with the hands, the recitations, and numerous other small rituals indicate 
more to me than a self-actualization and empowerment program. Though the logic of the 
program was distinctly Creole enough to prevent me from labeling them Hindu 
nationalists, the performativity rituals did carry a longing for an authentic recreation of 
Indian Hinduism. Put another way, there is something more at work in Kendra programs 
than community enrichment programs but at the same time, something less than 
unqualified nationalism. If the Kendra’s brand of diasporic Hinduism is not a 
nationalistic endeavor in preservationism and self-promotion, then what is it? As with 
any practice inspired by numerous external and subjective logics, their praxis defies easy 
categorization. From my vantage, what I see at work in Kendra efforts is what I have 
been calling ‘creole authenticity’.  
I have already discussed in great detail why I do not believe that many of the 
Hindu communities in Trinidad, but particularly the Kendra, are accurately classified as 
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nationalists, the principle reason being that the architect of the Kendra’s many programs 
and its subsidiaries proudly declares that he is not a preservationist and freely interprets 
features from the vast Hindu corpus of literature, ritual practice, and tradition as he needs. 
But we must also recognize that the creole authenticity of Trinidadian Hinduism is an 
attempt to maintain the integrity of Hinduism while negotiating a non-Hindu social and 
political context within which rigid authenticity is not only impossible, but undesirable. 
The Kendra’s hybridized traditions are practical constructions of Hindu forms that are 
responses to and negotiations of creole Caribbeanism.  
In one conversation Raviji told me that he prefers being a Hindu in Trinidad over 
being a Hindu in India. When I expressed surprise he said, waving his hand in emphasis, 
“I am much happier being a Hindu here than India. This is much better.” When I asked 
what the difference was he said that the freedom to invent practice and play with 
established forms was not only liberating but allowed him to shape Hinduism to fit 
Trinidad’s unique needs. It also occurred to me that there is no Hindu authority in 
Trinidad that will call any particular group’s interpretation or practice into question. 
Fascinated by Raviji’s creative approach to Hinduism, I brought the issue up often, 
curious if others felt the same way. Not surprisingly, those who had not been to India 
tended to romanticize it in ways those who have experienced it do not. Anecdotally, it 
also seemed to me that the Kendra’s most dedicated participants and parents who had not 
been to India also tended to be the most rigid in their interpretation of Hindu practice. Of 
the roughly twenty parents I spoke with only a few had been to India, and one was from 
India. They, and the three main teachers of the Kendra who had also been to India, were 
aware that Kendra practice took some interpretive liberties with the more conservative 
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Vedic traditions that dominate much of Hinduism in northern India. Though I didn’t think 
to ask about it at the time, my impression is that the variety of Hindu forms evident in 
India, let alone in the numerous diasporic communities, must have reminded the parents 
and teachers who traveled to India that interpretive monopolies do not and can not exist. 
It was instructive for me that the parents who had not been to India saw it is the 
birthplace of Hinduism rather than Hinduisms. Looked at from a different angle, the 
experience of diverse practices evident in India allows for the freedom to re-imagine 
practice in Trinidad. Of course, this freedom operates within certain boundaries. Those 
boundaries are the delimiting lines of authenticity, beyond which practice would cease to 
be strictly Hindu. Speaking more generally, we could ask who defines those boundaries 
and decides what is still authentic Hindu practice and what is too creolized to meet the 
criteria of authenticity? Given the enormity of solving that question, I will stick only to 
briefly exploring this problem as it pertains to the Kendra and how they go about 
fashioning an authentic creole Hinduism. 
  As with many other transnations, Hindu communities in Trinidad must contend 
with the maintenance of indigenous practice in a new and different social-political 
context (Scher 2004). The process of preserving certain customs and discarding others is, 
above all, contingent, contested, and often idiosyncratic. What features are kept and 
which are let go often has to do with those community members appointed (by 
themselves or by others) with preserving the nation, or the imagined community, in its 
new home. Community leadership then is often a key component of cultural preservation 
among many transnations. Despite his claims of free innovation, Kendra ritual 
performance and practice under Raviji’s guidance does fall within broadly accepted 
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standards of Hindu interpretation. I said as much to Raviji one day over lunch. He replied 
that his work as a Hindu did fall within an interpretive range popular among specific 
schools of thought. Namely, his work is influenced by the more creative approaches 
employed by groups like the RSS and the Chin Maya Mission, but ultimately beholden to 
neither. He freely admitted that he borrowed ideas from various interpretive traditions as 
well as crafting a few of his own, forging an eclectic practice in the process. This should 
not alarm anyone, he said, given that changing times and contexts require sacrificing 
some traditions and shaping new ones. He offered the Arya Samaj, in India a strictly 
Vedic group espousing a monotheistic theology (see Chapter I), as an example. “They 
have had to back off from their position a bit. Even they do Ramayana here.” It was 
surprising to hear that, yet at the same time expected. The Ramayana looms large in 
Hindu-Trinidadian public culture. Its position as sacred text and symbolic history of the 
Hindu Indo-Trinidadian community makes it impossible to disregard.  
The folk oriented approach to Hindu practice gained a legitimate voice in 
Tulsidas’s Ramacaritamanasa. Though widespread and openly practiced throughout 
India, folk Hinduism relied heavily on the Puranic texts and the folklore they inspired 
through their often lurid tales of the devas and devis for inspiration and practice. 
Tulsidas’s Ramayana refashioned an ancient and well-revered text into a more accessible 
and thus public document. Though the elite protested it would debase accepted practice 
and distract people from the more important Vedic texts, their antagonism did little to 
slow its popularity, especially among the lower castes and classes who saw their beliefs 
mirrored in the new Ramayana. It was from this community that the indenture recruiters, 
the infamous arkatis, would draw for labor on new world plantations. Trinidad’s Hindus 
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were a part of this class, bringing with them their folk practice and their folk hero, Baba 
Tulsidas. As Trinidad’s Indian community mushroomed throughout the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, Hindu missionaries arrived hoping to gain legitimacy for their 
interpretive schools by establishing traditions in the diaspora that would follow those in 
the Motherland. The Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, the Chin Maya Mission, the Arya 
Samaj, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh all established programs, schools, and 
mandirs in Trinidad, none of which strictly adhere to the founding principles and 
practices of the original group. The Maha Sabha is widely regarded as the most 
conservative Hindu community in Trinidad, and its president, the outspoken Sat Marahaj, 
is often mistaken as the spokesman for Hindu Trinidad, no small source of consternation 
for many Kendra participants. Yet despite its conservatism, the Maha Sabha, like nearly 
all Hindu communities in Trinidad, emphasizes bakhti practice to such a degree that the 
creolizing effect is unmistakable.  
Vertovec’s (2010; 2001) fine distinction between the types of Hinduism 
commonly practiced in India and those that were transported to the New World is an 
important one and lends meaningful insight into both how the creole religious process 
unfolded and how the quest for authenticity is still informed to some degree by the folk 
traditions that arrived in the mid-19th century. Resisting overdetermined models that split 
Hindu practice into either Great (priestly) or Little (folk) traditions, Vertovec urges 
scholars of Hinduism, either in India or in diaspora, to move analyses of and debates 
about Hindu communities beyond the folk/priestly binary. Vertovec’s use of his terms 
‘official’ and ‘popular’ (2010) to distinguish between the types of traditions imported to 
the New World from India notwithstanding, I agree with his insistence that we focus on 
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the “transformations” within Hindu communities and the processes by which they adapt 
practice to suit rapidly changing contexts (2001: 636). In the case of Trinidad, the 
diversity of practices, almost entirely folk, or popular practices, imported throughout 
indenture, not to mention the vast diversity of Indian languages, led, ultimately and 
somewhat ironically, to the establishment of Trinidad’s own interpretation of a Great 
tradition. Vertovec’s (2001) observations of remnants of folk practice in the 1980s holds 
true to my own contemporary observations. Though vestiges of the folk practices remain, 
most visible in my work in certain forms of divination (esp. Hindu astrology) and animal 
sacrifice at Kali pujas, the main current of Hindu development in Trinidad has been an 
increasingly philosophical iteration inching toward a homogenous orthoprax. Though 
post-Vedic texts such as the Ramayana, the Bhagavad Gita, and many of the Puranas, 
remain in broad currency throughout the many programs and communities in Trinidad, 
the move toward homogeneity favors certain practices such as satsangh (devotional 
service, or reading), pujas, yagnas (or yajnas, sacrifice or offering rituals), and melas 
(festivals). In other words, Trinidadian Hinduism is less about the development of a 
hegemonic orthodox and more about trending toward an orthoprax, that is, a more 
common set of religious practices.  
In light of this trend toward forging Hindu practice in the shape of a mostly 
communal form, I suggest that the authenticity the Kendra is striving for is one that is in 
line with Trinidadian Hinduism, or a creole Hinduism. The model by which the Kendra 
and other Hindu communities in Trinidad largely conform is a locally and dialectically 
shaped model whose transformation is determined from various sources and in varying 
degrees. For example, theological shifts in Hinduism stemming from movements and 
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groups within India typically have a minor, if not negligible impact on Trinidadian 
Hinduism. I would further argue that the more radical the interpretation, whether from the 
extreme right as it is articulated in Hindu nationalist discourse, or the extreme left, 
stemming from liberal responses to the religious nationalists by Marxist theorists in the 
Bengal tradition (Chatterjee 1993: 22-8), have virtually no impact on Trinidadian 
expressions of Hinduism. Anecdotally I would add that given the popularity of 
Bollywood films among Indo-Trinidadians, it is more likely that popular uses and 
representations of Hindu iconography and interpretation paraded in popular media have a 
greater influence on Trinidadian Hinduism than many of the theological schools do.  
To be clear, I am not asserting that Hinduism in Trinidad conforms to one 
monolithic model. Rather, certain features, practices and interpretations of Hinduism in 
broad currency in India either do not appear in Trinidad (extreme religious nationalism, 
caste, Brahmanic control) or do so in a creolized fashion. In short, local changes in the 
social/political landscape as well as global ideologies and discourse shape the contours of 
Trinidadian Hinduism to a more radical and measurable degree than the theological 
evolutions and revolutions emerging from India. Thus, the quest for authenticity for many 
Trinidadian Hindus is not necessarily one that demands exact replications of Hindu 
traditions and forms from India (cf. Handler et al). Yet neither is authenticity a question 
of matching practice with an indigenously fashioned form. Rather, authenticity, 
particularly as it manifests at the Kendra, is an amalgam of Indian-derived Hindu 
tradition maintenance coupled with an openly subjective interpretation that exists in a 
dialectic with local public culture and in negotiated interpretation of global discursive 
forms and popular media. Raviji’s creation of a musical style borrowing from Indian 
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traditions but responding to local events and practices is an ideal example of the 
performance and performativity of an authentic Trinidadian Hinduism. 
 
Pichakaaree: The Invention of Tradition 
Calypso stands as one of Trinidad’s greatest contributions to global music traditions. The 
trademark Afro-jazz horns backgrounding the witty poet excoriating local officials and 
popular figures, or satirizing features of Trinidadian public culture2 lend calypso its 
distinctive Caribbean sound. Calypso, however, broaches more than political and social 
commentary, stirring controversy for its rehearsal of racial stereotypes (typically of Indo-
Trinidadians) and often veering into ribald and racy terrain eroticizing Indo-Trinidadian 
women (Niranjana 2006: 146-150). Might Sparrow’s “Marahjin” series of calypsos 
infamously covered his adoration of Indian women with sexually explicit images and 
innuendos. Mesmerized by the beauty of an Indian woman, he sings to her: 
 When I see you in your sari or your orhni (head cloth) 
 I am captivated by your innovative beauty 
                                                        
2 I have in mind here, as just one of countless examples, The Mighty Composer’s 
ironically educational tune “Child Training”. Linking violent and other forms of 
antisocial behavior with nonsense talk parents use with their children, The Mighty 
Composer reminds his listeners that “A child depends on his parents, to teach him some 
common sense/But when parents talk so much nonsense, he only learns 
disobedience/They make the child too much pity, from the time he a young baby/And 
when he grow a little, and sat around the house/This is how they does talk to he, ‘Who 
bad? Doo doo. Sooga pyaah. Mommy nice, aiy? What you vant?’” With the exception of 
a few Calypsonians such as David Rudder and The Mighty Chalkdust (Hollis Liverpool) 
to name a few, Calypsos rely on playful satire to communicate social and political 
problems that need attention. Calypso shares with Reggae the treatment of social and 
political critique accompanied by upbeat music. However, Calypso generally lacks the 
gravitas of Reggae, whose themes of oppression, imperialism, and brutality are broached 
in characteristically parodic fashion by Calypsonians. The tradition of satire and parody 
can also be seen in the mas (masquerade) outfits of many traditional Carnival characters 
(Scher 2004).     
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 Chorus: 
 Marahjin, marahjin, oh my sweet dulahin (bride) 
 Saucy marahjin, sexy marahjin, racy marahjin, all right 
 O dulahin, o dulahin, hear the sweet music playing 
 I want to hold you, I want to rock you 
 I want to jam you, jam you, jam you, jam tonight. (cited in Niranjana 2006: 146)                 
 
Mighty Sparrow’s longing for an Indian woman and rhapsodic poetry of her enticing 
beauty comprise a longstanding tradition within calypso of essentialist treatments of 
Indo-Trinidadians. Representations of Indians, Niranjana (2006: 131) points out, began in 
earnest in the 1930s and assumed two main forms: songs that ridiculed Indians for their 
‘peculiar’ customs, food, and clothes (a variation on this theme is the expression of envy 
at the savvy Indian’s economic prowess), and songs that eroticized Indian women. 
Though calypso was born in the late 19th century, fused mostly from African poetic 
traditions and rhythms and European instrumentation, and despite the arrival of Indians in 
1845, calypsos about Indians only emerged after they began moving into urban areas and 
they established themselves as entrepreneurs. Indian calypsos became a popular theme 
among calypsonians and their audiences, alternately eliciting laughter for their use of 
satire or lust for their lurid depictions of East Indian women. Implicit in the Indian 
women calypsos is an articulation of normative masculinity (in this case Afro-
Trinidadian masculinity counterposed against the purportedly less viral Indo-Trinidadian 
masculinity) and an idealized femininity, embodied by the docile, devoted, yet alluring 
Indian woman (Niranjana 131-140).  
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 Calypso has been and remains an almost exclusively Afro-Trinidadian cultural 
production. Indo-Trinidadians have contributed substantially to Trinidadian musics, 
mostly by way of Soca (said to be Indian influenced calypso, or ‘soul calypso’), Chutney 
(Indian music played on the plantations and in the rural areas), and Chutney Soca (Indian 
influenced dance music). However, the limited participation in calypso notwithstanding, 
there has not been an Indo-Trinidadian musical answer to the bawdy, often racy, and 
heavily lyric driven tradition inaugurated by calypso in Trinidad. Raviji sought to correct 
this omission with the creation of a style he dubbed ‘pichakaaree’. Indo-Trinidadians 
often expressed their outrage and irritation with the way they had been represented in 
calypsos, but few responses were ever in kind. Most were in print, found in the op-ed 
sections of one of the dailies. “Calypsonians have been writing about Indians for many 
years”, Raviji tells me, “some of it very critical material. Pichakaaree is a response to that 
tradition and an opportunity to strike back.”   
 The name pichakaaree, Raviji says, is taken from a brass hand pump used to 
squirt red dye during the Paghwa (also Holi in India) spring festival when participants 
cover each other in powder and liquid dyes of bright colors. The dye imprints its 
signature on the surface it is projected onto, leaving a noticeable stain that speaks to the 
presence of the participant. Likewise, pichakaaree was created with the intention of 
imprinting a Hindu Indo-Trinidadian stamp on local public culture. The metaphor speaks 
not only to Indo-Trinidadians’ desire to be heard and make a mark in a public 
imaginative space dominated by Afro-Trinidadian art forms such as pan, calypso, soca, 
and rapso, but also to a longing to critique representations of Indo-Trinidadians in 
currency within that popular space. Like calypso, pichakaaree uses satire, parody, and 
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sardonic wit to articulate social-political grievances and skewer public officials and 
characters perceived as overly eccentric, out of touch, or corrupt3. But more commonly 
pichakaaree operates as a mechanism of social critique, highlighting patterns of behavior 
and trends perceived to be developmentally disruptive. For example, Meenaji wrote a 
pichakaaree popular among Hindus in the Chaguanas area called “Digital Baby”. The 
song, backed by traditional Indian instruments but set to a somewhat calypso beat, 
laments our digital age where children are overly plugged in to technology and thus 
distracted from self-development. As Meenaji described the song to me4, it was an 
attempt to shed light on the distractions technology offers young generations coming of 
age in a time when civic and moral virtues are in decline. Like calypso, pichakaaree is an 
attempt to use popular spaces to communicate perceived social problems, however, it is 
also a response to calypso, an opportunity to fight back against representations of Indo-
Trinidadians in the Afro-Trinidadian public imaginary. As I will cover in the next 
section, ideal models of behavior are essential to Kendra pedagogy, thus, the eroticized or                                                         
3 In June and July of 2007, former Prime Minister Basdeo Panday, then head of the UNC, 
took to wearing a red beret as a form of protest against Patrick Manning and his PNM 
party. Panday said he would not take the beret off until the PNM acknowledged his 
grievance, which was never quite clear to me or any other Trinidadians I spoke to. At 
other times, he claimed to wear it not as a form of protest but to prepare for war against 
the PNM in the approaching elections. He wore the beret for over two months, making 
reference to it in his many speeches, which were increasingly bitter and incoherent. At 
the annual political calypso competition held in the soccer stadium just outside of Port of 
Spain’s Woodbrook neighborhood, Panday’s beret was the object of many calypsonians’ 
ridicule, most of whom were, unsurprisingly, PNM supporters.  
 
4 Sadly, I never got the lyrics to the song, despite my requests that bordered in badgering. 
Neither did she ever bring in the CD where the song was recorded. At the time, and I 
suspect this may still be the case, pichakaree was not available on commercial formats. 
Pichakaree is a live experience, recorded on mobile equipment at performances. Since the 
pichakaree was never furnished and I couldn’t go out and buy my own copy, I base my 
descriptions on the ones provided by Meenaji, composer of Digital Baby, and Raviji, 
creator of the art form.  
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demonized representations of Indians in calypso are imperative to counter. In a sense 
then, pichakaaree is part of a battle taking place in the public arena of the imaginary over 
the ideal Indo-Trinidadian.  
 
Acting the Ideal: Ramayana Characters as Moral Guides    
Part of the Kendra’s self-appointed task is to wage an ever-vigilant battle against the 
morally slack tendencies of common culture. Standing in the entryway of the mandir 
talking to one of the kids, I overheard Shrutiji sternly correct two boys using street 
language. One boy had mistakenly referred to the other as “dude”, to which Shrutiji 
responded, “Leave that at home. Bring your Hindu behavior here.” The use of the 
common term “dude” clearly signaled to Shrutiji a lapse into the common cultural forms 
that “disturb the mind”. It brought the profane into the sacred, polluting the pure space of 
discipline, focus, and moral effort with everyday carelessness5. The speech and action 
rectification then are important means of counteracting the spiritually and mentally 
disturbing forces of the dominant culture. Shrutiji’s insistence on maintaining a strict 
boundary between purity and pollution by policing the attitudes, language, clothing 
styles, and behavior of the students signals to them not only a proper code of conduct, a 
code any institution may have, but more so a way of life and approach to self and others 
that is superior to the lazy habits of common culture. Perhaps the most effective and often 
mobilized tool in the Kendra toolkit is the use of Ramayana characters as role models 
(for the upright ones such as Rama and Sita) and as exemplars of destruction (for the 
                                                        5 Though Shrutiji is not the only instructor waging the battle against common culture, she 
is unquestionably the most vigilant about it.  
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wayward ones like Rawana and the Rakshasas). What the instructors hope to inspire in 
the children is darshan, or seeing. By studying the characters, in this case the good ones, 
students learn the ideal attributes that lead to success. By performing those characters 
they embody those essential attributes of success. Performing Ramayana characters (see 
Figure 1), whether the good ones or the destructive ones, allows students to see, in a lived 
and thus experiential and embodied way, the consequences of wrong behavior and 
attitude on the one hand, and the rewards of hard work and mental and moral discipline 
on the other.  
 
Figure 1. Practicing Ramayana  
  
Invoking the appropriate practices of the ancients, Shrutiji informed her class that 
today’s children have lost proper moral guides and imitate the wrong people doing bad 
things. “In olden times,” she said, “children played games imitating adults (as we do at 
the Kendra now) who behaved appropriately. Now there is a lot of violence, and we play 
shooting each other. Ram Leela teaches you to follow good behavior.” As an example she 
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offered the story of Raja Dasharatha (Rama’s earthly father) giving gifts to others and the 
gods when his children were born. The Raja’s act of giving, dãn, demonstrated his 
gratitude for the birth of his healthy children and thus set a good moral example for his 
community. As Shrutiji liked to remind her students, “It is your responsibility to set 
trends of generosity and kindness” as Raja Dasharatha did.  
 To learn darshan then, involves more than seeing that the Ramayana’s dharmic 
characters behave correctly and thus achieve success as a natural result. Rather, the 
students must see in a deeper, more ontologically reorienting way. Put another way, they 
must experience the virtue of the gods themselves in order to embody their values, 
similar to the way Vodou practitioners of Haiti do not perform rituals simply to see God, 
or merely to talk about God, but rather to become God (Desmangles 1992: 4; Deren 1970: 
217; Métraux 1972: 83). Though the motivation is of course different, what I find 
compelling about both Hindu Trinidadian Ramayana performance and Vodou practice is 
the embodiment of the gods as a means of changing one’s life, typically for the better. 
For the Kendra’s students, performing the gods is certainly much different than 
manifesting the lwas (spirits) for Vodouisants. However, the idea is for them to fully 
embrace the attributes of the character they are performing, whether mortal or god, 
commoner or king, rishi (saint) or laborer. In this sense, they take on and thus live, in 
mythic time and space, behaviors with natural rewards and consequences (Turner 1990). 
As the character sketches below demonstrate, the interpretation of each character’s moral 
traits embodies both a somewhat traditional post-Vedic Sanatanist view as well as one 
compatible with Trinidadian iterations of modernity. For example, as the character sketch 
shows, Sita, wife of Rama, is described in ways that emphasize Trinidadian 
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understandings of gender relations, thus, the adjective dutiful, a trait often emphasized in 
Hindu discourse from India, never appeared. Rupali, a fourteen year old student in her 
third year at the Kendra, volunteered to draw a grid (Figure 2), labeled on the top, on the 
board as other students voiced descriptors of Sita.  
 
Physical Aspects Emotional Aspects Intellectual Aspects 
slim, fair, graceful, long 
hair, large eyes 
kind, humble, calm, loyal, 
generous, gentle, concerned 
about others, strong, modest 
wise, good judgment, 
intelligent, followed dharma  
    Figure 2. Character Sketch of Sita 
 
 During the afternoon performance practices, students would then act out the 
scenes discussed in the lecture period, trying to express in their performances the traits 
described either in Shrutiji’s discussion or collaboratively outlined by the class. Raviji’s 
direction guided the students while peer feedback communicated whether the 
performance was effective or needing attention in key areas. The important thing for the 
instructors is that the students fully embrace the traits for which each character is known. 
In the case of revered characters, they must emulate those traits both in performance of 
the Leela and performatively in life. A student playing Sita must convincingly express 
humility, loyalty, wisdom, and intelligence. In keeping with Trinidad’s less overt 
patriarchy and with the Kendra’s emphasis on personal success, ambition, and 
independence, the actors role-playing Sita must be strong yet modest and smart yet 
righteous (dharmic). In short, students must embody idealized Hindu values interpreted 
from the Ramayana through a distinctly Trinidadian colored lens.  
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 Shrutiji’s concern that today’s children are not growing up with proper role 
models and, in fact, are encouraged through popular media to cultivate antisocial 
behaviors, combines interestingly with Raviji’s concerns that Indo-Trinidadians are too 
docile when it comes to standing up for themselves and their communities’ needs. 
Between the two, who exert the most influence on Kendra pedagogy, an environment of 
strict discipline combines with guided, creative public expression intended to promote 
strong public speakers. Raviji and Shrutiji both encourage bold, well-articulated, even 
precise public speech, but for different reasons. Raviji sees docility endemic in the Indo-
Trinidadian community and hopes that a performance program that requires continual 
public performance will create a generation of Hindu Indo-Trinidadians unafraid to speak 
up against injustices and for the needs of their community. Shrutiji, on the other hand, 
sees moral decay in the young generations and hopes to rectify, or at least mitigate, its 
effects in the Hindu community. I would like briefly to address these two motivations in 
the next sections to draw out the importance they have on the Kendra’s pedagogical 
environment and the way in which these concerns animate performance practices.  
Discipline and Performance: The Role of Precision in Subject Creation 
To steup someone in Trinidad is to simultaneously express your indifference toward her 
while also insulting her. Naipaul illustrates the popularity of teeth sucking in nearly all of 
his Trinidadian novels and his non-fiction classic The Middle Passage. The steup is a 
popular form of protest, a non-verbal cue expressing dissatisfaction or irritation. When 
well-timed, it articulates in a seemingly small gesture one’s callous disregard for another. 
If the inhaled tooth suck expresses indifference the exhaled steup through pursed lips 
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expresses incredulity, particularly at someone else’s audacity or stupidity. Despite its 
widespread popularity, there are certain contexts in which steupin’ is its own act of 
audacity. It would be rare to see anyone using the steup in a professional setting, 
especially an educational one. Nonetheless, because it is a non-verbalized communication 
and thus offers some protection to the user who can hide behind its apparent ambiguity, 
unlike one could with an obvious insult, it does make appearances between superiors and 
subordinates.  
 When Shrutiji was steuped by one of her 14 year old high school students, 
Vinaya, it seemed as though time stood still. I had never seen anyone display such a 
reckless attitude toward Shrutiji. Though I suspect plenty of students have entertained the 
thought of steupin’ her because of her relentless pursuit of perfection in nearly all matters 
that many find tedious, none have been bold enough, as far as I have seen, to ever do it. 
During the event I sat in stunned silence, looking at Vinaya then at Shrutiji, waiting for 
Shrutiji’s wrath to fall. To my surprise, it never did. Shrutiji simply turned on her heels 
and herded the other children to lunch. After the students had gone at the end of the day I 
asked Shrutiji about it. “She’s done it to me before,” she casually stated, sounding 
resigned to her waywardness. “She’s very stubborn,” she went on, “and has problems 
with authority. The child has no discipline. She’s done this to me for a long time now.” It 
is precisely this kind of disrespect, particularly for elders, that Shrutiji finds problematic 
in today’s generation. The disrespect today’s children show their elders is one sign 
among many for Kendra instructors that humanity is in a moral tailspin and in need of 
regimentation to rectify the problem before it is too late. 
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 As I have elaborated in other sections and earlier in this chapter, the primary 
means of promoting discipline for Kendra instructors, especially for Shrutiji, is through 
exactitude. The precise pronunciation of Hindi, Awadhi, and Sanskrit is for Shrutiji a 
pedagogical method that inspires attention to detail, promotes a healthy work ethic, and 
instills moral values that guide children to do and say things in the right way. The 
children spend countless hours reciting texts in myriad situations. The day begins and 
ends with a recitation of the Prarthana. During each of the classes, the teachers ask the 
students to recite sections of the Ramayana, the younger ones often do so in English, and 
the older students will do so in Awadhi, Hindi, or Sanskrit. The three oldest students, all 
in their late teens, sit alone with Raviji, studying Ramayana scripture and learning 
Awadhi concurrently. The interns, as they are called, often assist the younger children in 
the small group sessions where they sit in circles of about eight to ten students 
memorizing Ramayana verses in Awadhi. The students are given several sheets of paper 
on which typed verses in Awadhi are written with no definition offered. Line by line the 
students take turns reading the text in the cadence set by the intern, placing proper 
emphasis where the Awadhi requires. A student that struggles to repeat a word or phrase 
correctly may have to repeat it until she gets it right, which can be as many as fifteen or 
twenty times. The interns’ emphasis on precision is a lesson learned from Shrutiji.  
 All of the Kendra students had gathered one morning for an impromptu lecture 
Shrutiji was giving on the importance of giving blessings while we waited for a film to 
arrive. She asked if there was anybody in the group that remembered the Bala blessing 
from the Ramayana. A tall thin boy with wispy hair and a shy smile raised his hand and 
volunteered to recite it. The blessing was long but he managed to remember every line of 
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it. To me the effort was impressive, deserving of praise, but Shrutiji looked to the rest of 
the class and said, “That was good, but did anyone catch his pronunciation mistake?” 
“Kinha”, one of the kids offered, “He say kinha wrong.” “He said kinha wrong”, Shrutiji 
corrected. “But no, that’s not it.” There were several other attempts to discern what the 
student had mispronounced but I could not understand them. It didn’t matter anyway as 
none of them identified the correct word. When Shrutiji identified the word he had 
mispronounced the children looked expectantly at their teacher, waiting to hear the 
correction. The boy who misspoke had to remain standing throughout the ordeal, waiting 
to hear what he had done wrong. The treatment he received seemed unnecessarily 
punitive, humiliating even, for a minor pronunciation error. He did, after all, just sing a 
hymn in Hindi before his peers, getting nearly every line correct. To my fresh eyes, his 
performance was worthy of high praise, especially for a kid deemed extremely ‘cool’ by 
his peers and who I later found out was considered a problem student by some of the 
teachers. To my mind he should be praised for such a brave effort, and I wrote as much in 
my field journal at the time. Taking the side of the young man standing alone amid his 
peers as his faults were recounted I condemningly recorded the event as the teachers, 
“hammering poor boy who got up to chant the Bala blessing about mispronunciation of a 
single Hindi word. Clearly,” I observed, “the emphasis on perfection is immense.”  
 My bias in favor of the student who, from my perspective, demonstrated not only 
courage before his peers but a willingness to buy into the teachers’ program, is evident 
from my field notes. My own similar experiences growing up in a very strict Baptist 
church left me bitter and confrontational toward my Bible instructors. Watching this 
young man stand before his instructors and peers to receive not praise but criticism for 
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his admirable efforts struck me as bordering on the cruel. Wouldn’t it make sense, I 
wondered, to employ positive reinforcement in this case, especially for a so-called 
‘problem’ student? Wouldn’t the attention on his minute failure in the face of his larger 
success discourage him from participating and investing in the rest of the program? 
Won’t he grow weary, as I did in the church, of being singled out as the resistant student?  
 As I observed more of these kinds of interactions and got to know the students, 
teachers, and parents better I grew more bold with my questions, and on several 
occasions virtually interrogated Shrutiji about her strategies. I asked in particular and 
often about the boy she seemed so critical of. To her, Mahindra needed this kind of 
rigorous attention to detail, lest he become complacent with mediocrity, or worse, 
realized that he lived in a country of low standards and could therefore get by with little 
effort. It was in relation to Mahindra that the Kendra’s logic, especially Shrutiji’s, came 
into sharper relief for me. If a student is praised for work less than perfect, less than the 
absolute best that can be performed, a standard has been set that asks little him. If the 
Hindu community is to become a disciplined one, and in the process promote discipline 
as a larger national value of Trinidad, standards must be not only maintained but 
continually raised. Should a student be rewarded for substandard work merely for having 
done the work we perpetuate, by Kendra’s logic, a nation tolerant of second-rate effort. 
Shrutiji wants the children to strive for perfection, not mediocrity. The logic that 
underwrites their pursuit of perfection then emerges not only from a desire for their 
community to succeed within competitive capitalism but also from frustration with living 
in a country viewed from the metropolitan powers as second rate. Another event 
involving the same boy aptly illustrates this frustration. 
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 Students are routinely asked to write and then perform, either by reading alone or 
acting out with others, a skit dealing with some issue relevant to the Ramayana. Working 
with another class for most of the morning, I returned to Shrutiji’s class just as Mahindra, 
the problem student, was finishing a story he had written. All I caught was that the story 
had something to do with the United States military. The students evidently found it 
amusing and laughed their approval. Shrutiji looked stern and then exasperated. Why, she 
wondered, can’t we base our stories here in Trinidad using our army? “Trinidad has an 
army that is well-structured and all over the place,” she reminded the suddenly dour 
students. “Why not use ours? You see, you are all brainwashed.” She then went on to 
discuss the problem of identity, admonishing the students to “locate your identity in your 
country and in your culture.” Her use of the term “your culture” is slightly ambiguous 
here, but, given the context, it is likely she had in mind the whole of Trinidad and not just 
Hindu culture. That being the case, the event with Mahindra illustrates to me her 
investment in a broader Trinidadian culture.  
  Mahindra’s story points up a constant source of frustration not only for Shrutiji 
but for many community leaders, intellectuals, social critics, and national advocates. As 
Selwyn Ryan has pointed out in his massive biography of Eric Williams (2009), 
Trinidad’s nascent nationalist movement, starting in earnest after the first world war, 
faced deflating indifference from a population unused to regarding Trinidad as anything 
other than a colonial backwater. Even Trinidad’s intellectuals feared the repercussions of 
independence, afraid that the fledgling nation would not be able to stand on its own 
without the support of a more capable economic and political power. Henry Hudson 
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Phillips, a member of Trinidad’s political elite in the 1940s and 50s, wrote that 
independence from Great Britain was pure folly. 
 The West Indies can never stand alone nationally, economically, culturally, or  
 otherwise without the protection of a great power. Let British capitalism take  
 flight from Trinidad tomorrow, and we face disaster; let British law and order and 
 the much criticized British administration depart, and the West Indies would  
 revert to barbarism within a year. Our plain duty, even self-interest and self- 
 preservation, dictates that we continue to be part of the British Empire. We do  
 ourselves a great injustice if we feel we can do without Britain and that we should  
not share the little we have with her sons and daughters, in return for the manifold 
blessing we receive. (cited in Ryan 2009: 87)     
Though Trinidad has been able to build on the gains engendered by a strong 
independence movement, a relatively stable democracy, and a consistently solvent 
economy, for those community leaders committed to staying in the country to promote 
viable and competitive communities, stories like Mahindra’s are a continual source of 
frustration. For teachers like those at the Kendra, and the young leaders of skill building 
groups like the HSS, the problem they confront is a persistent belief among the youth, 
even if unarticulated in such bald terms, that Trinidad’s cultural and intellectual 
contributions to the world are perennially second rate. On the surface, it seems 
paradoxical that Shrutiji, who spends so much time trying to steer her students away from 
a mass culture she is openly critical of, would be defensive about students looking 
elsewhere for inspiration. Yet the paradox is easily resolved when we recognize that 
Shrutiji’s frustration stems from her earnest longing to encourage young people to invest 
emotionally and intellectually in a country that has suffered from generations of 
underinvesting in Trinidad. When I was the inadvertent cause of Shrutiji’s frustration in 
this regard, it become much clearer to me that the campaign she, and other similarly 
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situated leaders, is waging, is one not merely of national pride, but one of cultural 
reconstruction.  
 A non-profit group in Port of Spain had invited me to participate in their annual 
parade one morning. The parade was to start at 9:00 AM and, as usual, I fretted about 
being there on time. Getting from the Kendra, out in the little town of Enterprise just east 
of Chaguanas, to Port of Spain takes a minimum of four connections using public 
transportation. The afternoon before the parade I related my anxiety to Shrutiji and a 
group of others who helped me plan my route to arrive at the non-profit on time. I had 
done the route dozens of times and knew the drill well, but I had never had to negotiate it 
so early in the morning going into Port of Spain, the direction of the heaviest traffic at 
that time of day. I left the Kendra at 7:00 AM, figuring on about a half an hour of flex 
time with which to get some coffee and a light breakfast once I got into the city. A late 
bus and long walk later, I arrived at the parade at precisely nine on the hour. I chatted 
with some of the non-profit leaders and community members, put on a t-shirt they gave 
me to create a look of uniformity among the marchers, and waited for the parade to start. 
And waited and waited and waited. By 9:30 I was wilting in the blaring sunlight from 
hunger and dehydration. Everybody seemed to be in place, yet the parade remained 
stationary, waiting, I learned from an organizer explaining to a small impatient mob, for a 
group coming from Arima caught in traffic. “Why they didn’t leave earlier then?” an 
older woman asked in irritation. I took that as my cue to head over to the Catholic run 
cafe on Frederick street to wait for the parade to pass before surreptitiously joining in. On 
my way, I met a reporter from a local station filming the event. He was extremely 
agitated because he also to get to a press conference with Prime Minister Persad-
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Bissessar at 10:00. It was quarter till and the parade showed no signs of budging. The 
journalist looked exasperated and said, “You see, anytime is Trinidad time. Anytime you 
feel like showing up is the right time.”  
 When I returned to the Kendra Shrutiji asked me how the parade went and 
whether I got there on time following her advice. I reported that the bus was late but I 
still managed to arrive on time but that the parade didn’t start until almost 10:30. She 
shook her head, looking almost annoyed and apologetic at the same time, as if to say, 
“We’re not all like that.” I related what the journalist told me about Trinidad time and 
without hesitation she refuted him in a way that paradoxically agreed with him. “No”, she 
said forcefully, “that’s not true. We cannot accept that. We must be more disciplined than 
that. We are more professional than that.” I regretted mentioning the journalist’s slight 
because I had obviously broached what for Shrutiji, and many others, is a source of 
embarrassment. In so doing, I had inadvertently leveled an insult aimed indirectly at her. 
Shrutiji’s terse response embodied simultaneously a refutation that punctual indifference 
is a necessary hallmark of Trinidadians, an admonition that such indifference must 
change, and a critique of a culture that allows this to happen. To me, that the parade 
started when it did was not a big deal. Is a parade something that should start right on 
time? But it was this event, more so than any other, that brought home for me what the 
Kendra, Shrutiji especially, is fighting against and for.   
 By rehearsing the journalist’s quip, I had also rehearsed a stereotype about 
Trinidad’s lack of professionalism, about its chronic inability to function smoothly, and 
its reputation as an island that cares only for a good fête. In this sense, I was not merely a 
messenger, but a participant in the construction of the stereotype, which Shrutiji 
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rightfully contested. The purpose of the Kendra, and of similar programs like the HSS 
and the Chin Maya Mission, is to shape subjects that do care about professionalism, 
achievement, dedication, respect for others and themselves, and about devotion to their 
community, to their aspirations, and to exemplars, from Rama and Sita, to Shrutiji and 
Raviji, who embody these ideals. It is in this way that the work of the Kendra and its 
related organizations can be understood as active engineering of, on the individual level, 
subjectivity, and, in a broader sense, the public imaginary that carries vestigial 
stereotypes left by the imperial worldview.   
Fearful No More 
Myriad theories, both emic and etic, abound as to why Indo-Trinidadians took so long to 
become active members of Trinidad’s political machinery. Indians have complained that 
they were actively excluded from electoral politics. Scholars have located the problem in 
geography and culture – they were too removed, both geographically and culturally, from 
the Creole and urban dominated cultural-political center of Trinidad (Samaroo 2006; 
Brereton 1982; Trotman 1986). A belief popular among some in the Afro-Trinidadian 
masses is that they are either a) too involved in business to care, or b) too inclined toward 
corruption to stay in office (see op/ed article in Chapter I). Among both Afro-and Indo-
Trinidadians, however, is a commonly held stereotype that Indo-Trinidadians have 
historically been and remain too timid to stand up against Afro-Trinidadians. A shocking 
tirade in a small market underscored for me the pervasiveness of, and frustration with, 
this apparent reality.  
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 The corner market near my apartment in Port of Spain is run by an East Asian 
woman and a moody Indo-Trinidadian man with a boxy face and greased back shoulder 
length hair that curls tightly at the ends. On some days he’s chatty and jovial, on others 
quiet and sullen. I stop there every morning I stay in the city to get a peanut drink or 
mauby juice and a newspaper. I read the paper as I wait in line, often using the headlines 
to make small talk with the proprietors. In July of 2010, after Kamla had taken office, 
there was discussion, mostly among the news punditry and those bitter about nearly four 
decades of PNM hegemony, about whether former PM Patrick Manning should be tried 
on corruption charges. The allegations were rather loose, but there did seem to be some 
legitimate concern that he had abused the privileges of his office. Based on the reports I 
had been reading, Manning’s graft appeared no more egregious than what most officers 
of his station, in any country of the world, dabble in from time to time. But Manning had 
become a polarizing figure, staunchly supported by PNM stalwarts and the object of 
scorn, ridicule, and fierce critiques and wild accusations by nearly everyone else. He was 
being accused by members of other parties (mostly the COP and a few members of the 
UNC) with graft, cronyism, improper use of funds, and, quite inexplicably, stealing a 
grand piano from the Presidential Mansion. Predictably, Manning refuted all the claims, 
made a joke about the absurdity of stealing pianos, and spouted a few platitudes about 
serving his country honorably while in office. I watched the Manning “bacchanal” with 
interest not so much for the juicy political gossip that usually attracts my attention but, in 
this case, for the parallel bacchanal that went down when Panday was removed from 
office on uncannily similar grounds.  
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 Corruption charges against Manning occupied the front pages of the three dailies 
for the better part of a week before fading into obscurity. Kamla, ever politically savvy, 
expressed little interest in pursuing charges against Manning, issuing vague statements 
that cleverly implicated him and his PNM party in malfeasance while demonstrating her 
own magnanimity in not kicking a man when he’s down. Reading the headlines with 
relish, I asked Sammy, the corner store proprietor, if he thought the UNC/COP coalition 
would pursue charges against Manning. At the time, it seemed an innocuous question, 
hardly the stuff of racially tinged outrage. But I had opened for Sammy a Pandora’s box 
of frustration and irritation. “Dey (UNC) ‘fraid of dem (PNM)”, he said. “If it was the 
other way around, dey would charge him right now. Dey would jail him. But dey ‘fraid. 
Indians always ‘fraid the black man. Dey (Indians) came later. The blacks are bigger and 
intimidatin’ and so the Indians doormats for the Afro-Trinis”. As he spoke his voice rose 
as he moved around the shop gesticulating wildly. I and the other patrons stood silently 
and listened, slightly stunned. The East Asian woman stopped checking and bagging, 
watching Sammy as he released his bottled rage. “Dey never gonna charge him ‘cause 
dey ‘fraid. He do the same thing as Panday, but what happen to Panday? He kicked out of 
office. Manning stay ten years and nobody say notin’!” He quickly noticed that he had 
grabbed everyone’s attention, including his Afro-Trinidadian customers, and there was a 
moment of silence as he took note of his audience. In the same tone of outrage he turned 
the direction of his tirade from race relations to abstract rights and democratic principles, 
“I speakin’ my right. That’s why dey don’t like me. I speakin’ my right like no one else 
will do”.    
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 While it was not clear who the “they” are that do not like him (Afro-Trinidadians? 
Meek Indo-Trinidadians? Politicians?), Sammy does see himself in a minority of Indo-
Trinidadians who will speak out for their rights. Like Raviji, Sammy sees the problem 
with Indo-Trinidadian failure in politics as a symptom of fear. Though Raviji is careful 
not to couch his concerns in racialized terms, opting instead to highlight the Indo-
Trinidadian history of being latecomers to the island Sammy briefly alluded to, he 
routinely reminds his students that Indo-Trinidadians allow themselves to be trampled by 
those more bold and fearless than them. Indo-Trinidadians, Raviji contends, are too 
passive in public arenas, particularly politics, which stems not only from arriving late to 
the island but also from a Hindu worldview that tends to look at the big picture and thus 
see immediate needs as inconsequential. For Raviji, the amelioration of Trinidad’s rural 
Indian communities depends on their learning not to be afraid to “get up in front of 
people”. Just as the students in the performance classes, Indo-Trinidadian adults must 
learn to perform confidence, poise, and control in front of others while also fearlessly 
voicing their criticisms in bold yet creative and diplomatic language.  The structure of the 
Kendra’s programs is designed with this set of skills in mind. The improvisational skits 
are designed to help the students model quick thinking and confident performance of 
their ideas. The precise recitation of Ramayana verses reinforces the importance of 
attention to detail. Through the performance and, ideally, the performativity of the 
Ramayana, students will become Ramas and Sitas. 
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CHAPTER III 
“I AM A TRINIDADIAN. I AM A HINDU. I AM AN INDIAN”: 
NATIONALISM, PRESERVATIONISM, AND REINVENTION 
IN CREOLE HINDUISM 
 
 
What conclusions are a group of people willing to draw from the ‘national sentiment’ 
found among them? No matter how emphatic and subjectively sincere a pathos may be 
formed among them, what sort of specific joint action are they ready to develop? The 
extent to which in the diaspora a convention is adhered to as a ‘national’ trait varies just 
as much as does the importance of common conventions for the belief in the existence of 
a separate ‘nation.’ 
     ~ Max Weber, The Nation 
 
Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our 
behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our 
anticolonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain 
forever colonized. 
~ Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments 
 
It would seem that mythological worlds have been built up only to be shattered 
again, and that new worlds were built from the fragments. 
                               ~ Franz Boas, epigraph to The Structural Study of Myth, Lévi-Strauss 
 
 
Toward the end of a lengthy interview Raviji, founder of the Kendra, paused for dramatic 
effect while discussing his life’s work and then declared that he was a Hindu nationalist. 
To stress the point he repeated his declaration a second time, verbatim, “I am a Hindu 
nationalist.” His delivery was nonchalant but direct. At the time I took his unequivocal 
declaration for what it was – pure self-identification – and so didn’t press the issue any 
further. After all, I was in Trinidad to research religious expressions of ethnic 
nationalism, and this was ethnographic gold. The discourse of India/Hindu nationalism 
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within India and the diaspora is voluminous, and what I had just witnessed was yet 
another iteration of that well documented nationalism. There was little question that 
Raviji was but one among many diasporic nationalists trumpeting the greatness of all 
things Indian, in particular, India’s contribution to global philosophies in the form of 
Vedantic Hinduism. But the more I reflected on the point, the less unequivocal it became. 
What does it mean to be a Hindu nationalist in a predominantly Christian, Afro-Creole 
country? Is Raviji’s nationalism a direct import of the well-developed Hindu nationalism 
in India (Kishwar 2001; Chatterjee 1993a; 1993b; Bhatt 2001; Sharma 2003; Reddy 
2006)? Is such a social form as nationalism, which in India arose in response to a highly 
specific set of theological (Bhatt 2001), political (Chatterjee 1993a), and social (Reddy 
2006; Hansen 1999) events, so easily exported as any other commodity? Is the idea of 
Hindutva, a Hindu essence, meaningful in Trinidad? And what does it mean to be a 
Hindu nationalist in a country where Hinduism was never the dominant religion? In other 
words, Hindu nationalism in India is first and foremost about fixing Hinduism’s place as 
the dominant organizing principle of India, to the exclusion and marginalization of other 
secular and religious logics. To the exclusion of the numerous other religious possibilities 
that have existed for countless centuries side by side with, and in some cases even 
subsumed under, Hinduism, the ideological hegemony of Hindu nationalism attempts to 
situate Hinduism as the natural order of things for India. Like conservative xenophobias 
elsewhere, Hindu nationalism, in the final analysis, is about the naturalization of a power 
hierarchy and the self-appointed right to stay atop it. Rhetoric from revivalist groups such 
as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its 
political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), attempts to establish the primacy of 
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Hinduism as state religion and India as the ancestral home of Hinduism (Kishwar 2001: 
109-133). Hindu nationalism in India flowered because this position of dominance was, 
and for many still is, threatened from external forces like colonialism, Islam, modernity, 
Christianity, secularism. The threat of positional erosion, real or perceived, prompted 
social anxiety, motivating numerous revivals, reinterpretations of tradition, and even 
violence toward those that would usurp Hindu supremacy (Reddy 2006: 35-42).  
Hindu Trinidad, however, never had any incursions to fear, for they are the late-
comers to the island, only arriving in the mid-19th century. Indians arrived to Trinidad in 
successive waves between 1845 and 1917 to a largely Christian colony, and did so with 
Muslims among their masses. Their first concerns were practical ones. How do we 
scratch out a living amid squalid conditions, poor pay, and extreme competition for 
scarce resources? The geographic, cultural and legal isolation (Munasinghe 2001: 71-76) 
experienced by the Indian immigrants, in addition to the labor conditions and hierarchies 
of the plantation system (Vertovec 1992), forced upon them a radical reprioritization of 
social-cultural values and logics (Look Lai 1993). Furthermore, as we will see later in 
this chapter, many Indian Hindus viewed travelling abroad as a taboo because it diluted 
one’s spiritual purity. The strands of Hindu nationalism developing in India throughout 
the 19th and 20th centuries I will argue did not travel with the migrants, and, even if it had, 
could not take root in the soil of the new World plantations.  
 
The Rise of Hindu Nationalisms in India 
In outlining some of the important strands of Hindu nationalism emerging in India 
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, I would like to identify the areas of influence 
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these reformation movements had on Trinidad’s growing Hindu community. As I will 
argue throughout this text, the radically different social, economic, and political context 
rendered much of the nationalist and reformationist discourse unusable for Trinidadian 
Hindus. As Hansen (1999) rightly illustrates, India’s Hindu nationalism flowered not 
only in the political spheres that gave rise to anti-colonial and independence movements, 
but also, more broadly, in the public imaginary. Neither, then, was Hindu nationalism 
simply a religious phenomenon reflecting an emergent fundamentalism responding to 
modern epistemological and theological pressures. Hindu nationalism, Hansen argues, 
took shape in the public imaginary, within the shared and contested realm of public 
culture, which embraces moral, religious, and political (both social and juridical) 
discourses (1999: 19). Similarly, I will assert that while some features of Hindu 
nationalism in India did influence Trinidad’s nascent Hindu community, both directly and 
indirectly, the religious life and practice of Trinidadian Hindus must be understood in a 
Caribbean creole context. Though historians have made much of Indian isolation in the 
hinterlands of Trinidad’s Central region, allowing Hinduism to flourish, the new context 
not only provided limitations on the shape Hindu practice could assume (e.g. caste 
maintenance, see Vertovec 2010), it also influenced the logic by which Hinduism was 
interpreted (Brereton 1993; Trotman 1986; Laurence 1985). As I will discuss, Hindus in 
Trinidad faced many of the same external pressures as Hindus in India. Yet the character 
of what manifested in both regions turned out to be radically different. Central to my 
argument is the conclusion that Hinduism is understood, interpreted, imagined, and 
mobilized in markedly different ways in Trinidad, altering the way in which the Hindu 
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self and community are created and shaped. Thus, the shift in terrain, or what Appadurai 
would call an ethnoscape (1996: 48-65), inaugurated a shift in Hindu subjectivity.  
 
The Sacred as Political: The Emergence of a Political Hindu Nationalism 
The search for a postcolonial modernity has been tied, from its very birth, with its struggle 
against modernity. 
     ~ Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments 
 
Hindu nationalism in India reached its theoretical apogee with the work of V.D. Savarkar 
in the early 20th century. A devout Hindu and Indian patriot, Savarkar agitated against 
colonialism in the 1920s and 30s, publishing his magnum opus, Hindutva, in 1923. V.D. 
Sarvarkar’s articulation of Hindutva is an attempt to encompass categories of religious 
creed and practice, race, and nation into one unified concept. Savarkar’s ‘brochure’ 
Hindutva (2003 [1923]), at 138 pages, stands as a catalytic document of colonial era 
Hindu nationalism. Allegedly scratched out on the walls of his British prison cell and 
then committed to memory before the walls were repainted, Hindutva is more ultra 
patriotic manifesto than religious text. If, as Chatterjee (1993; see also Handler 1998; and 
Anderson 1981) has pointed out, nationalisms require “the invention of tradition” as an 
essential component of cultural constructivism, Hindutva is archetypal nationalist 
historiography. Overwrought and tending toward the dramatic, with words and phrases 
like “adventurous”, “intrepid”, “enduring”, and “strong and vigorous race”, Hindutva is 
the romanticized history of an unblemished race fighting against the oppressive forces of 
Muslim and Western imperialisms. It is a plea for solidarity. Unlike religious reformers 
attempting to codify a Hindu dogma, Savarkar attempted to distill the essential substance 
that bound Hindusthan (India), Hinduism, race, and cultural forms and turn them into a 
political position. Reformers and protonationalists before him, such as Dayananda 
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Saraswati (1824-1883), founder of the Arya Samaj and a 19th century religious reformer 
regarded as the first Hindu fundamentalist to provoke widespread changes in Hindu 
interpretation, recast Hinduism as an ultimately monotheistic religious complex (Bhatt 
2001: 16). Saraswati argued that the divinity and thus infallibility of the Vedic texts 
rendered later texts that gave rise to the pantheon, such as the Puranas and the epics 
Mahabharata and Ramayana, invalid as indicators of God (Sharma 2003: 22-23). 
Saraswati’s movement, called the Arya Samaj (Society of Aryans), inspired new 
iterations of nationalistic discourse identifying an encompassing Hindu primordialism. 
His central ambition was to return Hinduism to its pure, uncorrupted form, which, like 
the Western Abrahamic religions, was a steadfastly monotheistic tradition before the 
introduction of smriti (essentially the epics, but literally “transmitted” texts vs. shruti, or 
“revealed” texts, primarily the Vedas). The Arya Samaj’s ‘semitic Hinduism’ was one of 
the first of many revivalist movements to spring up during what has been termed the 
‘Hindu renaissance’ (Bhatt 2001: 16; also Chatterjee 1993b: 35-75).  
In similar fashion, the rhetoric of Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950), though much more 
politicized than Saraswati’s, sought to reform both Hinduism as a practice and Hindus 
themselves as more resilient, more manly, and thus less easily conquered people (Sharma 
2003: 46-69). Dispirited by India’s chronic inability to defend itself from invaders, 
Aurobindo contrived an explanation and prescription for this malady. In his view, India 
possessed the requisite technological, intellectual, and military powers to vanquish would 
be conquerors. However, in order to mobilize these forces effectively Hindus would need 
to reorient the way in which they self-identified. For too long Hindus had embraced the 
feminine principles of the priestly Brahmin caste. In order to rectify this effeminate and 
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feminizing principle Hindus would need to embrace the spirit of the warrior, or manly, 
caste, the Kshatriyas (Sharma 2003: 53-55). In a bid to convince Hindus that they must 
embrace the sacred ideal of the masculine warrior if they wished to end India’s open door 
policy to conquerors, Aurobindo crafted an elaborate argument that placed the fully 
realized Kshatriya warrior above human moral codes. To validate his claim, Aurobindo 
invoked the iconic scene in the Bhagavad Gita where the god Krishna implores a 
reluctant Arjuna to fulfill his duty and finish the battle against his own kin as his 
Kshatriya caste demands of him. Arjuna’s doubt and moral hand wringing serve as the 
central symbol of Aurobindo’s refashioned morality. In the famous scene, Krishna allays 
Arjuna’s concerns by reminding him that caste duty rises above all other concerns, even 
those of filial piety. Such moral trepidation is a worldly concern and thus is adharma, or 
non-dharmic. The true warrior fulfills his karmic duty in a detached yet purposeful 
manner (Easwaran, trans. 1985). Likewise, Aurobindo argues, “the first virtue of the 
Kshatriya is not to bow his neck to an unjust yoke but to protect his weak and suffering 
countrymen against the oppressor and welcome death in a just and righteous battle” (cited 
in Sharma 2003: 50). The ethical dilemma in Aurobindo’s program notwithstanding, the 
tradition he attempts to invent operates from an interpretive logic that shapes a new 
national ideal from religious iconography and lore. Like Saraswati before him, 
Aurobindo’s reformation project focused on specific features of Hindu practice and 
interpretation that would modernize Hindu theology and, more importantly, re-establish 
Hinduism’s global prominence as a great intellectual and religious power. The aim of 
both Aurobindo and Saraswati, as with the many other reformers of the Hindu 
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Renaissance, is to develop a ‘postcolonial modernity’ while also contending with 
transnational, Western modernity.  
In distinction to purely hermeneutic projects attempting to recreate Hindu practice 
and knowledge, Savarkar (1824-1883) sought a more ontologically embracing project. 
Particular interpretive traditions within the vast Hindu complex were not so much his 
interest, as they were with religious reformers variously influenced by Muslim, Christian, 
and modernist incursions. Rather, for Savarkar, the point was to identify and name that 
essential element coursing through history from the early Indus valley civilization up to 
the 20th century that all Hindus, regardless of sect, shared. Hinduism’s durability, he 
posited, is testament to and evidence of this determining essence. Whatever interpretive 
and ritual differences might exist, all Hindus shared belief in a common principle that 
animates every practice, however idiosyncratic. Drawing from nationalist theorists before 
him (see Bhatt 2001: 77) who adapted the term from Sanskrit, Savarkar referred to this 
principle as Hindutva. For Savarkar, and countless commentators to follow, Hindutva is 
the inalterable essence that lends Hinduism its unique power and resilience. Thus it is not 
Hinduism itself as an alterable and interpretable religious form that is at issue, it is the 
determining substance, or Hinduness, that binds Hinduism, history, land, and people.  
 Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being  
 of our Hindu race. Therefore, to understand the significance of this term  
Hindutva, we must first understand the essential meaning of the word Hindu  
itself and realize how it came to exercise such imperial sway over the hearts of  
millions of mankind and won a loving allegiance from the bravest and best of  
them. But before we can do that, it is imperative to point out that we are by no 
means attempting a definition or even description of the more limited, less 
satisfactory and essentially sectarian term Hinduism. (Savarkar 2003 [1923]: 4)  
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Conceived of as both a racial typology and a body of “thought and activity”, Hindutva 
expresses the “adventurous valor” that is a hallmark of all Hindus (2003: 5). It is the 
constellation of “a common nation (Rashtra) a common race (Jati) and a common 
civilization (Sanskriti)” (2003: 116).  
The ideal conditions, therefore, under which a nation can attain perfect solidarity 
and cohesion would, other things being equal, be found in the case of those  
people who inhabit the land they adore, the land of whose forefathers is also the  
land of their Gods and Angels, of Seers and Prophets; the scenes of whose history 
are also the scenes of their mythology. (2003: 136) 
 
Thus, should the Jews be able to re-establish themselves in Palestine (remember, 
Savarkar is writing this in the early 1920s) they would be in a prime position to realize 
the kind of national solidarity that makes a nation great. He goes on to list the potential in 
a number of Middle Eastern and European states, though none of them possess the unique 
advantage of India. China is “almost as richly gifted with geographical, racial, cultural 
essentials as the Hindus are,” but miss out on having, as India does, “a sacred and a 
perfect language, the Sanskrit, and a sanctified Motherland” (2003: 137). For Savarkar, 
the unique blessing of Hindus is the congeries of (sacred) language, land, culture, and 
contiguous history, a congeries that indicates the unifying structure of Hindutva. The 
concept attempts to merge categories of being and praxis in order to transcend sectarian 
differences among the different branches and interpretive schools of Hinduism. Hindutva 
then is both an ontological and political project. By delimiting what is and what is not 
Hindutva, Savarkar constructs a set of social categories that attempts to privilege certain 
practices and epistemologies and thus empower certain groups of Indians, while 
marginalizing others. Savarkar’s iteration of religious fundamentalism is an expression of 
governmentality that would establish acceptable and unacceptable ways of being. In 
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drawing boundaries between what is and what is not Hinduism Sarvarkar infuses the 
religion with an interpretive conservatism that excludes forms too distant from the center. 
Such exclusion attempts to render those Indians of the ontologic periphery silent and thus 
politically powerless.  
As a transcendent concept, Hindutva extracts from historical, religious, and 
territorial categories an essence that, once recognized, will allow Hindus to self-actualize 
in ways they could not before, offering them “a future greater than what any other people 
on earth can dream of” (2003: 138). Thus, for Savarkar, as with other Hindu 
primordialists before and after him (see, for example, Tilak 1984) a national 
consciousness and shared sense of destiny is inextricably linked to the “sanctified 
Motherland”.  Hindutva therefore is not, strictly speaking, a religious reformation project 
in the vein of the nationalists before him. However, like his predecessors, Hindutva does 
operate as a form of preservationism, even if in a highly politicized fashion. By 
identifying and articulating a Hindu essence, Savarkar was able to generate a nationalist 
ethos that forged primodialism with modernity, territory with religion, and ontology with 
history. It is from this crucible that modern Hindu nationalism in India has been forged.  
For Trinidadian Hindus, the concept of Hindutva, such as it exists, is, by contrast, 
mostly taken as a spiritual substance. The term has little currency in Trinidad and was 
only ever mentioned or reflected upon when I brought it up. The notion did not sit well 
with some of my participants who, I later inferred, might have been uncomfortable with 
an implied link between their work and the xenophobic Hindu nationalists for whom the 
term has much traction. Ellen, the president of a Hindu mandir in Bharataria, a small 
suburb on the outskirts of Port of Spain, put it to me this way, “I am Trinidadian first. My 
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first obligation is to Trinidad. But I am also Indian and want to embrace my culture.” For 
Ellen, her “culture” clearly derives from India, though she shares that devotion with her 
country, Trinidad. For many Hindus of Ellen’s age (she was in her mid-fifties when I first 
met her), identifying their culture with India and their country with Trinidad is common. 
In a separate interview Raviji echoed Ellen’s statement, which he put in his terms as his 
“triple identity”. “I am a Trinidadian. I am a Hindu. And I am an Indian.” Younger 
generations, however, are less apt to identify culturally with India. The rising 
participation of Indo-Trinidadians in popular culture such as music (chutney soca) and in 
politics has drawn the younger generations of Indo-Trinidadians into the broader shared 
space of Trinidadian public and popular culture1. Even among the older generations then, 
Hindutva’s meaning is not only greatly diluted compared with its incarnations in India, 
but it also considerably less traction.  
 For those familiar with the term, Hindutva simply stands as a unifying ethos, a 
kind of theological rallying point that binds Hindus through common worship practices 
and beliefs. The concept is problematic and of little use for Trinidadian Hindus, Raviji 
tells me, merely by virtue of the journey over the Kalam Pani, or dark waters of the 
Pacific, Indians undertook in the 19th century. “There was a taboo against travelling”, he 
said, “because leaving India was thought to dilute one’s Indian substance. So travelling 
just wasn’t done by Indians except those going to work in other colonies.” These Indians, 
he suggests, were already considered less Indian, less Hindu, than those that remained at                                                         1  Though different styles of art and music between Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians continue 
to define their respective contributions, their styles reflect distinctly Trinidadian themes. 
For example, as one musician told me, “If you want to hear heavy metal, and some punk, 
you have to go to the Indian areas. They love that stuff. Walk in the Indian 
neighborhoods and that’s all you’ll hear coming out of their houses. In the black areas it’s 
almost all soca and reggae and hip hop.”  
  89 
home. The notion of Hindutva then could have little meaning for a community already 
considered by Hindu elites of India to be less Hindu than those who stayed in the rashtra. 
That leaving the Hindu rashtra, or nation, the axis mundi of the Hindu world, and living 
among a nation of non-Hindus robs one of their Hindu essence indicates that such an 
essence is not immutably fixed. Rather, its strength derives from and is contingent on 
remaining a Hindu in India, the land of the “Vedic seers”.  
Sat Maharaj, president of the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, is widely considered 
to be one of the most conservative Hindu leaders in Trinidad, and unquestionably the 
most outspoken. His guest columns appear regularly in Trinidad’s three dailies and his 
press conferences and interviews typically evoke a wide range of responses – from utter 
hostility to complete agreement – by many Trinidadians. His July 2009 piece in the 
Trinidad Guardian titled “Who is a Hindu?” calls for a “modern” definition of Hinduism 
and laments that the tradition “has not yet articulated itself clearly to the modern mind.”  
In contrast to Hindutva discourse, Sat Maharaj’s article is tellingly Trinidadian as it calls 
for “a redefinition and new understanding of Hinduism” yet hesitates to offer a concrete 
definition. Instead, after complaining that even “Hindus with a modern western education 
usually do not understand their own tradition” he abruptly shifts directions and finishes 
the second half of the article with a story about a French businessman living in India who 
follows Hindu practice and changed his name from Christian Fabre to Swami 
Pranavananda Brahmedra Avadhuta. Presumably, what Sat Maharaj is trying to 
communicate is that a Hindu may well be anyone who embraces the faith and, following 
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s definition of a Hindu, “accepts and practices the ancient 
philosophies and preachings of Bharatiya [India]”. Oblique as it is, Sat Maharaj’s 
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argument, astonishingly for a conservative Hindu, calls for a re-evaluation of who may be 
considered a Hindu based not on birth, country of origin, or caste, but rather on one’s 
commitment to the dharma. Trinidad’s multicultural context, coupled with Hindu 
Trinidadians’ historic struggles to prove their Hinduness to Indian Hindus helps us 
understand Sat Maharaj’s openness that rests simply on commitment to the dharma. It 
further illustrates the complications of the concept of Hindutva in a country where 
Hinduism itself is continually re-imagined.  
 
Valences of Nationalism/ Taxonomies of Hindu Nationalism 
Nationalism shares with other social interpretive categories – religion, culture, syncretism 
– a confounding degree of ambiguity. Attempts at universalizing its forms and features 
have met with the same humbling results as many of our other prized interpretive 
schema. The term does capture a certain sentiment, and, like religion, we know it when 
we see it. But what sentiments qualify as nationalism? Or what arrangement of 
sentiments qualify? And to what degree of zeal must they be embraced to qualify? Is 
there a threshold we can identify that when crossed moves a people from mere self-
awareness to nationalism? And in what way is that threshold culturally and discursively 
determined? What I would like to explore here is where that threshold lies and to 
problematize its use as an interpretive form. It is worth asking why some groups are 
labeled as nationalists while others, who appear to embrace the same, or at least highly 
similar, set of principles are not. For example, Fundamentalist Christians in the United 
States, since at least the 1960s, have turned their focus toward the active and 
revolutionary participation of their members in electoral politics (for an excellent history 
  91 
of Christian fundamentalism in America see Harding 2000; see also Crapanzano 2000). 
They agitate openly for the return of a Christian nation (cf. Hindu rashtra) and lament the 
decline of Christian based rituals in public institutions (e.g. prayer in schools and court 
rooms). They lobby for Christian causes in congress, attempt to shape knowledge through 
control over textbook publication and school boards, and exert an enormous influence on 
public discourse through the monopolization of various media (Harding 2000: 61-82). 
Like Hindu reformers in India such as Saraswati, Aurobindo, and Savarkar, who feared 
the intrusion of outsiders, many Christian fundamentalists in the US promote incendiary 
anti-Islamic rhetoric and violence toward perceived threats to the American way (recall 
Pat Robertson’s plea to assassinate Venezuela’s democratically elected president Hugo 
Chavez). America, many Christian fundamentalists believe, is a Christian nation, made 
great through God’s divine will. We exclude Him from public and political life at our 
peril (Juergensmeyer 2009: 405-410). Yet, though they promote a national ideal, whose 
subtext is often ethnically biased toward white Americans, they are seldom, if ever, 
referred to in either popular or scholarly literature as Christian nationalists. But Hindus in 
Trinidad, whose agenda is far more innocuous, and far less ambitious, are known to be 
nationalists. It is worth considering then several of the salient strands of nationalist theory 
to understand how nationalism, as an interpretive model, is applied to some groups 
(Trinidadian Hindus) and not to others. What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive 
treatment of theories of nationalism, but rather an outline of several influential schools of 
thought with the intent of attempting to determine what established category of 
nationalism, if any, politically active Trinidadian Hindus fit into. By exploring several 
salient theories of nationalism and later the history of Hinduism in Trinidad, I would like 
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to question the applicability of the discursive term nationalism to contemporary Hindu 
communities in Trinidad. Is it appropriate, or even accurate, to interpret Trinidadian 
Hindus as nationalists simply because they are socially and politically active? And is 
Hindu preservationism an unproblematic fact of social engineering?        
Post-colonial nationalism is reputedly a Western European export to its former 
colonies. Early observers and theorists viewed nationalism as a worthwhile and necessary 
institution in a state’s social-political development. Nationalism is a marker of a people’s 
arrival to modernity, they posited, and a sign of participation in post-enlightenment 
principles of statecraft and collective consciousness. More than simply a reflexive 
moment in the historical trajectory of a people, it is, more importantly, the invention of 
“nations where they do not exist” (Gellner, cited in Chatterjee 1993a: 4). Reflecting a 
positivistic approach to nation building, nationalism paves the road to self-determination. 
However regrettable any form of despotism emerging from nationalist ideology may be, 
it is undeniably better than no such ideology, or consciousness, at all. Such obstacles are 
merely wrinkles to be ironed out of the larger fabric of a nation’s historical telos. Once a 
national consciousness has been realized, it was argued, the nation may begin 
contributing its unique ideas to the common fund of humanity (Chatterjee 1993a: 8). The 
realization of a nationalist sentiment then is not only the beginning of self-determination, 
it is the necessary acquisition of reason that allows a nation-state to develop industrialism 
and, hence, modernity. Nationalism, it was assumed, was a step on the staircase of geo-
economic upward mobility. 
Liberal observers, predictably, were not so easily seduced by the siren call of 
nationalism as reason. As one critic unequivocally states it, “Nationalism is the ideology 
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of scoundrels...” (Anderson et al. 2008: 148). Liberal critics, repulsed by its narrowness, 
feared nationalism could only exacerbate tensions between states and promote tyranny 
within them. Reason, it was asserted, is not always a good thing. In his iconic essay 
“Dark Gods and Their Rites”, Elie Kedourie points to nationalists’ cynical use of 
education and objectivity in the justification of human destruction. Western educated 
Africans and Asians, armed with objectivity, exploit their insight into social structures 
and processes to mobilize native symbols in the service of what he calls “secular 
millennialism” (Kedourie 1994: 209). Nationalist leaders employ a “conscious and 
deliberate manipulation of...primitive superstition” to foment anti-imperial animosity and 
justify violence. Nairn, like Kedourie, sees nationalism as an outwardly imposed ideology 
that is merely indigenously interpreted (1994: 72). The body of myths, symbols, 
sentiments that “well up from within” is simply a local manifestation of a global process 
wrought by the introduction of industrial capitalism (Nairn 1994: 72-4). Nationalism 
(emphasis his), he contends, is only a generic template whose blanks are filled in by local 
folklore and the invention of tradition. The problem of nationalism then for liberal 
scholars is not that it is a cultural-historic form that can go wrong, as Plamenatz or 
Gellner might see it (see Chatterjee 1993a), but that the ideology itself is corrupt to start 
with as an outgrowth of competitive capitalism. The paradox of nationalism, says Nairn, 
is that “the most notoriously subjective and ideal of historical phenomena is in fact a by-
product of the most brutally and hopelessly material side of the history of the last two 
centuries” (1994: 72). Nationalist projects are thus merely extensions of the often violent 
struggle for resources cloaked in positivist rhetoric. Nationalism’s critics see in it an 
expression of hegemony and, to borrow a phrase from Bourdieu (2008: 191-193), 
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symbolic violence that promotes a class of dispossessed others2. Thus, nationalism in 
critical discourse is a medium of hegemony, or domination, whose practical value is only 
one of pretension and division.  
Though they differ in their views on the utility and social value of nationalism, 
critical and supportive strands of nationalist discourse agree on several important features 
about its practice. First, nationalism is a form of what Hobsbawm (1994: 76) refers to as 
‘social engineering’, or invented tradition. Handler’s (1988) sharp exegesis of Quebecois 
nationalism is one of many such examples (see also Linnekin 1985) that provide an ideal 
case study in processes of tradition inventing. Integral to this process are historical 
revisionism, the (re)interpretation of local myths, legends and sacred texts, the 
mobilization of indigenous symbols and tropes in new contexts and, implicitly, the 
marginalization, or othering, of those perceived to fall outside the national normative 
ideal. Nationalism’s critics take Gellner’s proposition that nationalism is not merely the 
                                                        2 “In a society in which overt violence, the violence of the usurer or the merciless master, 
meets with collective reprobation and is liable either to provoke a violent riposte from the 
victim or to force him to flee (that is to say, in either case, in the absence of any other 
recourse, to provoke the annihilation of the very relationship which was intended to be 
exploited), symbolic violence, the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never 
recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, 
confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety – in short, all 
the virtues honoured by the code of honour – cannot fail to be seen as the most 
economical mode of domination, i.e. the mode which best corresponds to the economy of 
system” (Bourdieu 2008: 192). Bourdieu’s discussion here about the subtle forms of 
control, coercion, and domination evident in certain social relations neatly articulates 
liberal reservations with nationalism (see, for example, Nairn 1994). Similar to Gramsci, 
whose theories of class domination (hegemony) have been much more pronounced in 
critical approaches to nationalism than Bourdieu’s, what Bourdieu attempts to illustrate 
are the subtle forms of control that institutions such as nationalism are capable of 
performing. Carnegie’s moving articulation of the ‘silent norm’ constructed in the 
nationalist imaginary that would homogenize a nation, and the violence this silently 
commits against those who cannot exemplify the ‘normative national self’, aptly 
demonstrates Bourdieu’s point (Carnegie 2002).    
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awakening of a people to self-awareness but the creation of a state a step further, 
asserting in various ways that it is the creation of a homogenous social-political body that 
would attempt to naturalize and police a new ‘silent norm’ (Carnegie 2002). Conservative 
observers see the rise of nationalisms and the creation of unified states as examples of 
post-Enlightenment principles of reason and progress at work in the positive development 
of a state. Recalling the barbarism to civilization evolutionism of L.H. Morgan (2001 
[1877]), conservative discourse locates nationalism as a progressive step toward 
autonomy and industrialism. In contrast, liberal critics see in nationalism a sinister form 
of governmentality whose pretensions of homogeneity promote majoritarian tyrannies. 
Whether harbinger of progress or technology of control, nationalism, it is agreed, is an 
invented tradition attempting to “homogenize the heterogeneous” (Williams 1991). 
Invented traditions draw on a primordial past linking land, history, and people in a 
herculean effort to homogenize disparate groups and establish a national ideal. Narrations 
of nationalism then are ideologies composed of symbolic fragments mobilized to create 
the illusion of a historically continuous and ethnically complete whole (Bhabha 1990; 
Wiliams 1991: 38-42).     
Second, nationalism is about self-determination. Its ultimate goal is to unify a 
people with an aim toward autonomy, control, and power. Though the impulse for unity 
under a single banner is not new, subsumed under religious institutions in earlier eras (see 
Anderson 1991) or what Seton-Watson has referred to as ‘old nationalism’ (1994: 134-
137), modern nationalisms emerge from secular logics. Post-Enlightenment, capitalist 
principles of order, efficiency, and reason offered burgeoning states seeking unity and 
technologies of population control a means of allowing them to compete in a transformed 
  96 
global market. Whether nationalist rhetoric is cloaked in religious or secular language 
makes little difference. The underlying logic of modern nationalism is one that is 
commensurate and compatible with capitalism and the global power dynamics dominated 
by the Western states. For both critics and champions of the new secular nationalism, its 
defining feature is self-determination through a rather narrowly prescribed set of criteria.  
Finally, nationalism is a normative system. Under the banner of unity and self-
determination, nationalism constructs a framework for ideal configurations of the 
national moral self. The construction of such a framework requires establishing what are 
and what are not acceptable features of the national ideal and a regulatory moral code that 
naturalizes behaviors of the dominant class and delegitimizes the norms and forms of the 
subordinate classes. Nationalism arrogates to itself the role of arbiter over who fits the 
‘silent norm’ of the ideal and who does not (Carnegie 2002: 3-4). The framework outlines 
what physical, intellectual, and spiritual features make up the new ideal. So, for example, 
according to Hindu reformers and nationalist groups such as the RSS and the Sangh 
Paravar, India’s national ideal is male, Hindu, and middle-class. The ideal sits in the 
middle of a spectrum of possibilities and cultural and ethnic configurations. The farther 
away one sits from the center the less status and thus rights one has as a citizen of the 
state. A Jain then, rests close enough to the center and might only experience minor, if 
any, marginalizing effects. Muslims, on the other hand, routinely experience 
marginalization as members located at an extreme end of the spectrum. For critical 
scholars of nationalism such normative practices signal a new form of hegemony and 
political oppression that give rise to a class of disempowered subalterns (Spivak 1994). 
Champions of nationalism, on the other hand, regard normative discourses of nationalism 
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as necessary steps to collective prosperity, however regrettable the dispossession of some 
of the state’s members may be. Whether nationalism as a normative system is hegemonic 
or an essential feature of national consciousness, both liberal and conservative observers 
stress the fundamental presence of normalizing discourses.  
In briefly outlining a few prominent strands of nationalist discourse what I hope 
to do is demonstrate the problem of applying the concept in a diasporic community where 
the historical and social-political landscape differ drastically from the motherland. To 
return to some of the questions posited earlier, we might ask what interpretive purchase is 
to be gained by understanding the behavior and practice of diasporic Hindus, particularly 
those in Trinidad, as nationalist. Though some, or even many, of the elements described 
by the two dominant discourses are present in a group’s approach to self-determination, is 
it the same thing as what scholars observe in the homeland? In the case of Hindu Trinidad 
I would argue that the sentiment of the vast majority of Hindus is not one of nationalism. 
Loosely following Anderson (1991) we might call it ‘creole nationalism’, but even in that 
case I would do so with numerous reservations3. Hindus in Trinidad have unquestionably 
picked up many features of the well-documented nationalist movements in India, of 
which Hindu Trinidad is purportedly an heir. The turn toward bhakti worship, clear 
strands of anti-Islamic rhetoric (though many participate in Hosay, an Islamic festival 
                                                        3 Anderson touches on the rise of nationalism in the American colonies to promote his 
thesis of print-capitalism determinism. Creole nationalism here refers to the construction 
of a national sentiment in many of the American colonies, particularly the Spanish ones, 
by Europeans born in the colony. These creoles were regarded by ‘pure’ Europeans as 
having assumed the racial taint of the natives. Creole nationalism then is more an 
outcome or product of an empowered colonial class rather than a descriptor of a type of 
nationalism. However, as Anderson points out, the creole class’s success at forging a 
strong nationalist movement, which included the indigenous, is testament to a differently 
conceived kind of nationalism (1981: 49-50).     
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[Korom 2003] and express solidarity with other Indo-Trinidadians), the voracious 
appetite for Indian popular culture, and the welcoming of Hindu missionary groups, 
would seem to indicate the presence of an exported Hindu nationalism. Yet the historical 
and contemporary context is markedly different than in India where different pressures 
engender different social-political processes. Hindu Trinidadian orientation toward the 
prescribed forms and expressions of Hindutva is altered enough that we must ask if it is 
still meaningful to interpret them as nationalists. The centerpiece of this exploration and 
problematization is the concept of Hindutva and its tenuous history in Trinidad. In order 
to understand this problem further in its Trinidadian context, the history of Hinduism and 
its link to the larger Trinidadian culture must be explored.    
  
New World Nationalism: The Problematic of a Creole Hinduism in Trinidad 
Like Hindus in India, New World Hindus faced a host of threats to their valued traditions, 
some more ominous than those faced on the sub-continent. The history of Hinduism in 
Trinidad began as, and remained for several decades, a tenuous proposition (Klass 1961; 
Jha 1985; Singh 1985; Laurence 1985). Indians that survived the treacherous journey 
over the kalam pani, the dark waters, were sent straight to the plantations to begin their 
labors. Of the roughly 140,000 Indians to land in Trinidad, few were of priestly caste. 
Most were common laborers, culled from sugar and other agricultural production regions 
in India such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Bengal. Like their African predecessors, 
Indians attempting to preserve their religious practices did so in the highly idiosyncratic 
fashions endemic to their regions and homes in India (Ramdin 2000). Without the benefit 
of community cohesion and the consistency of practice such an environment promotes, 
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Hindu Indians made do with what they had. Diverse practices particular to different 
regions meant that Trinidad’s new Hindu community would have to accept certain 
compromises in their interpretations and religious practices if they wished to preserve 
their religion in the New World. The many historical and cultural fragments of India 
would have to be assembled in a way that was agreeable to the diverse community, and 
this would have to be done in a labor-intensive environment where the first priority was 
always the plantation. In addition to time constraints Hindu laborers wishing to establish 
a viable community of worshipers had to do so in a social environment hostile to 
polytheism. Distance from India, limitations of time and space for building the new 
diasporic community, and an unwelcoming social environment replete with Christian 
missionaries all conspired to undermine the prominence of Hinduism in the lives of 
Trinidad’s Indian laborers (Vertovec 2010).  
In her historically rich ethnography Callaloo Nation, Aisha Khan chronicles 
changing colonial attitudes toward Hinduism starting from the 18th century to the height 
of imperial hegemony in the 19th (2004: 38). What started as fascination with Hinduism’s 
colorful imagery and theological sophistication soon gave way to horror over its gaudy 
and often grotesque images and its penchant for superstition. Colonialists taking note of 
the culture patterns and religious practices of their laborers regarded Hinduism in much 
the same way they had viewed West African Orisha practice (Scher 1997: 322; Olmos 
and Paravisini-Gebert 2003: 27; Stewart 2004); both were expressions of a less advanced 
spirituality whose followers placed their faith in false idols. Adopting a Malthusian 
worldview, the idolatry the Christians witnessed was a causal agent, missionaries 
believed, of Indians’ misfortune and degraded state. Though little could be done about 
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Hinduism in India, where locals had more autonomy to repudiate Christian imperialism, 
the West Indies was open ground. Thus, Christian conversion loomed as a constant threat 
to Hindu laborers. Plantation owners, typically indifferent to the religious persuasion of 
their workers (see Turner 1998), deferred to missionaries who sought to claim Indian 
souls from the clutches of paganism. The task of converting the Indians fell to the 
Canadian Presbyterians, who accepted the task with gusto. 
When Indians first began arriving to Trinidad in 1845 few had long-term designs 
in their new host country. Indenture contracts were for five years, a length of time 
sufficient to save money to bring home to India. Contract renewal, a program vigorously 
pushed by plantation owners, allowed for another term of five years. But even among 
those renewing their contracts few did so with the intent of permanently settling in 
Trinidad (Brereton 1985). The harsh labor conditions, distance from home, and the alien 
environment reconfirmed for most Indians that home was India. Historical accounts of 
the early indenture period paint a grim picture of Indian communities surrounding the 
plantations. Villages were packed with small homes filled to capacity by large families. 
Sanitation in the villages was abysmal. Violence between Indians, including the infamous 
wife murders, was rampant4. Malnourishment and disease debilitated astonishing 
numbers of Indians. And education, whether in Hindi, Bhojpuri, or English, was virtually 
non-existent (on the squalid conditions of Indian villages see Brereton 1985; Haraksingh 
                                                        4 The much remarked upon wife murders of the early indenture period were the result, it 
is presumed, of the skewed male to female ratio of as high as 4:1 at one point. Thus 
women were in a unique position of agency and men were desperate. The theory goes 
that men, ever vigilant against the threat of infidelity, would kill their wives before letting 
another man take her from his home (see Brereton 1985: 26; Niranjana 2006: 69-84; in 
British Guiana see Mangru 2006: 211-228; on the overall increase of violence in Trinidad 
due to the gender imbalance see Trotman 1986: 153-154).  
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1985; 2006; Williams 1981). By the late 1860s the first Canadian Presbyterian 
missionaries had arrived, primarily to address the indentured community’s education 
needs, and, in the process, undermine the authority of the tenacious Hindu complex.   
    In 1868 the Canadian Presbyterian Mission, founded by John C. Morton, 
established formal schools for Indo-Trinidadians. The Presbyterian schools were the first 
to offer the Indian migrants sustained exposure to academic education in Trinidad. By 
1900 the Mission operated 60 Presbyterian schools in Trinidad, mostly in the Indo-
Trinidadian rural areas. Between 1892 and 1900 the Canadian Presbyterian Mission 
opened three colleges for the training of Indo-Trinidadian instructors, inspired as much 
by goodwill as the conversion of the Indians (Campbell 1985: 117-118). As Campbell 
(1985: 118) notes, such a rapid pace of Christian expansionism was unusual in the British 
Caribbean, even though Anglicans, Baptists, and, to a lesser degree, Quakers, have long 
been visible members of its cultural landscape (Turner 1998). Indians did convert to 
Presbyterianism in the early stages, evidenced by, among other things, the contemporary 
presence of Canadian Presbyterian schools and churches operated primarily by Indo-
Trinidadians5. Because the colonial administration was reluctant to address the education 
                                                        5 The conversion rate remains fairly low. Of the approximately 400,000 Indo-
Trinidadians on the island 86 % are Hindus and about 8% Muslim. The other 6% are 
Christian of one stripe or another or without religion altogether. Despite the relative 
unpopularity of the church, the Canadian Presbyterians maintain an active presence in 
Indo-Trinidadian communities. The education they provide is their most obvious 
contribution, which many Indo-Trinidadians continue to take advantage of without 
converting. One parent of a Ramlila participant shared stories with me of attending 
Canadian Presbyterian schools as a child. By his anecdotal observations few of the 
Hindus he knew converted, despite the persistent and creative religious education they 
received. Ironically, the parent knows virtually no Hindi or Bhojpuri but could sing the 
Sunday school classic Jesus Loves Me in flawless Hindi, taught to him by his 
Presbyterian instructors. After he sang the tune for me he smiled and shrugged, as if to 
say, ‘I know my Christianity as well as any other Christian, but I’m a Hindu for life.’  
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needs of the growing Indo-Trinidadian community, Indians benefited greatly by the 
Christian schools, even though their overall conversion rate was, at least for the 
Presbyterians, disappointingly low. One of the many obstacles confounding conversion 
efforts was not necessarily the tenacity of Hinduism (however that can be assessed) or an 
emergent diasporic nationalism. The Mission’s implicit belief in the cultural, and by 
extension racial, superiority of their instructors and headmasters instigated conflict and 
power struggles within the organization. The Mission’s reluctance to train Indians for 
posts as headmasters, while logically consistent with their aims, generated widespread 
disaffection in the early 20th century. In response Indians began scraping together 
resources to build their own Hindu schools and requesting both financial and instructive 
help from the growing number of Hindu preservation and promotion groups in India. 
Christian proselytizing then threatened Hindus from early in the indenture period and 
remained a specter until community leaders and Hindu missionaries could establish 
independent schools. 
Hindu schools began springing up in the countryside by the end of the 19th 
century. Supported by community advocacy groups called panchayats and by 
missionaries from India hoping to preserve Hinduism from the onslaught of Western 
cultural imperialism, Hindu schools promoted an Indo-centric curriculum that included 
language study in Hindi, devotional religious practice, and scriptural study. Since 
government support for Hindu and Muslim denominational schools was not to develop 
until the 1930s and 40s, and even then sparingly, Indian communities had to rally 
resources and rely on Hindu missionaries for what little they could procure (Campbell 
1985). Hindu reformers and preservationists, eager to promote their brand of 
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interpretation and practice, sent emissaries to the growing Indian community in the 
Caribbean. Groups such as the Arya Samaj, the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, and later 
the Chin Maya Mission, helped construct mandirs and schools that would serve as 
platforms for promoting their nationalist causes. Texts such as the Bhagavad Gita and the 
Ramayana assumed increasing importance as the Hindu community sought out narrative 
scripture encapsulating their exilic experience (Vertovec 2001). Exiled from India and 
largely isolated from the rest of Trinidad on and around the plantations, Hindu Indians 
found solace and inspiration in the Ramayana. As I will explore in later chapters, the 
centrality of the Ramayana among Trinidadian Hindus has much to do with their history 
both in India and overseas, and, most importantly, the way in which they interpret their 
history.  
To gain a sense of how central the Ramayana has been in the public imaginary of 
Hindu Indo-Trinidadians, it is worth mentioning the isolationism experienced by the 
indentured laborers. Indian settlements were far removed from the urban and 
administrative areas of Trinidad and were thus easy to ignore for the colonial 
government. The rigors of plantation life allowed for few of the luxuries afforded the 
leisure classes such as community development programs, settlement planning, and 
sanitation systems. This situation not only contributed to the squalor already mentioned 
but exacerbated feelings of isolation and exile. Plantation owners tirelessly schemed ways 
to keep their indentured workers near the plantations, including drafting convoluted laws 
written only in English whose violation meant jail and automatic contract renewal 
(Brereton 1985: 24), lowering the age of sexual consent to allow for more births per 
family (Trotman 1986: 180), and the promotion of land acquisition programs that gave 
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laborers enough land to induce them to stay in Trinidad but small enough that their crop 
yields would not compete with plantation production (Laurence 1985: 95-114). As 
scholars have duly noted, the settlement patterns arranged on and around the plantations 
generated spatial and social-cultural isolation from the broader Trinidadian society. It is 
within this sense of isolation, of exile, both from India and later from the administrative 
and cultural center of Trinidad, that Hindus found a parallel history with the Ramayana.   
 
The Ramayana: The Epic and Epic Narrations of Nation 
On a sultry afternoon Shrutiji, one of the head instructors of the Ram Leela, and I sat 
outside the Kendra, staring out into the fields still tilled and worked by Indian peasants. 
Resting on the metal lunch chairs, trying to find solace in whatever puff of wind came 
our way, we discussed the Ramayana and its centrality in Hindu Trinidad. While the 
Bhagavad Gita maintains an important place in the lives of Trinidadian Hindus, its 
prominence, compared with the Ramayana, is noticeably smaller. I was curious why the 
Ramayana, which struck me as more narrative than instructive, would be the preferred 
scripture. It seemed to me that the Gita, with its emphasis on duty and piety, would 
occupy a larger place in the collective imagination of Trinidad’s Hindus. Mopping her 
brow with a small white kerchief, Shrutiji explained that the origins of the Ramayana 
played an important role in its popularity. Written by Baba Tulsidas in the 16th century, 
the Ramayana6 tells the story of Vishnu’s incarnation as Lord Rama whose moral purity, 
                                                        6 The original Ramayana was composed by Sage Valmiki, it is believed, in the 5th 
century BCE. Numerous version of the Ramayana abound within India and within the 
Hindu diaspora. Tulsidas’s Ramayana, called the Ramacaritamanasa, develops a more 
bhakti, or devotional, approach to Hindu practice. Hindu Trinidadians still refer to the 
scripture as the Ramayana, pronounced simply, ‘ra-mine’.  
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bravery, and skill would restore order in a world made chaotic and violent by the demon 
King Rawana and his destructive minions, the Rakshasas. Composed in the sugar-
producing region of Uttar Pradesh, the Ramayana describes Lord Rama’s struggles 
against the forces of adharma (unrighteousness) that would undo Hindu dharma. Rama is 
then forced into exile from Ayodhyakan, the kingdom of his father. Rama’s exile from 
Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh mirrors the exile experienced by Trinidad’s Hindus. The long 
history of sugar production in the region made it a popular spot for arkatis (recruiters) to 
enlist plantation laborers for many of Europe’s sugar facilities throughout the world 
(Ramdin 2000). For many of Trinidad’s Hindus, the underhandedly coercive techniques 
deployed by the arkatis and the powerfully disruptive forces of Western imperialism 
remind them of the struggles Rama faced away from a home he was forced to leave. Like 
destructive Rakshasas, arkatis, minions to larger colonial powers, disbanded communities 
and disrupted lives for their own benefit. Lord Rama’s resilience in the face of tragedy – 
the abduction of his wife by Rawana, his exile from Ayodhya, the destruction caused by 
the demons – and the uncertainty he faced in his quest to restore the dharma, stand as 
testament to the moral power of Hindu dharma. As Shrutiji repeatedly explained to me 
and to her class, “Vishnu took avatar as Sri Ram to offer us an example of how we are to 
live our lives.” Of all Rama’s qualities, it is his steadfast devotion to dharmic morality 
that affords him his success against outside forces attempting to disturb the mind and 
divide communities. What Rama offers is an example of the ways in which dharmic 
practice, sadhanas, can empower individuals and strengthen communities even in the 
midst of centrifugal social forces.   
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The Ramayana of Baba Tulsidas (Figure 3) then is more than mere scripture for 
many of Trinidad’s Hindus, it is an integral part of their history. From ancient Ayodhya 
in Uttar Pradesh to the present in Chaguanas, Trinidad, the Ramayana captures the 
sentiment of a particularly situated people and symbolizes their relationship to the divine. 
As sacred text it inaugurates a devotional turn in worship practice. As historical text it 
narrates the story of an agrarian community and their steadfast devotion to Rama and 
their relationship to the dharma. Observers have noted that the centrality of texts such as 
the Ramayana and the Bhagavad Gita within the Hindu diaspora developed alongside a 
simplified devotional Hindu practice called bhakti yoga. The rise of bhakti in favor of 
more complex Vedantic (philosophic) approaches to Hindu spirituality was contemporary 
with both the rise of colonialism and the subsequent emergence of transnational Hindu 
communities. Because bhakti facilitates communal services around a single theme or 
passage, much as sermons function for Christians, it is much easier to cultivate a sense of 
common purpose. A consistent weekly message, centered around a common text and 
explored communally, offered indentured Hindus a message of hope and a means for 
interpreting their struggles. As I will explore in later chapters, interpretations of and 
relationships with the Ramayana are highly contingent processes that rely as much on 
contemporary cultural features as historical precedent.    
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Figure 3. Baba Tulsidas 
The history of Hindus in Trinidad and their contemporary interpretation of both 
the broader culture around them and Hindu practice must be understood in light of their 
relationship to the Ramayana. Likewise, that relationship to the Ramayana, and all the 
paradoxes and complexities that that entails, must be understood in light of the 
contemporary struggles, concerns, and discourses of modern Trinidadian Hindus. In order 
to understand steadfast Hindu practice in Trinidad as an expression of religious or ethnic 
nationalism is to overlook important recent shifts in cultural form and practice. Of 
particular interest in the following chapters are processes of interpretation and subject 
creation that illustrate the ways in which Hindu Trinidadians negotiate local and global 
iterations of postmodernity. It is worthwhile then to reconsider several historical changes 
within the emerging diaspora that prevented a fully nationalistic discourse to emerge 
among Trinidadian Hindus.                 
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That Hinduism exists in Trinidad in the vibrant fashion it does today is a historical 
improbability. Historians account for that vibrancy by pointing out, among other things, 
the geographical isolation of the Indians and the snail’s pace by which they were 
integrated into Trinidadian political and popular culture. It would be impossible to 
determine whether Hinduism would exist in its current state had Indians been more 
readily integrated into their new social environment. Given the evidence, however, from 
throughout the Hindu diaspora, it seems reasonable to conclude that Hinduism would still 
exist in Trinidad in something like its current robust state. More than a reflexive 
nationalism, I will argue, kept the Hindu community together throughout the fragmenting 
process of colonialism, indentureship, and cultural imperialism. While Hindus in India 
sought to withstand the pressures of colonial modernity through articulating a Hindu 
essence and thus fixing a Hindu identity, Trinidadian Hindus faced imperialism with 
creative adaptability. They survived not by cultural monopoly but by bricolage. They 
assembled the fragments of their old mythological world, as Boas put it, to reassemble a 
new one in a novel land (see Levi-Strauss 1965: 202). To adapt to the environment 
around them, however spatially remote they may have been from Trinidad’s cultural 
center, required collecting the fragments of past practice and forging a creole Hinduism. 
Because Hinduism never held a position of supremacy, never determined normative 
values for the vast majority of Trinidad’s populace, never structured cultural features of 
the state, Hindus were never in a position to assert authority, to establish truth regimes, or 
to define a Hindu essence. Undoubtedly, it was abundantly clear to the cast away Hindus 
that existence precedes essence, to put it in existentialist terms (Sartre 1949). Hinduism 
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was not simply carried over the Kalam Pani to be replanted in the New World. It had to 
be constructed.  
Hinduism was, however, threatened by many of the same forces that threatened it 
in India. The colonial project, with its emphasis on the efficiency of production and the 
systematization of labor, dismantled and fragmented cultural frameworks and reordered 
them with its own logic of capital accumulation (James 1989; Williams 1994). Implicated 
in processes of Western imperialism was Christianity and missionarism, uneven, 
contradictory, and complicated as it was (Turner 1998: 66). Adding to the litany of 
troubles besetting them, Hindus in Trinidad were also removed from the thrum of ritual 
and hermeneutic processes that nurture belief and practice. Most of the Hindu Indians 
arriving in the West Indies throughout the indenture period did so from disparate parts of 
India and were predominantly of labor, rather than priestly, castes (Brereton 1985). 
Indentured Hindus, like the African slaves before them, thus had to cobble together a 
functional model of religious practice from the fragments of interpretations brought to the 
New World over the Kalam Pani (on processes of creolization see Knight 1990; Benitez-
Rojo 1998; 2006; Harris 1998; Hall 2007b; Gilroy 1993). The fragments of religious 
practice and interpretation pieced together over the years following the introduction of 
Indian indenture did not happen in total isolation. Despite the geographical divide of 
Indians in and around the plantations in the rural areas and the former slaves moving 
increasingly to urban areas in search of non-agricultural labor, Indians still had to contend 
with Trinidad’s dominant Christian, Afro-Creole culture. Unlike in India, where Hindus 
feeling besieged by colonialism, Christianity, Islam, and modernity agitated to maintain 
social supremacy and religious purity in the form of Hindutva (see, for example, 
  110 
Sarvarkar 2003 [1923]), Hindus in Trinidad attempting to preserve their heritage had to 
find a means of carving space in the local cultural landscape for themselves. Doing so 
required not only ingenuity, but a great deal of compromise. The loss of established 
institutions such as the varna, or caste, system (Vertovec 2010) and Indian languages 
(Singh 1985; Mahabir: undated) signaled two of the largest compromises Hindu Indians 
would make settling permanently in Trinidad.  
In constructing a creole tradition in the Caribbean, Hindus were, and are, doing 
what generations of West Indian slaves had done before them. They constructed new 
logics, new unifying principles, and new imaginative spaces from fragments picked up 
from the past and from a wholly new present. They became a part of the machinery of 
modern capitalism in Europe’s production colonies of the New World and imbibed the 
mechanistic logic by which capitalism operates (Benitez-Rojo 2006). Pulled from an 
indigenous logic into one centered around efficiency, production, and labor, slaves and 
indentured workers became what Scott has accurately termed “conscripts of modernity” 
(2005). The jarring shift from communal logics to one of capital accumulation and 
efficient control, ushered the collapse of a pre-modern lifeway that could only be partially 
reconstructed. The inherently fragmentary and constructed nature of all knowledge, of all 
organizing principles and cultural logics, must have been disconcertingly clear to slaves 
and indentures burdened with the task of fashioning some kind of meaningful culture in 
the face of such gross imperialism. Trinidadian Hindus, however, had an advantage in 
several regards. Hinduism was never outlawed in the way many West African 
polytheistic traditions were (Houk 1995). Despite the idiosyncratic regionalism of Hindu 
practice and understanding, there was enough similarity within the complex – names of 
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the devas, puja practice, folktales – to reconstruct a faithful Hinduism. Indentured 
Hindus, though many of them illiterate in Indian languages and English, had sacred texts, 
such as the Ramayana, the Bhagavad Gita, the Puranas (stories of the devas), the Vedas, 
and the Mahabharata, that could be referenced. And, beginning in the 20th century, they 
welcomed Hindu missionaries to Trinidad who helped establish mandirs, schools, and 
interpretive traditions. None of these features, however, either in sum or individually, 
could prevent the creolization of practice. Hindu Indians had to refashion a coherent logic 
from whatever elements made sense within the new order, just as the slaves did 
generations before them.   
Throughout the toilsome and disrupting process of indenture and immigration, the 
Ramayana has served as an inspirational text whose message of perseverance, strength, 
and determination rings true to the experiences of Trinidad’s Hindus. The epic journey 
from India to present-day Trinidad, involving exile, coercion, and destruction is mirrored 
in the story of Rama and his companions as they work together to restore the dharma and 
promote peace and prosperity on earth. As Shrutiji explains, “we too are exiles, and must 
have the discipline to work like our ancestors did.”  As I will explore in the next section, 
the use of the Ramayana as a central rallying point for the process of cultural 
construction and community cohesion is part of a West Indian tradition social 
constructivism.      
 
Caribbean Nationalism: Trinidadian National Identity as Bricolage 
Caribbean nationalism is complicated by several features unique to the region. The 
process of generating a homogenous culture within a creole context has vexed nearly all 
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Caribbean states. Beleaguering such attempts are problems of cultural pluralism, identity 
politics (Knight 1990), and what Paul Gilroy has called ‘double consciousness’ (1993). 
Double consciousness, Gilroy states, is the impossible task of attempting “to face (at 
least) two ways at once” (1993: 3). His metaphor of facing several directions at once 
neatly articulates not only the condition of modernity former colonial subjects find 
themselves in, but also the double bind of state-level nationalist projects throughout the 
Caribbean. During the independence movements of the 1960s, leaders of the British West 
Indies had to negotiate the inheritance of colonial political and social structures on the 
one hand, and an oppositional creole voice calling for autonomy and an indigenously 
derived social system on the other. The problem leaders of state-level nationalist projects 
in more ethnically homogenous states like Jamaica, Barbados, and Granada faced was 
one of finding a suitable nationalist narrative. Narratives of African primordialism, such 
as those espoused by pan-African nationalists and, later, by leaders of the Black Power 
movement (Oxaal 1968), risked sounding anti-modern and alienating the sizable 
Christian populations. Yet failing to draft an indigenous creole ideology risked aligning 
oneself with the metropole. Nationalist leaders then had to walk a delicate high wire act 
between modernity (that is, European sophistication) and a creolism that was sufficiently 
African in its orientation. West Indian political leaders hoping to assume control of the 
state had to promote an ideology that simultaneously resisted European hegemony while 
leaving in tact many of the structures, both political and social, European masters were 
leaving behind. Trinidad’s Eric Williams is a prime example of a state leader who deftly 
embodied both modernity and an indigenous creole consciousness.  
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An Oxford educated doctor of history, Williams’ political party, the People’s 
National Movement (PNM), began mobilizing in 1956 to assume control of Trinidad and 
Tobago. By Independence in 1962 Williams was the clear favorite to lead Trinidad into 
its post-colonial phase. Like his teacher before him, C.L.R. James, Williams was 
intensely critical of British imperialism and spoke openly of its history of abuses against 
its colonial subjects (see, for example, Williams 1971; 1981; 1994; James 1989; see also 
Ryan 2009). Despite his vocal criticism of imperialism, Williams’ Oxford education, his 
sharp erudition and professionalism, and his sophisticated mien, made him the 
quintessential West Indian creole. Wiliams’ ability to face several directions at once 
endeared him to Afro-creoles of all classes who regarded him as one who beat the British 
at their own game7. Williams was a professional – always sharp in appearance, articulate 
in speech, and widely respected among scholars. That Williams’ policies did little to 
ameliorate the poor conditions of many Trinidadians was immaterial to his large and 
loyal constituency. In the eyes of his allegiant supporters, he was one who achieved 
success abroad – where he easily could have stayed – and brought his expertise home 
where he used it to thwart colonialism and rebuild Trinidad. And though he often spoke 
critically of Trinidad and of Trinidadians, routinely bemoaning the lack of discipline in 
the country (see Ryan 2009: 315; 538; 544), his reproaches only seemed to earn him 
                                                        7 On this notion of beating the British at their own game see Lazarus’ compelling essay 
Cricket, modernism, national cutlure: the case of C.L.R. James. Lazarus brilliantly 
captures in this piece the tension surrounding cricket in the West Indies and the ways in 
which the game served as both technology of social/bodily control and as a medium by 
which West Indians could defeat the British at their own game. Cricket then is one of 
many examples of Gilroy’s concept of double consciousness. The structure, sentiment, 
and rules of the game are thoroughly English. Yet, as Lazarus and C.L.R. James (  )both 
point out, West Indians expressed themselves through the game in their own idiosyncratic 
fashion. Put another way, they creolized cricket.    
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more respect. As Martin, owner of a small guest house I stayed in on my first day in 
Trinidad, put it, “He never did a damn thing for [Trinidadians], but everybody loved him 
anyway. He could walk in any neighborhood – Laventille, Beetham Gardens, Dry 
River8– and everybody come out to shake his hand.” When I asked if current Prime 
Minister at the time Patrick Manning could do that too, Martin laughed and said he 
wouldn’t even try to go in the first place. When I protested that Manning seemed like a 
man of the people who spoke plainly, wore casual clothes, and had minimal western ties, 
Martin replied that that was precisely the problem. “He’s too much like them. He’s not 
respectable. Eric Williams always wore a suit. Everywhere he went.” That Williams 
“never did a damn thing for them” then mattered little to his followers because he was a 
modern man and a Trinidadian. His adroit handling of double consciousness between 
European modernity and a subtly infused African creolité9(Bernabé et al: 1993) solidified 
his position as the archetypal West Indian. Williams’ nationalist project spoke to a 
constituency yearning for the bourgeois ideal yet attempting to do so on its own terms. 
However, unlike the more ethnically homogenous West Indian states, Trinidad’s 
nationalist project never settled on an agreeable set of norms, practices, or ideals.  
Nationalist projects in pluralistic West Indian nations underscore the contested 
public space of nationalism itself. Like any identity category, nationalism is never a 
fixed, totally determined/determining discourse (on the instability of identity categories 
see Butler 2008). The inherent instability of nationalist ideals however is more 
                                                        8 Areas around Port of Spain renowned for extreme poverty and violence. 
 9 Bernabé et al define creolité as “the interactional or transactional aggregate of 
Caribbean, European, African, Asian, and Levantine cultural elements, united on the 
same soil by the yoke of history” (1990: 87).  
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pronounced in ethnically plural states like Trinidad, Guyana, or Suriname, where 
primordialist narratives risked alienating large sectors of society. Generating 
homogeneity from heterogeneity was, and still is, complicated by an immigrant 
population arriving from different quarters of the globe. Hindu nationalism in India, as 
we saw, developed a robust primordial discourse by drawing on a common fund of texts, 
symbols and folklore, and creating around them a regulatory hermeneutic that attempted 
to homogenize Hinduism’s vast diversity of practice. Framers of Hindu nationalism in 
India could afford, indeed desired, to alienate and marginalize other groups, primarily 
Muslims, because control of political, economic, and social mechanisms of power was 
largely Hindu. Hindus in India could also lay claim to ownership of Hindusthan through a 
continuous 4,000 year occupation of the land, however spurious and logically irrelevant 
such an argument may be. Architects of state level nationalism in multi-ethnic Caribbean 
nations could not develop and articulate such evocative imagery. The primordialist 
narratives and imagery that had so much cultural capital within ethnic groups led to 
conflict, in some cases violent conflict (Despres 1964; Williams 1993), in the public 
space of state formation. As Despres argues, the extreme pluralism of a state like Guyana 
was held together by the thin bond of labor regulation under imperial authority (on the 
plural society see 1964: 22-29; also Smith 1965: 75-91). Ethnic antagonism never 
metastasized into violent conflict under Crown rule, Despres argues, because of a 
regulatory regime that provided a veneer of commonality. As Independence neared, 
political groups mobilized their ethnic base to assume control of the state apparatus. That 
political parties congealed under the banner of ethnicity rather than class represents for 
most Caribbean scholars one of the divisive legacies of colonialism and one of the largest 
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stumbling blocks to statist nationalisms. As Brackette Williams asserts in her study of 
Guyanese nationalism, the cultural and political hegemony exercised by European 
powers throughout the period of colonialism lefts residues that indigenous elites would 
appropriate upon assuming control of the state (1991: 36). 
 Williams adopts Gramsci’s notion of transformist hegemony to explain how 
Guyana’s cultural elites adopted, like Eric Williams had in Trinidad, an anti-imperial 
rhetorical platform that ironically kept in place class division. The failure of post-
Independence Guyanese leadership was the inability to naturalize these unequal power 
relations as the Europeans had so successfully done during imperial rule (1991: 36). 
European domination was as successful as it was, she argues, because of their ability to 
naturalize class and ethnic divisions. Under a system of well-executed transformist 
hegemony, Gramsci explains, radical power differentials and unequal access to 
institutions of class mobility appear to be part of the natural order of things (2009). In 
Gramsci’s model, hegemony can manifest itself as either total domination, as in the case 
of Western imperialism, or as intellectual and moral leadership. In the case of the latter, 
which is Williams’ concern in Guyana, certain class groups, in the case of Europe it was 
the middle class, demonstrate an acceptable level of intellectual, moral, and hence 
political leadership that inspires faith from the masses. Following Marx, as that class 
assumes social and political power their ideas become the dominant ideas of the whole 
society (see Marx 1978: 172). Elaborating on Marx’s model, Gramsci suggests that the 
ruling class gains the consent of the masses by making some ideological and aesthetic 
compromises in the fabrication of social values and mores. In Gramsci’s terms, “The 
bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable if absorbing 
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the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level” (2009: 80). 
Thus, the state assumes the role not merely of political control but also of educator as the 
ruling class must also ‘educate consent’. In a transformist hegemony then, the ruling class 
does not merely forcefully impose its ideology on the masses in a repressive fashion (as 
in Adorno and Horkheimer’s model 1998: 910; 120-167).  Rather, through the 
demonstration of intellectual and moral leadership the ruling class acquires the consent of 
the proletariat and peasant classes. The problem of state nationalism in Guyana, Williams 
argues, was precisely the inability of the post-Independence ruling classes to demonstrate 
the moral and intellectual leadership necessary to inspire confidence and maintain order.  
To the extent that hegemonic expansion and legitimation depend on the  
transformation of the rural agricultural sector in order to increase productivity  
and, thus, to be able to reward, however unequally, supporting coalitions, the  
symbolism of ethnicity and its production remains a problematic aspect of the  
elite stratum’s effort to link political and economic control with moral and  
intellectual leadership, an accomplishment that Gramsci (1971) identified as an 
essential condition for transformist hegemonic dominance. (Williams 1991: 37)       
 
The problem of demonstrating the requisite leadership for post-Independence political 
leaders was especially acute in ethnically plural nations where class considerations were 
only part of the equation. As Eric Williams was clearly aware, gaining the consent of 
Trinidadians to lead was not merely an issue of winning favor among the various classes. 
Rather, given the history of mistrust between Indo- and Afro-Trinidadians, controlling 
the state apparatus, which is but one feature of a nation’s social architecture, would 
require nationalist narratives and policies that situated all Trinidadians in solidarity 
against European imperialism. His task was complicated by the rise of a professional and                                                         10 For example, on the transition from shamanism to religion, they note that “Magic is 
utterly untrue, yet in it domination is not yet negated by transforming itself into the pure 
truth and acting as the very ground of the world that has become subject to it.”  
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academic class of Indo-Trinidadians chaffing against what they perceived as the cultural 
and political hegemony of Afro-Creoles. Primordialist nationalism, as we have seen, was 
untenable, and in the case of Trinidad, the most viable alternative – narratives that situate 
all Trinidadians as former subjects of empire – also generated controversy and 
confrontation. Just as Guyana’s post-Independence leaders struggled to inspire 
confidence throughout the broader population and among various ethnic groups, so too 
did Trinidad’s PNM struggle to expand its constituency beyond its Afro-Creole base.  
 Eric Williams’ often awkward attempts to reach out to Indo-Trinidadians typically 
generated more hostility than solidarity. Indo-Trinidadians, depending on the context, 
historically have not seen themselves as passive victims of European imperialism. Rather, 
they tend to emphasize their autonomy within the indenture system and thus regard their 
history in Trinidad more as one of participation in, and even cooperation with, colonial 
projects and powers (Kahn 2004; Munasinghe 2001). This interpretation of history, 
widespread and easily located in Trinidad, confounds one of the few alternatives framers 
of statist nationalism have in Trinidad. In the absence of a viable primordialism within an 
ethnically plural Trinidad, and in the face of the failure of solidarity narratives, to what 
means do political leaders hoping to generate broad public support turn11? As I have 
argued already and will continue to argue in succeeding chapters, nationalisms in the 
Caribbean, both statist and ethnic, must draw from a fund of symbols, tropes, metaphors, 
and narratives that embody Gilroy’s double consciousness. The construction of post-
Independence Caribbean societies required the assemblage of fragments brought over                                                         11 The question presupposes, of course, a liberal democracy, excluding dictatorships such 
as Trujillo’s in the Dominican Republic from 1930-1961 (Crassweller 1966), the 
Duvaliers’ in Haiti from 1957-1986 (Trouillot 1990) and Castro’s in Cuba from 1959 to 
the present (Williams 1971).  
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from Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and those found in the New World. What 
Trinidad, along with every other Caribbean nation, had at its disposal was a congeries of 
symbols, cultural forms, narrative logics, and metaphors that, when mobilized, had to 
tread carefully between colonial resistance and modern containment, cultural autonomy 
and European appropriation, creative agency and post-Enlightenment logic (see Hall for a 
similar discussion 2010). It is in light of this complex set of nationalist possibilities that 
leads Knight to conclude that, “Nothing in the Caribbean is simple” (1990: 309). The 
problem for West Indian architects of national sentiment and post-Independence political 
leaders was therefore not simply one of fragmentation, of fitting together meaningful 
assemblages from the numerous cultural strands surviving in idiosyncratic fashion in 
every state. Rather, the process of bricolage needed to be done with care toward the 
narratives that would attempt to bind those pieces together. The ethnic nationalisms that 
emerged in places like Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad were already robust traditions by 
the time Independence came in the early 1960s. State-level nationalists such as Eric 
Williams in Trinidad, Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, Norman Manley in Jamaica, had to 
negotiate these insular nationalisms if they were to legitimate their brand of nationalism 
and assume both political and moral leadership of the country. Furthermore, they had to 
prove that their leadership was for the benefit of every citizen and not merely their own 
ethnic group, a task which they failed to do12.  
                                                        12 Space does not permit a meaningful discussion of Caribbean wide nationalist projects 
such as the failed West Indies Federation. However, it is worth briefly mentioning that 
the brief life of the Federation (1958-1962) is testament to the obstacles post-colonial 
regions such as the Caribbean face in forging nationalist sentiments that speak to and 
address the needs of vast group of nations despite similar historical circumstances.    
  120 
 Evidence for Eric Williams’ failed attempts at a state level nationalist project lie 
in the simple fact that political party affiliation in Trinidad remains stubbornly ethnically 
based. The Peoples National Movement (PNM) is still widely regarded as the Afro-
Creole party. And the United National Congress (UNC) maintains a loyal Indo-
Trinidadian constituency. Other parties such as the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR), headed since the late 1980s by A.N.R. Robinson, and the Congress of the People 
(CoP), headed by Winston Dookeran, have attempted to bridge the ethnic divide with 
limited success. Historically, Caribbean scholars have located the ethnic basis of party 
affiliation in legacies of colonialism that pitted ethnic groups against each other for 
scarce state-dispensed resources ((Munasinghe 2003; Niranjana 2006). In the run-up to 
Independence in Trinidad ethnic groups mobilized political factions to claim seats on the 
colonially administered Legislative Council. By 1929 the Indo-Trinidadian community 
had three seats on the Council from which to agitate for community improvement 
programs (Campbell 1985: 121). The results were mixed. Part of the problem lay in 
continued antagonism between Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians who struggled to find 
common cause. However, the late 1920s through the Labour Riots of the 1930s are 
widely regarded as the high water mark of Afro/Indo relations in Trinidad13. The larger 
problem lay in the administrative practices of the colonial government. The Legislative 
Council functioned more as a palliative than a true governing body. Naipaul’s cynical 
parody of the mystic masseur whose political activism is ultimately thwarted by a seat on 
the Council is grounded in reality (2002: 186-207). While the Legislative Council had all 
                                                        13 The Labour Riots and the social events leading up to them that saw greater solidarity 
between Trinidad’s two largest ethnic groups cannot be given exhaustive treatment here. 
For a more detailed discussion see Thomas 1987.  
  121 
the trappings of real authority, policy decisions remained in the hands of the Colonial 
Office and the Privy Council in England until Independence in 1962. The re-emergence 
of Afro/Indo tensions after the years of solidarity orchestrated primarily by Afro-
Trinidadian labor leader Tubal Uriah Butler and Indo-Trinidadian labor leader Adrian 
Cola Rienzi during the Labour Riots can be located in political processes that situated 
ethnic groups rather than class groups as the focus of agitation (Jacobs 1987).  
 The centrifugal forces of colonial administrative practices that divided Afro-and 
Indo-Trinidadians and pitted them against each other reached a zenith in the mid-1950s 
when formation of political parties that would assume control of the state emerged. Eric 
Williams’ PNM, formed in 1956, became the principle party of Afro-Creoles, while the 
Democratic Labour Party (DLP) emerged as the Indian party. Though both parties 
directed their ire toward the Colonial Office and openly agitated for unity and equality of 
all Trinidadians, by the late 1950s whatever sentiments of ethnic unity that existed began 
unraveling (Ryan 2009: 142-3). The politics of mistrust that dominated Afro/Indo 
relations before the labor solidarity movements of the 1930s returned during the period of 
Independence, reaching its height of vitriol during the Black Power movement and the 
peak of PNM power, both in the 1970s14. The PNM’s 25 year grip on political control 
lasted until 1987 when Robinson’s NAR, in a coalition formed with the UNC (formerly 
                                                        14 It must be noted that Black Power leaders were some of Eric Williams’ and the PNM’s 
most vociferous and implacable critics. As a Pan-African nationalist movement sweeping 
the Americas, Black Power leaders regarded Eric Williams as a colonial compromiser, 
too irreparably Western and bourgeois to help restore African greatness in the face of 
cultural imperialism. Though Black Power agitators did attempt to enlist Indo-
Trinidadians to their cause as fellow victims of white imperialism, Indo-Trinidadians 
wanted none of it, which only exacerbated tensions between the groups.   
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the DLP), wrested control of government. It was not until 1995 that Indo-Trinidad would 
see its first leader, Basdeo Panday, step into the role of Prime Minister.  
 Panday’s victory in the polls was a coup for Indo-Trinidadians who believed that 
it was finally their turn to control government. The long drought of political power was 
over, and Indo-Trinidadians could now claim their place among the elites of Trinidadian 
politics. But the victory was both contentious and short lived. Panday was widely viewed 
as corrupt by many Afro-Trinidadians, which may be a reflection of colonial tendencies 
toward stereotypes of the ‘underhanded’, ‘dirty’ Indian, or may be a reflection of 
Panday’s less than transparent, often questionable, political strategies15. In all likelihood 
it was a combination of both. Panday’s victory nearly set off riots in Afro-Trinidadian 
quarters of the state. It is common Trinidadian knowledge that elections typically bring 
out the worst in Afro/Indo relations. Many Trinidadians have described the ebb and flow 
of ‘racialist’ (racist) rhetoric that heats up during elections then dissipates shortly after 
the votes are tallied. Panday’s election was different. Afro-Trinidadians feared that 
Panday, who they regarded as a savvy power broker, would serve only the needs of his 
Indo-Trinidadian community, treating resources of the state as spoils to be divvied up 
between his loyal followers. Though many Indo-Trinidadians shared some of the broader 
populace’s concerns, even if not nearly as vocally, the simple fact that they had 
                                                        15 I should add that a fair amount of Indo-Trinidadians also had reservations about 
Panday. After he lost his seat as Prime Minister in 2000 due to corruption charges the 
UNC tried to expel him from the party with little success. After nine years of wrangling 
Panday was finally removed as head of the party, replaced by the widely popular Kamla 
Persad-Bissessar.  
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engineered a national victory signaled their arrival as fellow architects of Trinidadian 
social and political life.  
 As both Prime Minister and the face of a new era in Trinidadian social and 
political life, Basdeo Panday proved to be a radically polarizing figure. His platitudes 
about serving all Trinidadians rang as hollow for Afro-Trinidadians as Eric Williams’ had 
for Indo-Trinidadians. Panday’s political savvy, coupled with his sharp tongue and often 
eccentric political tactics made him an easy target for, and exemplar of, tenacious 
stereotypes of the underhanded, self-serving Indian. Just as Eric Williams had 
represented the essence of Afro-Creolité so too did Panday represent Indianness. 
Panday’s efforts at bridging Trinidad’s intractable ethnic divide failed for the same 
reasons Eric Williams’ had. Both came from separate spheres of Trinidad’s cultural 
landscape, leading to concerns that each was in office to serve his own community’s 
needs rather than the whole of Trinidad’s. The degree to which these anxieties were 
justified is not of interest here. More to the point, what I wish to underscore is the 
sentiment of mutual distrust that has permeated Trinidadian politics and which has 
prevented a meaningful statist nationalism from emerging. Panday could no more 
generate a feeling of national unity than Eric Williams could not simply because he was 
Indian or Eric Williams Afro-Creole. Rather, the problem for both leaders was that they 
were seen as embodying cultural mores, values, aesthetics, and logics, that have long 
been associated with either Indo-Trinidadianness or Afro-Trinidadianness. Racial 
discursive regimes inherited from imperial knowledge categories unquestionably play a 
significant role in this historical trend, but those regimes are neither totally determined 
nor totally determining. What I would like to argue here and in succeeding chapters is 
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that the monolith of colonial racial discourse is showing cleavages in certain areas of 
Trinidadian cultural life. Trinidad, as with all other nations, is changing rapidly. The 
racial essentialisms upon which colonial knowledge categories were built are less overt 
than in times past, nuanced by claims of cultural difference and symbolic diversity and 
overshadowed by concerns stemming from beyond Trinidad’s borders.  
 For members of the Kendra, as with many other Hindus in Trinidad, the 
preservation and maintenance of Hinduism is less about competition for and control of 
state resources. Expressions of ethnic nationalism that would assert cultural and racial 
aptitude for state control and moral leadership are giving way to concerns about 
competing in a highly uncertain, Western dominated global market. As the following 
chapters will describe, in nearly every interview and in numerous observations of class 
discussions and organized educational activities, the most dominant theme was one of 
market competition. This is not to say that political hegemony has been totally forgotten. 
In the years leading up to Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s historic election, Indo-Trinidadians 
openly lamented their long run of political futility, insisting that it was their turn to run 
government. But the position of such concerns is not as central as in times past, 
particularly since the election of Kamla and the erosion of PNM dominance. The next 
chapter will consider the question of interpretation and the ways in which many 
Trinidadian Hindus interpret scripture in light of broader global-social concerns.
  
  125 
CHAPTER IV 
 SUBJECT CREATION, DISCIPLINE, IDENTITY 
FORMATION 
The cynicism of the politician whose premise was that “in politics anything goes” had 
penetrated deeply into the psychology of the masses. 
~ Selwyn Ryan, Eric Williams: The Myth and the Man 
 
In the expression “Islamic government,” why cast suspicion immediately on the adjective 
“Islamic”? The word “government” by itself is enough to awaken one’s vigilance. 
~ Michel Foucault, Open Letter to Mehdi Bazarga 
 
 
In her book No Bond but the Law (2004), historian Diana Paton effectively argues against 
the notion that humanistic governing strategies emerging in post-Enlightenment Europe 
shifted British jurisprudence in its Caribbean colonies from one of brutality to 
temperance. Using Jamaica as a case study, Paton examines the historical record to find 
that corporeal punishment remained a central feature of colonial punitive measures well 
after the Slave Emancipation Act was formally instituted in 1838 (2004: 9). Paton’s work 
seeks to challenge Foucault’s notion of changing governing strategies during the 
humanistic revolution by asserting that far “from marking a sharp break with strategies of 
power that inflicted pain on the bodies of subjects, slaveholders and state systems of 
punishment made direct use of physical violence and the infliction of pain…” (2004: 10). 
Similar to Jamaica, in Trinidad physical violence, the infliction of pain, and the use of 
fear were deployed by the island’s first governor, General Picton, as routine strategies of 
control in an attempt to impose order on a colony he was warned had no discipline and a 
simmering revolutionary spirit (Cudjoe 2003: 11). This chapter will explore Trinidad’s 
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historic “lack of discipline”, as Eric Williams put it (Ryan 2009: 149), arguing that the 
island’s status as an immigrant country lends it its notorious absence of social structure. 
Furthermore, this lack of structure and discipline are the very features of Trinidadian 
public culture that give rise to many parents’ anxieties and which animate the Kendra’s 
efforts to promote discipline and diligence in their students.  
 
The ‘Subversion of Categories’: A Short History of Discipline in Trinidad 
Standing trial for charges of torturing an eleven year old mulatto girl named Louisa 
Calderon, General Thomas Picton, Trinidad’s first governor, and his defense attorney, 
Robert Dallas, justified the governor’s actions on the grounds that the West Indian 
context demanded a subversion of the usual rationality and temperance guiding British 
jurisprudence (Epstein 2007: 721-22). The prosecution argued that the governor’s cruel 
tactics stood in contrast to the enlightened principles of humanitarianism shaping British 
law and represented the barbarism and lawlessness rampant in the British Caribbean 
(Cudjoe 2003: 17). To abolitionists and critics of colonial imperialism, Governor Picton’s 
actions were emblematic of the kinds of moral and juridical abuses permeating Britain’s 
overseas labor colonies. For his part, the governor insisted that his disciplinary strategies 
were no different than what any other colonial governor would do and which is required 
by the onerous task of imposing order and discipline on an unruly colony. Indeed, 
General Abercromby, who had given Picton, at the time of his appointment in 1801 a 
colonel, the keys to Trinidad, impressed upon the new governor his need to keep tight 
reins on a population tending toward criminality. A wealthy and powerful planter, 
Christóbal de Robles, reminded the newly appointed governor that England’s conquest of 
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the former Spanish colony was now largely his to govern as he pleased, advising him that 
British sovereignty had “virtually combined in you the whole power of the government”, 
allowing him to ignore conventional “forms or modes of prosecution” (cited in Epstein 
2007: 716). The newly appointed governor was warned that Trinidad was an island of 
desultory cast-abouts and wayward citizens who worked only when necessary and largely 
by guile. Governor Picton’s desire to reform Trinidad from a colonial backwater to a 
crown jewel mixed dangerously with this unfettered rule, his unchecked bravado, and his 
irascible, almost paranoid, temperament.  
 Trinidad became Picton’s own fiefdom, which he governed like a tyrant (Brereton 
1982). Picton’s governing style was capricious, cruel, and often mercilessly intolerant of 
anything resembling insubordination. He imprisoned, tortured, and hanged citizens he 
feared might be conspiring to rebel against him. Petty criminals received punishments 
well in excess of their minor crimes. At the time of Louisa Calderon’s imprisonment and 
subsequent torture, five other women were awaiting punishment on crimes of alleged 
witchcraft and sorcery. Calderon herself was guilty of having conspired with another man 
to rob her husband of $2,000. When Calderon refused to implicate her accomplice, Picton 
ordered her tortured by piquet, a mechanism operated by pulley that lowered a bound 
prisoner’s foot onto a sharp spike. Governor Picton himself had ordered the use of the 
piquet in Trinidad, claiming it was the perfect prescription for curing the colony of its 
lawlessness. Calderon was piqueted twice, once for 54 minutes and a second time for 23 
minutes until she revealed the name of her accomplice and the whereabouts of the 
money.   
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   The “case of Picton and the cause of Louisa Calderon”, as Epstein phrases it, 
became a rallying point for detractors of colonial excess. William Barrow, leading the 
prosecution against Picton, stated with chagrin that in his role as representative of the 
British Crown and as governor of a colony and thus “bound to protect his fellow 
subjects”, Picton had “disgraced the country to which he was born” and “stained British 
character” by his actions (cited in Epstein 2007: 719). Garrow went on to explain to the 
court that though jurisprudence in the colonies is a different matter than in England, 
Picton’s interpretation and administering of law was unacceptably barbaric. Picton was 
ultimately found guilty of torture but never sentenced and served no prison time.  
 For Caribbean literary historian Selwyn Cudjoe, the case of Governor Picton is 
emblematic of colonial ways of “othering” the subjects of empire both legally and 
through the construction of local “sensibilities” in written texts (2003: 17). The story of 
Louisa Calderon, Cudjoe explains, “is a valuable literary and generalized representation 
of how the newly emerging Trinidadian subject was viewed in this slave society” (2003: 
21). For Epstein, Picton’s case and Calderon’s cause evoke questions about gender, race, 
and class relations, but ultimately about “the uncertainties of colonial rule” (2007: 719). 
Like Cudjoe, Epstein is intrigued by how the case played havoc with “settled fictions of 
British identity” as Calderon’s “in-betweenness ramified this subversion of categories” 
(2007: 724). Like Cudjoe and Epstein I am interested in how cases such as Picton and 
Calderon’s are exemplary of identity and subject creation strategies, but also in the ways 
in which the case illustrates the problematization of humanistic governing strategies in 
the colonial world. The problematization (Rabinow 2003) of revolutionary governing 
strategies inaugurated in the 19th century that turned toward the creation of subjectivity 
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and the careful maintenance of class, racial, sexual, and national identity applied not only 
to the metropolitan powers of Europe but to their colonial subjects as well (Cf. Paton 
2004). In Trinidad, however, the conflict between plantation-style punitive measures and 
new juridical practices emerging from European humanism was compounded by a Creole 
society becoming ever more so plural as new waves of immigrants began arriving in the 
mid-19th century. Trinidad’s multicultural population, coupled with its enduring cynicism 
and abiding mistrust of authority made it a particularly troublesome island to govern. 
Discipline, as I have noted, became the catchword of Trinidad’s first Prime Minister, Eric 
Williams, who feared that without it, Trinidad would be left behind by other Caribbean 
nations. It did not bode well for Trinidad that the new West Indies Federation refused 
Chaguaramas, a port town in the north-west, as its capital on the grounds that the island 
experienced too much corruption (Ryan 2009: 172). For many Hindus of Trinidad, 
discipline must be integrated into the local communities first, then into the broader 
national community if the country is to move beyond what they see as its second-class 
status. 
    
Disciplining Trinidad 
In 2007 Patrick Manning, then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, rolled out what 
he and his PNM party dubbed “Vision 2020.” The Vision was Manning and the PNM’s 
program to bring Trinidad and Tobago into the First World by the year 20201.  To 
demonstrate to Trinidadians their commitment to the economic development of the 
country, Manning and the PNM embarked on a four-town whistle stop tour of Trinidad                                                         
1 The language and phrasing, incidentally, is theirs, taken from numerous speeches I 
attended and pamphlets collected.  
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and Tobago. They brought music (a Chutney artist), elaborate slide shows, and top-
ranking members of the party, capped by Manning himself, to highlight the country’s 
progress so far under PNM leadership and the progress yet to be made. Large pictures of 
shiny factories, new government buildings and projects, schools and universities, and 
new housing projects faded in and out as one speaker after the next touted Trinidad’s 
inevitable rise to First World status. Judging by the pictures and rhetoric, Trinidad was 
ready to overtake Switzerland any day now as a land of prosperity and discipline. By 
2020, Manning told what was by now a sparse and largely disinterested crowd, Trinidad 
will be respected globally as a member of the First World. Sensing that he was losing his 
audience to boredom, or fatigue, or perhaps other interests, the Prime Minister began 
sharply raising his voice every few seconds, sounding more hysterical than emphatic. He 
reminded his citizens, in a tone that sounded more like reproach than inspiration, that 
Trinidad will only achieve its goals with the focus and determination of its people. Sadly, 
his people were not listening, and Manning appeared to be losing his grip. What started 
out as a pep-rally ended as a rather frustrated reprimanding.  
As I stood watching Manning’s meltdown in the University of Woodford Square 
in downtown Port of Spain, the same place Eric Williams had given his history and 
political lectures to anyone who cared to listen and for which the modifier “University” 
was added to the square’s name, I wondered if Manning was now feeling the same sense 
of frustration and futility Williams had as he tried to “discipline” Trinidad. The event 
underscored for me the difficulty of a nationalist project in Trinidad and explained why 
many groups, especially many Hindus, who fear that Trinidad’s general educational and 
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economic environment is not sufficiently competitive, turn to their own resources to 
foster discipline and competitive professionalism in their members.     
A continual refrain among Trinidad’s Hindus is the voicing of concern over the 
spiritual influence of broader Trinidadian culture on their youth. What Sat Maharaj, 
President of Trinidad’s largest Hindu organization the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha 
Society, has referred to as the ‘culture of the extended Carnival’, goes by many 
euphemisms, several of them geographical – the North, the East-West corridor – others 
operating as group signifiers – Trini culture, carnival culture, Soca. Encountering thinly 
veiled references to the spiritually and thus socially disruptive Afro-Trinidadian culture is 
as commonplace as pan music. Whether in public statements such as Sat Maharaj’s or in 
casual conversation, Hindus routinely express anxiety about the allure that the carefree 
‘culture of the extended carnival’ will hold for their children. The exegesis of this 
anxiety, and its various iterations, yields numerous readings. Historically we may read 
the Indo-Trinidadian struggle for inclusion and empowerment from a marginal position in 
Trinidadian politics and cultural production. Additionally, we might also note, as nearly 
all scholars of Indo-Afro-Trinidadian relations have, the vestiges of colonial racial 
discourses that continue to prompt essentialist stereotypes of Afro-Trinidadians as people 
motivated largely by lust and revelry (in addition to already cited scholars in this 
discourse, for example Munasinghe 2001; Brereton 1985; Khan 2004; and Niranjana 
2006; see also Rampersad’s Sunday Express article “Why we lie about each other” 2007). 
In a more contemporary context, readings of Hindu concern over the social dominance of 
Afro-Trinidadian culture may also yield evidence of a tenacious Hindu nationalism that 
situates Hinduism as a tradition of inquiry, erudition, and discipline. From this 
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interpretation one may read the urgent need of an anxious Hindu community attempting 
to keep its tradition in tact in the face of dilution or even annihilation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to problematize these well-mined readings. I would 
like to problematize these readings not because I believe they are inaccurate or wrong-
headed in any way. Quite the opposite. Narratives of concern over Afro-Trinidadian 
cultural influence are racist rehearsals of colonially derived truth regimes. They are 
linked to anxieties about inclusion and community empowerment. And they are 
expressions of cultural nationalism. But they are not any one these alone. In some 
contexts, uttered by certain individuals they may be. But taken collectively they express 
all of these concerns as well as others that have not been so thoroughly explored. 
Borrowing a term from Raymond Williams (1984) the narratives of concern can be 
viewed as a ‘convergence’ of numerous historical and contemporary discourses. What I 
would like to explore here is the contemporary concern of Hindu Trinidadians with 
competition in the local and global capitalist market. In the last chapter I explored 
Raviji’s declaration that he is a Hindu nationalist, interrogating what such a statement 
could mean in a creole context such as Trinidad in particular and within the West Indies 
more generally. What I would like to explore here is Raviji’s later claim that he is “not a 
preservationist”, but rather “an innovator.” Why is Trinidad, as Raviji confessed to me, 
“a better place to be a Hindu than India”? The aim of this chapter then is to argue that 
contemporary forms and practices of Hindu subject creation are in response to and 
animated by more global concerns about marketplace competition and capital efficacy. 
The rigid nationalisms of India that strive to fix Hindu practice and interpretation give 
way in Trinidad to more fluid religious expressions and are therefore regarded as more 
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cosmopolitan and more modern. I would like to explore in this section theories that 
attempt to understand how subjectivity is constructed, shaped, and determined in order to 
argue first that subject determining forms are negotiable and thus partially indeterminate, 
and second that the fluidity of identity in Trinidad renders claims of ethnic nationalism as 
a response to discursive hegemony problematic.  
 
Subjectivity, Identity, and Identification 
My concern in this section is to identify and analyze how the public space of modern 
global capitalism – consumerism, representation, temptation – is negotiated by a 
community often easily labeled locally and in the scholarly canon as ethnic/religious 
nationalists. The Hindu communities I worked with in Trinidad are motivated not simply 
by some archaic brand of preservationism but rather by a longing for control over the 
intellectual and spiritual shape of their children. These communities are engaged in 
processes beyond merely trumpeting their historical/cultural successes in a bid for scarce 
state dispensed resources (Khan 2004: 18; 52). Rather, they are deeply concerned with 
maintaining the power to determine the intellectual contours and moral direction of their 
children in the face of global and local popular cultures that they paradoxically view as 
spiritually disruptive and full of temptation on the one hand, and yet as a space in which 
they wish compete in as equals with the West on the other. It is worth reiterating that 
Trinidadian Hindus, as with many other groups around the world (many religious but 
others less so) harbor feelings of ambivalence toward modernity – they are consumers of 
it, often excitedly so, and yet they also worry about its effects on their children and wish 
to retain control over the parameters by which subjectivity is shaped. The loop does not 
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stop there though as one of the principle reasons for maintaining control of subjectivity is 
so that their kids will succeed within the complex and competitive space of modernity. 
Thus, I will outline here a few salient theories of subject creation in order to preface my 
argument that the colonial governmentality of Trinidad, such as it was, has been both 
accommodated and renegotiated as transnational ideas, ideologies, and possibilities have 
emerged. To phrase the problem in Stuart Hall fashion, the only recourse by which to 
engage colonial discursive hegemony is not simply to generate or fall back on ethnic 
nationalism and racial essentialism. Rather, other possibilities can be and often are to 
reinterpret, reimagine, and reconfigure that hegemony in an attempt to forge new 
possibilities (Hall 2010; also Appadurai 2006; Gilroy 1993).   
Throughout his voluminous work, Foucault outlines the ways in which control of 
populations has shifted from that of sovereign power to the more subtle workings of 
control of the body through juridical-medical-scientific discourse. The scientific 
revolution, and later the bourgeois revolution, inaugurated new means of population 
control that operated through the creation of discursive categories that functioned as 
‘regulatory regimes’ (Foucault 1995). The turn from territorial control of the sovereign 
powers to bodily control under the bourgeois regimes meant an emphasis on shaping 
subjectivity, or what has been referred to as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 1991: 
100). Europe’s changing cultural logic from one of feudalism to a capitalist one required 
a new citizenry. It was no longer sufficient to simply police a territory, or a boundary, but 
rather to police the very activity of the individual body itself and the uses to which it was 
put. Bodies needed to be efficient, orderly, properly maintained, and appropriately 
employed. Control of the body, however, could not be repressive. Repressive control, 
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Foucault points out (following Althusser 1995: 112), is one of repeated negations, which 
is an untenable practice of power. Control of the body then had to emerge through 
juridical-medical discourse that regulated care of the self (Foucault 1990a 115-131; 
1990b: 25-32). Whole categories of sexual, emotional, psychic, and behavioral conduct 
articulated proper care of the self and delineated the pathological from the acceptable, the 
abnormal from the normal, the deviant from the citizen.  
Through the sciences of the body and of the self emerged novel forms of subject 
creation. Unlike the structuralists before him – Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim – who 
posited that meaning was made relationally, Foucault argued that knowledge categories 
did far more than shape meaning. Rather, discursive categories functioned as truth 
regimes that determined subjectivity itself. Subject determination, though never fully 
complete (Foucault 1990: 101), is a product of the limitations and foreclosures of 
knowledge that circumscribe the imaginable. This is not to say that the way in which the 
self can be imagined is necessarily predetermined, but rather to emphasize that the 
discursively derived norms structure, and thus limit, the range in which the subject may 
self-determine, a problem I take up in more detail below in the discussion of Judith 
Butler. The question of agency in this system then is one that must be interrogated if we 
are to understand how Hindu subjectivity in Trinidad is negotiated.  
 In Foucault’s model subject determination is a product and project of power. 
Power, Foucault asserted, is the animating force of discourse, by which the subject is 
determined. Foucault remained cagey about both power and its ability to completely 
determine subjectivity. In his famous Method chapter of the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality, Foucault outlines the salient features of power, prefaced by an insistent plea 
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of how we should not view power and its functions. After establishing that power is not 
top down subjugation, subservience, or repression he offers this: 
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and 
which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the 
support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a 
system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them 
from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose 
general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in 
the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (1990: 92-93, 
emphasis added) 
 
We can conclude from this statement, paradoxical and contradictory as it seems, that 
power is not a single thing, force, event, or property. It is not like a commodity to be 
owned and wrested from one group to another as each seeks control of others. Power is 
the field of force relations itself. It is the territory, or social space, within which the 
multiplicity of actors, or force relations, interact, compete, resist one another, and 
struggle. Power is not the sole property of any one agent or group within this ‘sphere’, 
but rather the sphere itself as constituted by the force relations. As Foucault puts it, “the 
rationality of power is characterized by tactics” whose authorship may forever remain 
anonymous (1990: 95). It is essential to note for a later discussion of colonial subject 
creation that resistances to power are never external. All resistances and struggles against 
power occur within it, as a part of it, as a product of the same rationalities that shaped it. 
“Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance 
is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (1990:95).  It would appear then 
that power is ultimately determining. Put another way, the subject is always/already 
determined by power and as such cannot resist power from a position outside of it. If this 
is so, how do we address questions of agency? For example, how are we to understand 
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processes such as interpretation, dialecticism, reinvention in such a model? Is power both 
local and global? How far does the sphere extend? Are there remote boundaries, 
interstices, or locations and contexts where the reach of power within the sphere is 
weaker? Before addressing these questions and the question of operationalizing this 
model in a colonial and post-colonial context, I would like to consider one more iteration 
of Foucault’s understanding of power.  
 In a lecture he agrees is pretentiously titled “Omnes et Singulatum: Toward a 
Critique of Political Reason” delivered at Stanford University, Foucault is at his 
Nietzschean best tracing the genealogy of political control in Europe from pastoralism to 
the political state (1994). The piece is somewhat rambling and unpolished but interesting 
for its study of metaphors of control – i.e., the pastoralist keeping watch over every 
member of his flock versus the political sovereign simply keeping unity among a state’s 
members. Each type of control operates from its own rationality of power, the former 
from a Judeo-Christian logic of individual care (as expressed by Yahweh), and the latter 
from a logic of technocratic maintenance. In either case, power, and the logic and 
rationality by which it is deployed, is part of “the art of government”.  In this lecture 
Foucault offers what is arguably his most direct definition of power. 
Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be 
delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals. Such 
relations are specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, production, 
communication, even though they combine with them. The characteristic feature 
of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s 
conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively. A man who is chained up and 
beaten is subject to force being exerted over him, not power. But if he can be 
induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, 
preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom 
has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an 
individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject 
him to government. There is no power without refusal or revolt. (1994: 324)  
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Here Foucault is clear about the practice of power – some people may indeed wield it 
against others in order to “entirely determine other men’s conduct”. This definition is in 
keeping with Discipline and Punish (1995) where Foucault illustrates the material 
connections of power as Europe shifted from feudalism to capitalism, a shift requiring 
new organizational logics and an efficient, well-ordered, even well-bred population (see, 
specifically, his chapter Docile Bodies, 135-69). The citation above, as with his other 
definitions, posits refusal, revolt, resistance, as essential components of power. Power is 
not the isolated incidence of control, nor is it the act of refusal, but rather it is the entire 
field itself in which this control is enacted in the presence of numerous other forces. Yet 
despite the presence of these resistances and refusals, power ultimately determines the 
subjects within its sphere. If resistance and refusal occur within the terrain of power and 
not as external forces, how are we to understand something like colonial, creole societies 
in the West Indies? In other words, in pluralistic societies where for centuries the 
dominant governing system was force rather than power, how do we operationalize 
Foucault’s model? Even supposing the ontologic project of post-Enlightenment 
governmentality was “entirely determined”, which in itself poses numerous problems, 
how effective was such a program in Europe’s overseas colonies? Is not the very 
descriptor ‘creole’ itself evidence that subject determination in the Americas had limited 
success? I want to be careful here not to overstate my case by emphasizing agency over 
and above discursive hegemony. Plenty of studies exist already anyway that colorfully 
describe the many creative resistances enacted by colonial subjects (Herskovits 1947; 
Price 1996; Mintz 1989). To be clear, this study is less an analysis of the power/agency 
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binary and more an inquiry into what happens to those discursive forms as they are read, 
interpreted, and refashioned in a religious community that was once a subject of empire 
and which studies, in its own fashion, various forms of hegemony.   
 Several anthropologists working in the field of colonialism and post-colonialism 
have taken up Foucault’s project by interrogating imperial technologies of control 
through the lens of governmentality. Anthropologists of governmentality have examined 
the ways in which colonial regimes instituted policies concerned not so much with 
practices of force but with technologies of human control and the conducting of conduct 
(Inda 2005: 3-11). Central to this project is the examination of the productivity of power 
and the changing role of the colonial state from one of force and repression to one of 
paternalism and education. The anthropology of colonial governmentality at its core is a 
consideration of the state as a cultural locus that both determines and is determined by the 
society in which it operates (see, for example, Ferguson and Gupta 2005). Other studies 
employ Foucault’s insight into rationalities and technologies of discipline, such as the 
widely cited use of panopticism. Redfield, for example, examines the use of panopticism 
in European penal colonies in order to demonstrate how technologies of control kept the 
incarcerated docile and disciplined (2005: 50-79). Linking anthropologies of modernity 
and coloniality is the changing face of imperialism and the turn toward humanism that 
heralded a shift in technologies of subject control, discipline, and punishment. Similar to 
studies of imperial hegemony, scholarship of the modern colonial state concentrates on 
the productivity of power in its ability to enact disciplinary measures through discourse 
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rather than force2. But to what degree was the colonial state capable of determining their 
subjects? Was the humanistic project of scientific discourse and knowledge of the self as 
productive in the West Indies as it was in Europe? Did the Caribbean, or any of Europe’s 
colonies, constitute part of the sphere of modern discursive power? Can we consider the 
resistances, refusals, and revolutions on the part of colonial subjects elements in the field 
of force relations that make up power? Or are we to consider the West Indies, with its 
emphasis on the use of force and power in conjunction as its own sphere of power? 
Finally, how do we treat the question of Caribbean subjectivities in the face of colonial 
power and its hybrid creolization? Borrowing heavily from Judith Butler’s articulation of 
subjectivity, I will argue that the West Indian colonies operated at the margins of 
European power where, as Baudrillard would have it, the territory itself, not the 
schematic of it, began to fray and tatter (2000).   
 
The Contingency of Subjectivity  
To return to some of the questions posed earlier I would like to ask: Is power both local 
and global? How far does the sphere extend? Are there remote boundaries, interstices, or 
locations and contexts where the reach of power within the sphere is weaker? Using 
Trinidad as a case study, I propose as a preliminary response to these questions that the 
reach of British governmentality was indeed severely limited, even as imperial logics of 
subjectivity were imposed through numerous forms of education (Lazarus 1999). The 
question of the degree to which European hegemony determined its colonial subjects 
remains a contested one. As post-colonial theorist Aníbal Quijano (2008; see also                                                         
2 For a powerful rejoinder to this argument using evidence from colonial Jamaica see 
Paton 2004.  
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Mazzotti 2008) has rightly pointed out in his articulation of coloniality, western cultural 
logics, based principally on capital accumulation, radically reordered indigenous logics 
throughout the world. In so doing, the West refashioned the entire global order in its own 
image. Quijano, following the lead of numerous scholars of colonialism, goes on to 
examine the points of resistance and refusal of indigenous peoples to western 
imperialism. The discourse of coloniality, situated primarily in Latin America, has greatly 
enriched post-colonial studies through critical analyses of the productivity of western 
cultural imperialism and power. What I would like to do here is turn the lens away from 
specific instances of power and their accommodation or refusal and toward understanding 
processes of interpretation and the unstable, unpredictable, rapidly shifting nature of 
knowledge production in general and of the self in particular. I would like in this work to 
begin building an ethnographically grounded philosophy of interpretation that considers 
not only the previously explored functions of power but also the role of contingency, 
performativity, paradox, and contemporality in a post-colonial context. In other words, 
what are the lived experiences, receptions, and renderings of articulations of power in a 
post-colonial, pluralistic society? As I will argue in this chapter, communities are made 
up of individual actors continuously engaged in the process of operationalizing their 
subjectively rendered knowledge categories. As such, features such as paradox and 
contradiction operate seamlessly within the domain of a broader cultural logic and within 
the operative logic of individual members. My own work among Trinidadian Hindus has 
underscored for me the fact that paradox and contradiction are as much a part of 
knowledge categories, including ontological ones, as positive abstract forms.      
  142 
In a three way dialogue Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek agree that 
“’identity’ is never fully constituted” and, further, that “identification is not reducible to 
identity” (2000: 1). In her first essay of the dialogue, Judith Butler continues building on 
her already well articulated thesis (2006; 2010) that subjective experience is not only 
incapable of being fully captured by discursive forms (interpellated, in Althusser’s usage) 
but that subjective experience also potentially destabilizes the very category that attempts 
to universalize subjectivity itself. Departing somewhat from her typically Foucauldian 
approach, Butler latches on to a dialectical Hegelian analysis to address the question of 
universality in an attempt to determine how we might understand processes of subject 
formation. Just as Hegel had posited that the subject is continually in a state of 
transformation due to a shifting relationship with the object, so Butler asserts that Hegel’s 
utility is precisely in his awareness that universal forms and norms of culture (to use 
Rabinow’s language) exist in a contingent relationship with the subject. What Butler I 
believe rightly proposes is that we understand universals as existing in such relationships 
with subjects of any kind of hegemonic order. That is, because the subject by necessity is 
continually in a state flux, so to is whatever universalizing, abstract form that would 
attempt to regulate that subject. Any signifier then that attempts to establish meaning 
lives a double life: one in the abstract form from which it emerges and one within the 
concrete experience of the subject whose relationship to that signifier, which is a 
metonym of the universal abstract, is unstable. The meaning behind any given signifier is 
therefore contingent on the individual concrete context in which it operates.  
 To state this in more ethnographically grounded terms, consider the apparently 
self-evident term ‘indenture’. The polyvalence of the word is most immediately evident 
  143 
by the fact that it operates as a verb (to indenture or to be indentured), a noun (as in a 
laborer, an indenture, or a plantation worker), and an adjective (an indentured worker). 
But as with many signifiers pertaining to labor in the Caribbean, racial and class glosses, 
several of them pejorative, inhere to the term. The indenture program was a labor scheme 
engineered by the planter class designed to fill the dual need of bringing in more workers 
after Emancipation and to depress wages for the freed slaves. Its situation in such a 
complex social context made both the program and the term controversial. For the 
plantocracy, as the autocratic plantation economy has been labeled, the program was one 
of necessity if West Indian sugar production was to remain competitive3. The indentured 
laborers, in the eyes of the plantocracy, were a means to an end, and their exploitation 
was justified in as many creative ways as slavery was. For Afro-Trinidadians, the 
indenture program was an obvious ploy to depress wages in what was at the time one of 
the highest paid labor markets in the Caribbean by saturating the island with a surplus of 
desperate workers (Williams 1981: 99). The indentured, as far the freed slaves were 
concerned, were simply the latest cogs to grind the gears for a ruthless colonial machine, 
and their intrusion into the Trinidadian labor market foiled Afro-Trinidadian attempts at 
greater bargaining power and agency in a system that had long oppressed them. Thus, an 
indenture, in the eyes of the Afro-Trinidadian labor class, was an opportunistic scab 
whose immigration, most galling of all, had been procured at the expense of Trinidadian 
tax payers. For the descendants of indentures themselves, the term is laden with paradox. 
                                                        
3 Sugar prices fell dramatically in the mid- to late-19th century as import substitution 
industries emerged in Europe in the form of beat sugar production. Between the 1840s 
and the 1890s sugar prices plummeted as total global production increased 700 percent 
(Rogozinski 2000:187).  
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It is a signifier of exploitation and salvation, coercion and cooperation, resistance and 
accommodation.  
I have briefly alluded to the context dependent interpretation of the term 
‘indenture’ for many Indo-Trinidadians in the last chapter. The definition and 
interpretation of the term shift because the context is unstable and contingent on what 
facets of the seven-decade event the interpreter wishes to highlight. Equally as important, 
the racial and class position of the Indo-Trinidadian community, situated between Afro-
Creole Trinidadians and white colonials, motivated a highly paradoxical view of Indo-
Trinidadian participation in the indenture program. Indo-Trinidadian sentiment toward 
their Afro-Trinidadian counterparts has alternated throughout history between 
indifference, suspicion, animosity, solidarity, as well as numerous other nameless 
feelings, depending on the set of events unfolding in Trinidadian politics, labor, and 
economics. When emphasizing their resolve, ingenuity, and perseverance (think 
Ramayana), Indo-Trinidadians commonly interpret their history with indentured 
servitude as one of triumph against exploitation at the hands of seemingly more powerful 
forces (as Rama similarly accomplished against Rawana). In this narrative, the defining 
feature is fortitude as heritage of Hindu legacy. It is from this narrative strand that many 
observers see unabashed Hindu nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racial superiority. The 
subtext that is often rightly read into these narratives is one of Hindu resistance where 
their Afro-Trinidadian counterparts were simply exploited laborers who only acquired 
freedom after it was given4. The other side of this narrative is one of volition, partnership, 
                                                        
4 Naipaul suggests in his novel The Suffrage of Elvira that this could be fairly said of all 
Trinidadians. “Democracy had come to Elvira four years before, in 1946; but it had taken 
nearly everybody by surprise and it wasn’t until 1950, a few months before the second 
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and salvation. Indians participated in the indenture program willingly, it is often argued, 
in order both to strike out in new lands and to help England restore one of its beleaguered 
colonies. Trinidad was in a state of disarray before their arrival and needed the hard work 
and dedication of a new class of laborers to remedy it. Both narratives, as well as the 
myriad permutations of them, are, of course, apocryphal. As with nearly all apocryphal 
accounts, the interpretation of the events in question suit certain ideological ends. In the 
case of Hindu Indo-Trinidadians, the recasting of indentureship as a willfully engaged 
enterprise allows them to underscore their equality with empire. It is a means of 
understanding the self whose contingency rests on how the narrative of indenture is 
structured in specific social-political contexts. The utility of Butler’s model is 
immediately evident here as it is clear that discursive and repressive forms of hegemony 
are negotiated by Trinidadian Hindus in highly varied, often paradoxical and 
contradictory ways.   
Given the contingent nature of discourse and the way in which it is understood, 
reinvented, performed, and interpreted it needs to be accounted for in light of the context 
in which its technologies are deployed. The various interpretations of indenture in 
Trinidad should be understood not only as a refusal of western hegemony but also as a 
product and practice of a broader social-cultural ethos allowing for shifting valences and 
the destabilization of meaning. Aisha Khan’s classic essay ‘What is a Spanish’? 
accurately describes the contingency of the racial signifier ‘Spanish’ (1993). As Khan 
points out, the term’s ambiguity rests in part on the fact that the term itself is not always 
                                                                                                                                                                     
general election under universal adult franchise, that people began to see the 
possibilities” (1987: 13; see also Naipaul 1978: 78, where he uses virtually the same 
phrasing).  
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self-evident even to those who use it. It is a catch-all term that attempts to categorize 
those who do not fall obviously into the Indo-Afro phenotypic binary. The signifier is 
metonymical of social-cultural features that lend Trinidad its uniquely amorphous social 
structure that Naipaul disparagingly referred to as a ‘picaroon’ society. Using Naipaul’s 
critiques of Trinidad, I would like to outline some salient features of Trinidadian society 
based on textual, archival, and field research in order to establish the variability of 
discursive power and the problem of subject creation in colonial and contemporary times. 
I would like to use Naipaul as an entry into this discussion first to outline some of the 
broader features of Trinidadian social/cultural forms, and second to point out that it is 
within those behavioral points that Naipaul so disparagingly critiques that we can find the 
interstices of structural determination and subjective agency.   
 
Naipaul’s Trinidad: Convergences and Contestations 
 A mantra I’ve grown accustomed to hearing from several of my closest friends, 
confidants, and informants in Trinidad is to “read your Naipaul”. As far as they are 
concerned no writer, Trinidadian or otherwise, captures the essence of Trinidad’s 
uniquely eccentric character as Naipaul does. Of course, I have read and do read Naipaul 
routinely, but this is not what they mean. There is an unmistakable subtext to their 
imperative reminding me that Naipaul is one of the sharpest exegetes of Trinidad whose 
characterization of it is the clearest distillation of their post-colonial society. When 
discussing my fieldwork and the people I’ve met and worked with, I am often asked if 
I’ve read a certain Naipaul novel, which invariably leads the group into a long 
reminiscence of Naipaul’s colorful eccentrics and acerbic descriptions of Trinidadian life. 
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Inevitably I ruin the fun of rehearsing classic lines and scenes by launching into a critique 
of Naipaul’s narrow contextualization. Naipaul’s work does succeed as a satiric, vaguely 
ethnographic brand of literature. And several of his stereotypic characters are hardly 
embellished; Trinidad supplies plenty of eccentrics, such as those of Miguel Street 
(1984), that need little literary flourishes5.  Neither do I doubt that Naipaul’s 
characterizations of several of the broader trends and features of Trinidadian society are 
largely accurate. There is an unmistakable kind of individualism there that is cynical, 
guileful, and self-serving. And such a form of individualism does lend Trinidad an air of 
social lawlessness that subverts normative forms as they emerge. Yet it is this quality that 
lends Trinidad its undeniably creole character, its sense of cultural form in constant 
movement, negotiation, and contestation . But Naipaul’s characterizations emerge from a 
belief that the West Indies has never created anything, produces nothing but cheap 
facsimiles of western cultural forms, and strives in vain to mimic modernity without 
actually embracing the ideals and values that make modernity the success it has been in 
the West (see, for example, The Mimic Men 2001). “The history of the islands”, he 
writes, “can never be satisfactorily told. Brutality is not the only difficulty. History is 
built around achievement and creation; and nothing was created in the West Indies” 
(1978: 29).                                                          
5 On one of the many memorable late night drives around the island, my friend Burton 
regaled me with tales of some of Trinidad’s most iconic oddballs, several immortalized in 
calypsos. For example, there was Minuteman, a ‘Chinee’ (Chinese) peanut vender so 
called for his ability to materialize in any quarter of the three square mile Queen’s Park 
Savannah in mere minutes. My favorite character though was the taxi driver who ‘drove’ 
all over Trinidad in his invisible car. He could be seen walking in various parts of 
Trinidad, steering his invisible car along the streets and sidewalks. A small time 
politician got the great idea to ask the taxi driver if he could post his handbills all over 
since he covered so much ground. The driver agreed. He accepted the large sheaf of 
handbills, threw them in the backseat, and continued driving.  
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In a piece that earned him equal measures of scorn and accolades, V.S. Naipaul 
lays bare in The Middle Passage his stinging assessment of Trinidadian society. He 
describes Trinidad as a cynical society whose primary motivation is self- gain at the 
expense of others. Trinidad, according to Naipaul, is lawless, naturally anarchistic, 
corrupt, and brazenly self-serving. “Trinidad”, he states, “has always admired the ‘sharp 
character’ who, like the sixteenth century picaroon of Spanish literature, survives and 
triumphs by his wits in a place where it is felt that all eminence is arrived at by 
crookedness” (Naipaul 1978: 78). A consequence of such a cynical society is tolerance, 
but “not the tolerance between castes and creeds and so on – which does not exist in 
Trinidad anyway – but something more profound: tolerance for every human activity and 
affection for every demonstration of wit and style” (1978: 82). Thus, the picaroon society 
is one with a “taste for corruption and violence and [a] lack of respect for the person” 
(1978: 80). Naipaul traces this taste for corruption, violence, and trickery back to the 
colonial society “where every man had to be for himself; every man had to grasp 
whatever dignity and power he was allowed; he owed no loyalty to the island and 
scarcely any to his group” (1978: 78). Individualism then in the post-colonial West Indian 
society is not an ideology or an ethos but rather a consequence of a labor regime where 
only the most clever and cunning thrived6.  
The theme of the picaroon is revisited in nearly all of Naipaul’s Trinidadian 
novels. Given the choice between failure at the hands of the more cunning or success at 
one’s own, even well meaning people fall victim to using guile and trickery to achieve 
their aims, as seen most vividly in Naipaul’s portrait of Ganesh Ramsumair, in The                                                         
6 Eric Williams also inveighed against this type of individualism he believed rife in 
Trinidad (see Munasinghe 2001: 234).  
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Mystic Masseur (2002). Ganesh’s early adult life is a shiftless, desultory existence as he 
casts about for something to do and someone to be. He settles on becoming a writer, 
which inspires awe and deference among his peers. After five weeks of concentrated 
effort Ganesh published his first book, 101 Questions and Answers on the Hindu 
Religion. “Though Ganesh’s joy was great there was one disappointment he couldn’t 
quite stifle. His book looked so small. It had no more than thirty pages; and it was so thin 
nothing could be printed on the spine” (2002: 86). The book did little to bring Ganesh the 
notoriety he felt he deserved, small as it was. Desperate to bring more money into the 
house, Ganesh falls into curing spiritual and psychological maladies through the use of 
Hindu terminology (to lend his practice spiritual legitimacy), and psychology. Ganesh’s 
success as a mystical masseur and Hindu pundit turns him toward community activism 
and ultimately to politics where he “dropped Indology, religion and psychology and 
bought large books on political theory” (2002: 200). He also trades his turban and dhoti 
for suit and tie. Ganesh’s early desire to help Trinidadians, first through mysticism and 
psychology and later through community organizing, are thwarted in the end by a longing 
for status, recognition, and the hallmarks of modernity.   
 Ganesh is the perfect exemplar of Naipaul’s belief that Trinidadians’ success is a 
result of the artful use of ‘wit and style’. At the end of the novel, Ganesh callously forgets 
his village friends who supported him throughout his endeavors. Now in suit and tie and a 
Member of the Executive Council, Ganesh opts for a more modern and sophisticated 
name, coldly introducing himself to an old acquaintance who shouts his Hindu name in a 
London train station as ‘G. Ramsay Muir’ (2002: 208). The evolution of Ganesh 
Ramsumair from humble village mystic with largely pure intentions to G. Ramsay Muir, 
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a self-serving man of cold pretentions, illustrates what for Naipaul is the tendency of 
West Indians: loyalty to the self7. As in The Middle Passage, Naipaul points the finger of 
culpability at British social construction, though he seems ambivalent about doing so. 
Ganesh’s political activism and firebrand social advocacy catch the attention of colonial 
officials who promptly promote him to the prestigious rank of MBE (Member of the 
British Empire) where his position is largely ceremonial and politically impotent. Though 
Naipaul recognizes the problematic nature of the colonial society, indicating both its 
inability to nurture loyalties beyond the self and its cynicism, as we see in the case of The 
Mystic Masseur, he is reticent to interrogate social norms and practices as legacies of 
corrupt regimes. The administrative move that muzzled Ganesh was certainly a cynical 
tactic, but Ganesh’s blind ambition to achieve notoriety and become modern through the 
machinery of British politics is what ultimately undoes him. Just as Naipaul focuses his 
sights on individuals and the creative ways in which they negotiate structures of power, 
bureaucracies, education and the like, so too does my work seek to describe subjective 
experiences of knowledge and power. However, though I see some of the same patterns 
in operation as Naipaul, I would like to dispel the notion that practices of modernity in 
Trinidad are simply mimesis or a vain attempt among certain communities to prove 
themselves as cosmopolitan or sophisticated as the West. His belief that Trinidadians are 
mired in a competition to prove themselves modern, hence the reason they drink Nescafe 
rather than the quality coffee they produce in the mountain regions, is what lends 
                                                        
7 Gordon Lewis concurs, linking picaroon individualism to plantation capitalism by 
stating that it “is difficult, if not impossible, to have an acquisitive society based on the 
private profit motive without at the same time having its logical consequence, a pervasive 
social climate of predatory individualism; which then adds new fuel to the Trinidadian 
legacy of Byzantine hedonism” (1968: 225).  
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Naipaul’s work an almost Kipling-esque quality. Like the endearingly naive but earnest 
East Indians of Kipling’s novel Kim (1988), Naipaul’s post-colonial subjects are forever 
one step behind their lords. For Naipaul, the social dominance of personal ambition over 
other potentially socially cohesive forces, such as nationalism, class solidarity, or a 
nationally operative ethos, is what allows him to claim that “there is no set way in 
Trinidad of doing anything...Ostracism is meaningless; the sanction of any clique can be 
ignored. It is in this way, and not in the way of the travel brochure, that the Trinidadian is 
a cosmopolitan” (1978: 82-3).  
 The claim that “there is no set way in Trinidad of doing anything” is both 
hyperbole and irony; hyperbole because the claim, while based in what appears obvious, 
is an overstatement, and irony because some things in Trinidad appear immutably fixed. 
Two major examples come to mind: food and music. The recipe for roti (curried stew 
wrapped in flat bread) is the same whether you’re in St. James, Curepe, Chaguanas, or 
San Fernando. The same can be said for doubles (curried chana, or chick peas, wrapped 
taco-like in fried flat bread) or macaroni pie or any number of iconic Trinidadian dishes. 
Similarly, musical styles like Calypso and Soca have not demonstrated the kind of radical 
experimentation with rhythm and melody that other Caribbean musics, namely Reggae, 
have 8 (on Reggae innovations see Hebdige 1997; on Reggae’s link to radical social 
change see Chevannes 1998: 14; Homiak 1998: 172-3). Unintuitively fluid, however, are 
approaches to identity categories engendered by a willingness to experiment with 
knowledge and truth claims that leads Naipaul to claim that set procedures do not exist in                                                         
8 The one exception might be Rapso, a genre that takes the bounciness of Soca, mixes it 
with light social commentary in a vaguely Calypsonian fashion, and adds the upbeat of 
Reggae. Even still, this style is a hybrid genre, not an emergence, strictly speaking, from 
any one of the forms from which it borrows.   
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Trinidad. Naipaul is right to locate Trinidadians’ experimental approach to problem 
solving in an immigrant context. Unlike most of the rest of the Caribbean, Trinidad never 
developed the kind of robust and rigid plantation economy that fixed operational 
procedure and established immutable hierarchies of order. Competing imperial logics of 
Spanish, French, and British domination blended with the cultural logics and cosmologies 
of immigrants from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia from the late 18th century to the 
middle of the 20th century, creating a creolized logos.    
 Naipaul’s accounts of Trinidadian life offer readers insights into post-colonial 
culture that verge on imperial apologetics. Much like travel writing, Naipaul is content to 
sketch salient trends, patterns, norms, behaviors, customs, with only cursory attempts at 
locating their origin. In the case of what he calls Trinidad’s cynical tendencies, he offers 
only a perfunctory claim that its roots lie in plantation social engineering. Naipaul’s view 
that anything goes in Trinidad is, on one level, difficult to quarrel with. A striking feature 
of Trinidadian social life is the malleability and constant creative negotiation of forms 
that many members of other societies try assiduously to fix. Aisha Khan’s study of the 
ethnic category ‘Spanish’, which serves as a catch-all racial signifier for the 
phenotypically ambiguous (not the white of French-Creoles, nor the black of Afro-
Trinidadians, nor the brown of Indo-Trinidadians) is one of the more obvious examples 
of Naipaul’s point (1993). But it is this very quality of malleability, indeterminacy, and 
contingency evident in certain aspects of Trinidadian social life that make Trinidad such 
a complex and intriguing study in processes of subject creation. The larger discursive 
shifts that in Europe gave rise to subject determining knowledge categories are less 
evident in Trinidad precisely because those knowledge categories of the self have been 
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continually contested and refashioned in their creole context. It is because there could not 
be a coherent nationalist project in Trinidad that there also could not be an effective 
governmentality that regulated conduct as Foucault has illustrated happened in Europe 
and as other anthropologists have explored in Europe’s former colonies. A creole society 
is not a requirement of contestation, refashioning, or interpretation, as Foucault has aptly 
shown in his meditations on the process and power of individual thought (Rabinow 
2004). But I don’t think it would be controversial to argue that the creole context of 
Trinidad, or any deeply syncretized society imbibing values and symbolic media from 
numerous semiotic systems, demonstrate a more radical degree of idiosyncratic 
interpretation of discourse. Where Naipaul simply sees comical mimesis of European 
modalities I see creative, often paradoxical, interpretation and negotiation of modernity.   
Naipaul’s accuracy and satire are undoubtedly what make him popular among the 
educated (middle) class of Trinidad9. But Naipaul’s observations, in contrast to more 
sympathetic writers, paint a rather dim portrait of Trinidad. His articulation of mimesis 
and its awkward sophistication contrasts with the earnestness of Sam Selvon’s characters 
(1995), or the frustrated and oppressed of Earl Lovelace’s (1989; 1998), the abject and 
ruined people of Harold Sonny Ladoo’s work (2003), and the innocent and naive that 
populate Mittelholzer’s one Trinidadian novel (2010)10. Whereas for Naipaul 
Trinidadians are merely acting out fantasies of modernity without truly apprehending                                                         
9 I might also add, anecdotally, that Naipaul’s Trinidadian readers are also largely Indo-
Trinidadian. Though Naipaul’s satire appears to skewer Trinidadians indiscriminately, 
Afro-Trinidadians have felt unfairly represented in his novels, and not without good 
reason. It was his treatment of Afro-Trinidadian culture in The Middle Passage, however, 
that earned him the unyielding contempt of many Afro-Trinidadians.   
 10 The possible exception here may be Naipaul’s A House for Mr. Biswas (2001), which, 
to my mind, is his most sympathetic treatment of Trinidad.  
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what modernity really is, for these other writers there is a greater sense of the tragedy of 
colonialism and the abjection suffered from it in its aftermath11. The tragedy of the post-
colonial world for Naipaul is not its abjection by the West and its dual place in the 
western imaginary as dependent and as a developmental afterthought. Rather it is that the 
post-colonial world is destined to remain mimicking the innovations of the West. 
 Racial antagonism in Trinidad, as Naipaul understands it, is simply competition 
for who may assume the privileges previously monopolized by whites. His resource 
competition reductivism, which leads him to fret over the introduction of electronic 
media that will only exacerbate the individualistic and fragmentary nature of Trinidadian 
society (1978: 82)12, obscures the imaginative cultural spaces of Trinidad that remain in 
constant motion. Trinidad’s notoriously haphazard approach to nationalism is not only a 
symptom of the failure of colonialism to develop subject determining governmentalities. 
Rather, it is also a sign of the refusals, the intermittent accommodations, the elaborate 
refashioning, of a modernity that belonged to another context and another habitus. As I 
will demonstrate here, subject determination and the regulation of conduct are indeed 
influenced by global modernity, but they are articulated and practiced through a locally 
specific interpretation of that modernity. Put another way, on one hand the hegemony of 
western cultural imperialism is neither complete nor total, and neither the reign of British 
colonialism nor the contemporary reach of postmodern capitalism had or have total                                                         
11 Here I am borrowing ideas first from David Scott (2005) and his meditation on tragedy 
in the work of C.L.R. James, and second on James Ferguson’s study of abjection in post-
colonial Zambia (2004).  
 
12 “With commercial radio and advertising agencies has also come all the apparatus of the 
modern society for joylessness, for the killing of the community spirit and the shutting up 
of people in their separate prisons of similar ambitions and tastes and selfishness: the 
class struggle, the political struggle, the race struggle.”  
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discursive dominance. On the other hand, however, those forces do materialize in local 
communities who must contend with them in some fashion. The Hindu communities I 
worked with illustrate the imaginative, paradoxical ways in which modernity can be 
negotiated. 
 
Discipline and Purchase: Gaining a Foothold in Modern Capitalism 
The term ‘discipline’ is in constant circulation in Trinidad. It was a favorite signifier of 
Eric Williams who once declared that if Trinidadians, with their abundant natural 
resources, had the discipline of Cubans, the nation would be an indomitable force of 
global commerce (citation). Naipaul’s Victorian ‘ethnography’ of the island in The 
Middle Passage is a thinly veiled prescription for the discipline Trinidad needs to 
overcome its troubles. “[The picaroon] society,” he authoritatively says, “cannot 
immediately become responsible; but it can be re-educated only through responsibility” 
(1978: 80). The term also has great traction among Hindus. The economy of the term 
belies an anxiety about falling prey to the ‘culture of the constant carnival’. At mandirs, 
at Hindu schools, at Hindu youth groups, and in casual conversation I heard the word, 
with all its attendant ambitions and fears, uttered dozens of times a day. Activities, 
games, performances, drills, commands, and Hindi and Sanskrit words, have been 
devised and arranged to curb any inclinations toward the lawlessness Hindu community 
leaders see playing out everyday on the streets and in the ubiquitous rum shops of 
Trinidad. Some of these routines are dredged from centuries old practices, extending back 
to local customs and rituals from particular regions of India. Some of the routines derive 
from practices established by contemporary Hindu preservation societies of India such as 
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the RSS or the Chin Maya Mission with whom Trinidadians have studied. And some 
routines are created independently, responding to the particular, context dependent needs 
of Trinidad’s Hindu community. I have understood these forms, routines, practices, and 
articulations, as apparatuses of subject creation. That is, they are indigenously forged 
tools used for fashioning or molding individuals into disciplined subjects with the 
character traits that will ideally lead them to success. 
   Of all the forms, routines, and practices that they do in a day at the Hindu 
Prachar Kendra (from here on simply ‘the Kendra’, Figure 4), and at the Hindu 
Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), the most important is unquestionably the line formations. 
The line formations may be viewed as an ‘ideal type’ of the broader Hindu community 
and their concerns about failure and their efforts to circumvent it. The formations are 
militaristic, with commands such as ‘attention’, ‘stand’, and ‘at ease’, firmly shouted in 
Hindi phrases and words. As a model of discipline there is no greater exemplar than the 
military, a connection not lost on the leaders who promote the disciplinary ideal of 
regimentation and group order. Kendra students are expected to have the Hindi 
commands and their specific actions memorized and performed to precision. Watching 
the children sitting on the mandir floor suddenly stand at attention after hearing the 
command “utishta!’ several times a day everyday, I was reminded of J.L. Austin’s insight 
that words not only convey meaning but actually ‘do things’ (1955). It is the intersection 
of what these words do and the meaning they carry for organizers and leaders of these 
programs, as well as for the parents who tacitly endorse these methods by sending their 
children to these schools, that I wish to analyze. 
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Figure 4. The Kendra 
  The day begins promptly at the Kendra at 9:00 AM with the ringing of a brass 
hand bell. Nearly fifty students between the ages of 5 and 17 form three straight lines 
facing the devasthaan (shrine area). A fourth line, intended to showcase the 
undisciplined, is added for latecomers. Commands shouted in Hindi direct their behavior. 
“Daksha!” The students stand at attention, arms pressed to their sides, backs erect, and 
heads forward. Instructors check the lines, making certain they are straight and that 
students are standing ‘correctly’. “Araam.” The students stand at ease – hands clasped 
behind their backs, legs shoulder width apart – waiting to be addressed by one of their 
instructors. After one of the instructors paces back and forth before them, chastising them 
for either excessive tardiness, slowness to form proper lines, slovenly attire, or all the 
above, they stand again in Daksha (at attention) to recite the Prarthana, a praise hymn to 
the deva/is (primarily Lord Rama) pieced together from parts of the Ramacaratimanasa 
and recited in chant form.  
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 Equally important as the correct (respectful) posture during the Prarthana is the 
accurate recitation of it. The hymn is 38 lines long, composed of Awadhi (a language of 
Uttar Pradesh in which Baba Tulsidas composed his Ramayana), KaAshikaa (the 
language of poet Kabir Das, a contemporary of Tulsidas), and Sanskrit. Pronunciation of 
the many words of the Prarthana must meet Shrutiji’s exacting standards. It is a common 
practice of hers to make the children correctly recite certain terms or phrases that she 
believes are being improperly pronounced. One particularly salient example is the 
repetition of the word purush, found in line 6 and meaning both ‘husband’ and ‘swami’. 
Correct pronunciation of the word, according to Shrutiji, is ‘puh-[r]әsh’, not ‘pooh-
roosh’, as she hears the students mispronounce it. I’ve heard her make the students repeat 
the proper pronunciation of purush a dozen times and on several occassions. Why she 
chooses to be so particular about this term and not others points up the central operative 
logic of the Kendra – no terms, formations, commands, lessons, no matter how 
insignificant they may seem, are arbitrary. Discipline requires attention to detail, which 
students cannot effectively learn if they are expected to be precise in some areas and 
allowed to slack in others. In a society perceived to promote mediocrity at best and 
reckless self-indulgence at worst, the only corrective is to hold exacting standards. It is 
this set of standards, and the moral discipline it instills, that inspires parents to send their 
children to the program. Parents uniformly agreed that the most important feature of 
Kendra pedagogy is the emphasis on discipline. In contrast to practices in the United 
States, parents may send their children to disciplinary programs because the children are, 
or perceived to be, unruly. This is rarely the case at the Kendra. Parents send their 
children to the program not to correct unruly children but to rectify an unruly society.  
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 Raviji founded the Kendra and the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh in 1981 with the 
goal of building a program that would address the needs of Indo-Trinidadian children in a 
Hindu fashion. Upon returning to Trinidad after studying with the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for ten years in India, Raviji saw a need in the community 
for programs that addressed childhood development in a disciplined yet creative 
environment inspired by the methods of generations of rishis, or Hindu saints. Studying 
with the RSS provided Raviji with the inspiration to create similar programs in Trinidad. 
The line formation drills, the recitation of Ramayana scripture in Sanskrit and Awadhi, 
and the theatrical classes used in preparation for performance of the Ram Leela, are 
inspired by the success he witnessed in similar programs operated by the RSS. For Raviji, 
the success of a community, and of each individual member within it, rests on the proper 
training of the children. As he put it to me, “We need to reach the young children. Five to 
seven is an important age. They are the future of Trinidad. They need to learn to speak up 
and speak out.”  
 After the Prarthana the children are then asked to sit, cross-legged, backs straight, 
without slouching, talking, or fidgeting, as they are addressed by an instructor. The first 
day of class is always the hardest, head instructor Shrutiji tells me, because new students 
must be acculturated to an unfamiliar system of regimentation, control, and discipline that 
they do not experience at home or at school. And returning students, many of whom 
backslide throughout the rest of the year, must relearn the system and resist the 
temptation to misbehave. This is no small feat, Shrutiji marvels, given the self-centered, 
unruly, and morally undisciplined times we live in. Children are not accustomed to 
discipline, to appropriate behavior, to respectful comportment, she implies, because the 
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culture in which they mature does not expect them to. The Naipaulian view that anything 
goes has a parallel here. The instructors of several of the programs I worked with, as well 
as parents of children participating in them, see Trinidad as a society without structure 
where doing what one can to get by is acceptable. For them, the Trinidadian ethos, writ 
large, fails its members for its inability to nurture the moral and intellectual faculties that 
build healthy communities. Understood in this light, the emphasis on punctuality, order, 
deference, and precision are not simply means of inculcating Hindu specific values. 
Rather, they are exercised as a means of self and community empowerment and 
understood as media by which creativity, in conjunction with discipline, promotes 
professional success. As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, there is a 
paradoxical tension between the dual emphasis on precision and creativity. To 
foreshadow that discussion, it is worth briefly mentioning that that tension is 
symptomatic of a larger paradox between Hindu preservationism and the agency to 
creatively interpret and reimagine texts and practices from the vast Hindu complex. That 
tension plays out in numerous ways in varying degrees of magnitude every day and 
points up the difficult position of Hindu religious leaders pulled between forces of 
tradition, agency, context, multiculturalism, modernity, and transnationalism.  
 
The Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh 
Line formations, simply called ‘formations’ by the students, are also a central feature of 
the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh’s (HSS) shakha meetings. Shakha meetings typically 
take place in the savannahs (open, grassy parks) in several areas throughout Trinidad and 
are something akin to what other religious communities would call a ‘youth group’. 
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However, as Krishnan, one of the leaders of the group in his mid-twenties, told me, 
people of any age are welcome to join, though I was the oldest by a wide margin. Most of 
the roughly 15 participants (the number varied evening to evening) were young 
teenagers, the youngest being 10 and the oldest 17. The evening begins with the 
formation drills, all conducted in Hindi with a smattering of Sanskrit. The line drills for 
shakha are considerably more complex than those for the Kendra, though both stem from 
the creative efforts of Raviji, who is also responsible for founding the HSS in Trinidad 
after his return from India where he worked for ten years with the RSS.   
 The formations begin in svasthaan, which is composed of two straight lines, one 
female, one male, facing a flag of the elephant headed god Ganesha, remover of 
obstacles. The person from the end of each line walks to the front to report sankhya, the 
count for the line. After a short prayer in Hindi to Ganesha, the two lines turn abruptly to 
the right, on the heel, at the command ‘dakshina vrita!’. The gana (group) then practices 
responding in precise unison to the many commands. ‘Ek pada pura sara’, shouts a 
designated leader in curt, militaristic style. Everyone takes one step forward. ‘Ek pad 
prati sara’. The gana takes one step back, returning to svasthaan, original position. Then 
we rehearsed the turns, where I struggled to keep the orderly symmetry of synchronized 
movement intact. As the leader belts out the commands the gana is permitted just enough 
time to complete the action before another is sounded. Maintaining the integrity of the 
gana is essential. ‘Dakshina vrita’, right quarter turn. ‘Vaam vrita’, left quarter turn 
(svasthaan). ‘Ardha vrita’, right about turn. ‘Ek pad dakshin sara’, one step to the right. 
‘Ek pad vaama sara’, one step to the left (svasthaan). Each command follows on the heels 
of the last, pushing students to concentrate and move both correctly and efficiently. 
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Misapprehension of commands leads to missteps and noticeable breaks in formation, 
though nobody in my experience was ever reproached or ridiculed for mistakes, 
thankfully.  
 Though the commands are unquestionably formal, which, incidentally, the 
students take seriously even in the absence of authority figures, the air of shakha is 
casual. It feels like liming, but with a purpose. The feel becomes noticeably more casual 
when the formations end and the organized activities begin. All of the activities, which 
are mostly strategy games, require physical movement, some of them tremendous 
dexterity and concentration. Several of the games get so rowdy they separate the boys 
and girls, though some girls felt they could take anyone in the group, and rightly so. Like 
the formations, the games have a purpose beyond simple camaraderie and play. Each 
game is designed, Krishnan explained, to teach life lessons and promote goal 
achievement. I could sense this even while playing the games.  
A game that stood out for its clear link to the HSS values and concerns was the 
break through game. In the break through game, two to three players are pitted against a 
wall of foes composed of the rest of the gana who attempt to prevent them from reaching 
their targeted goal. All players but two are lined up abreast facing their adversaries 
(typically the two most physical and agile players) who stand between them and the line 
they must reach on the other side. The goal is simple. Get past the two adversaries in the 
middle who will attempt to prevent you from reaching your goal by grabbing you and 
holding you in place. Once caught, the player then becomes part of the defensive wall, 
growing more intimidating by turns. The offensive players, their numbers shrinking as 
the wall grows and looms more menacingly, must try harder every turn. The offensive 
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players could work together, sending one player as a sacrificial decoy to free the others. 
Though such ideas are toyed with, the fun of the game lies in matching one’s speed and 
agility against that of others. Neither did anybody ever employ trickery to get through. 
The strategy was uniform – run in a mad dash for the wall, make space with football 
(American) style stiff arms, and hope for the best. The purpose of the game, from an 
offensive point of view, is to employ every ounce of strength and determination to defeat 
those who will exert every effort to thwart your ambition. What makes the game 
rewarding as an offensive player is the success of reaching the other side after the 
spontaneous exercise of micro strategies demanded of the quickly changing obstacles. 
The game teaches players to draw on their creativity, strength, and perseverance to 
succeed and can be seen as a ritual of the Hindu-Trinidadian view that society, 
anthropomorphized in this view into an agent of resistance, will attempt to hold one back 
despite one’s singular struggles. More broadly conceived, it is also a ritual of neo-
liberalism. As with many of the others, the break through game ritually embodies the 
Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh’s unequivocal motto “We achieve by our own efforts”.  
While playing the break through game I was reminded of Althussser’s notion of 
what we might shorthand as ‘practical ideology’. As Althusser explains, the ideas that 
underwrite ideology eventually disappear and instead become the animating force of 
ritualized activities through material apparatuses. That is, the ideas promoted by, in 
Althusser’s case the ruling class, no longer need specific articulation but rather are 
reproduced through ritual action that naturalize them. “Ideas have disappeared as such”, 
he proposes, “(in so far as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the 
precise extent that is has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of 
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practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus” 
(1995: 128).  Althusser shares terminology with Foucault, particularly in regards to the 
use of the notion of an apparatus as a means by which to shape subjectivity. Though 
Althusser’s structural Marxist system works out a little too neatly in my mind to mirror 
accurately subject/ideology relations, his insight, which would clearly have a measurable 
influence on Foucault’s work on discourse through problematization, assemblage, 
apparatus (see Rabinow 2005: 47-56; 76-77), into the way in which ideology is embodied 
through ritual is instructive and useful.  
 Another game, cryptically titled “Cubadee” (a name nobody could define for me, 
thought by most to be a nonsense word), played out in ritual form a paradox Hindu 
leaders wrestle with in numerous ways. Cubadee is a prime example of the contradictory 
binary between individual choice and community empowerment demonstrated through a 
rather aggressive game. Two teams line up facing each other with about twenty feet 
between them. A player from one team approaches the other repeating the word 
“cubadee” without breaking. While in the territory of the other the cubadee repeater must 
try to touch an opposing player and make it back to her or his own camp without being 
pulled into and held by the opposing team. If the cubadee player cannot break free she 
becomes part of the opposing camp. The continuous repetition of the word cubadee is an 
essential feature of the game. Players are not allowed to cease saying the word for any 
reason, including taking a breath. This is where the mental fortitude comes in. As the 
cubadee player ‘attacks’ the opposing team he will hear taunts and accusations from 
them. They will accuse the player of ‘breaking’, either hoping to convince him that he did 
break so he gives up, or, in my case, distract him so that he can be grabbed and brought 
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into the opposition. “He break! He break!” the players shout, causing confusion and 
attempting to distract the player from his goal. The cubadee player, I was told, must be 
quick, focused, and unperturbed by the pandemonium the opposition creates. I had the 
sense that the leaders designed this activity as a demonstration of ‘crab antics’, as Peter 
Wilson (1973) called it, in game form. As Wilson describes it: 
 Crab antics is behavior that resembles that of a number of crabs who, having been 
placed in a barrel, all try to climb out. But as one nears the top, the one below  
pulls him down in his effort to climb. Only a particularly strong crab ever climbs  
out – the rest, in the long run, remain in the same place. (1973: 58) 
 
The fear of crab antics, and of remaining in the long run in the same place, is what 
animates the efforts of the HSS and prompts games such as cubadee. As an artifact of 
practical ideology cubadee is rich in metaphor and symbolism. The game is a ritual re-
enactment of the chaos and confusion rife in Trinidadian society that will drag the weak 
back into the barrel if they are not vigilant. One parent told me that he tries to avoid ever 
having to take maxi-taxis (Toyota micro-buses that seat a maximum of 12 people, 
ideally), especially when shuttling his kids around, because the loud music (often soca, 
American hip hop, or reggae) “disturbs the mind”. It is his belief that such constant 
“noise”, as he called the music, prevents a calm, peaceful, and focused mind, thus 
resulting in personal failure and social chaos. Cubadee embodies that belief, 
demonstrating to students the reward of focus and discipline and the consequences of 
succumbing to chaos. The interpretive logic that underwrites the game is one that regards 
not only local ‘Trini’ culture as spiritually disruptive, but by extension globalized forms 
of popular culture as well. The bass heavy hip hop from the US that rattles the windows 
of the maxi-taxis (and the souls of some their passengers), is emblematic for many devout 
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Hindus of the moral misdirection of both Trinidadian and global popular culture13.  In 
order then to prepare their children for success later in life, they must demonstrate to 
them in tangible and immediate ways the rewards they can expect from remaining, like 
Rama, steadfast, and the consequences they can expect from succumbing to carnival 
culture around them. Crab antics must be overcome by personal will and an effective exit 
strategy from those who will hold you back. Once out and successful the final piece is to 
“give back to your community”, as Raviji routinely implores the kids.   
The importance of giving back was the subject of many of Raviji’s short lectures. 
On countless occasions I would hear him, or any of the other teachers, repeating the 
mantra ‘give back to your community’. One such lecture he called “The 4 Ps”. Speaking 
in his partially modified Indo-Trinidadian dialect, he asked the students if they knew the 
meaning of the word aticari. They shook their heads in unison. “It mean to do more.” He 
surveyed the room, pacing slowly in his dhoti, waiting for the meaning to sink in. Then 
he asked them rhetorically, “Who doin’ more? Who could do more?” Eager to please 
their guru, the little children enthusiastically raised their hands. Happy with the response, 
Raviji introduced the 4 Ps. “To do more you have to know what to do. So, the first P 
stand for Pick Up.” He looked at one of the small children, “You could pick yourself up? 
You could be a good Hindu? Pickin’ up mean you have to have the power to resist.” I 
believe he meant the power to resist the forces that would divert one from the dharmic, or 
correct path, but he never elaborated. “The second P is Pin Up. Takin’ responsibility. You                                                         
13 When I told a friend of mine about how my Hindu informants felt about maxi-taxi 
music he said they were not alone. Evidently passengers began bitterly complaining to 
the Ministry of Transportation about excessive noise levels in the vans. A law was passed 
in the late nineties prohibiting ear-splitting volumes. As with all things, ‘excessively 
loud’ is a relative term. By Trini standards the volume in maxis is now acceptable, 
though few Americans would tolerate such levels in public transportation in the States.    
  167 
have to be responsible for your actions. But you have to help the little children too. That’s 
why the third P is Pull Up. We all bringin’ up the children.” He made a strong gesture 
with his hands at this point, as if picking up a small child by his lapels. The children were 
transfixed. “The fourth P is Push Up. To do this you have to be ready to take charge. You 
have to be strong to push back. Who could do this? Who strong enough to do the 4 Ps?”   
Spontaneous mini lectures such as the 4 Ps emerge continually and can be 
provoked by anything from misbehavior to plain inspiration. I figured that the 4 Ps would 
become a theme of some kind, perhaps worked into the theory lectures or skit sessions, 
but I never heard anything about it again. This was simply another way to articulate the 
importance of Kendra values like hard work, discipline, determination, and giving back. 
The mantra to give back to the community typically followed on the heels of a discussion 
about reaching one’s goals and becoming successful. For the Kendra community then, 
success is achieved through the support and nurturing of individuals by a community of 
people who give back what they themselves received. The concept and injunction to give 
back to one’s community expresses a deep desire for the community as a whole to prove 
its power and potential as well as expressing anxiety that the successful will simply leave 
and never return. Trinidad is not only an immigrant nation, it is also an emigrant nation, 
with a higher rate of emigration than birth and immigration rates combined14. The bright 
and ambitious, Trinidadians will say, leave the island to make their fortunes in the US, 
Canada, or the UK, the top three destinations of emigrants. A scene I witnessed play out 
among some friends of mine is a common one in Trinidad.  
                                                        
14 The CIA World Fact Book keeps the most updated data on these figures.  
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One night I stood in Woodford Square, the famous venue of Eric Williams’ many 
open lectures to Trinidadians and thus renamed ‘University of Woodford Square’, 
waiting for then Prime Minister Patrick Manning to speak to a sparse and largely 
disinterested crowd. One of the guys I was liming with that evening had just returned 
from France where he was teaching English, and making good money doing so. His 
friend reproached him for his selfishness, telling him he needed to return and “give back 
to Trinidad.” The English teacher’s reply was unequivocal. ‘No I don’t.”  
“Trinidad gave you a free education. You owe your country”, he pleaded. 
“No I don’t.”  
And so it went. It is precisely this kind of callous disregard for abandoning Trinidad and 
the communities within it that Kendra and HSS leaders hope to avoid. The emphasis on 
being nurtured by and giving back to the community thus attempts to redress the problem 
of progress in the Hindu community and their perceived lack of it. Put in Naipaul’s 
somber terms, if individuals pursue success entirely for their own pleasure, we do not 
have a community but rather a cynical collection of people sharing geography.  
 The emphasis on community stands in stark contrast to the HSS’s motto ‘We 
achieve by our own efforts.’ Whether this motto was designed to counter the national 
motto ‘ Together we aspire, together we achieve’, is difficult to say. However, what it 
does express is the widespread sentiment among members of these communities that 
prosperity and poverty are reflections of effort and discipline, in the case of the former, 
and laziness in the latter. Anand, a community member I spoke with at length on this 
issue, was insistent on this last point. My lay Marxist protests that class inequality is 
structurally perpetuated only reconfirmed for him his belief that one’s lot in either 
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poverty or success is the result of individual choices. If parents would promote discipline 
in the home by making their children do sadhanas every day, as he does, the children will 
be successful. He pointed to his own kids as examples. Both are high academic achievers, 
one an archery champion in age brackets well above his own. He attributes these 
successes to the sadhanas and the discipline they promote and to the wise choices his 
children make, not to his middle class standing. Anand’s worldview, straddling 
individuality and community support, is emblematic of the paradox embodied in rhetoric 
and ritual activity of both the Kendra and the HSS locally, and, more broadly, of the 
growing neo-liberal ethos of agency as choice.   
 Faced with elimination from one of the games, I stood on the sideline with 
Krishnan watching the others play. I asked him about the overall mission of Shakha and 
his vision for the future of the program. Presently, Shakha is small, run, as with nearly all 
Hindu youth programs in Trinidad, entirely by volunteers. Krishnan would like to keep 
the volunteer aspect intact, though the full time volunteers would be supported by the 
community. Ideally, one dedicated volunteer would travel around Trinidad establishing 
new Shakha ganas and administering the old ones. Supportive members of the 
community would feed and house the volunteer as she or he traveled the country looking 
after the ganas. The volunteer would be in essence a steward of the ganas and the 
methods by which they promote their programs, and more importantly, by extension, a 
steward of the ideals and values – discipline, effort, order – that permeate the community. 
Like Raviji, Krishnan believes that investment in the children is paramount, an absolutely 
necessary one if the children are to successfully negotiate the complex and distracting 
modern world. Krishnan stated these goals in the clearest terms of any other community 
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member. “ We want them to be successful in business,” he said, growing more animated 
as he talked. “We don’t want them to fail. We want them to go to college and be able to 
finish their work and do well.” Shanta, a vigorous and enthusiastic co-leader of Shakha, 
backed him up on this score. “The games teach them how to persevere, and that’s what 
we want them to do. We don’t want them to end up like so many other Trinis.” She didn’t 
specify what she meant by this last statement and I didn’t ask because I assumed what she 
had in mind. Though Trinidad is among the most productive economies in the Caribbean, 
it is still, as many Trinidadians like to say, ‘an island lifestyle’. By this they mean 
Trinidadians like to party, or ‘fête’, as the vestigial French term has it.  
 The Trinidadian love affair with fêting (the term is both noun and verb) is 
legendary in the Caribbean, a fact many Trinidadians have shared with me on numerous 
occasions. “Fête after fête after fête!’, blares the radio, TV, and newspaper ads for the 
ubiquitous Soca parties around Trinidad. The fêtes typically feature a few popular Soca 
bands playing at maximum volume to a crowd of revelers winin’ (grind dancing) at a 
fabricated venue and where rum and beer flow in torrents. In contrast to the many rum 
shops that densely dot the island, fêtes are designed for a more raucous, party-style 
atmosphere. It is unlikely that a Friday or Saturday night passes without some kind of 
hyped fête happening somewhere. I got the distinct impression at times that it is not 
necessarily the fêtes themselves that are worth talking about but that they happen with 
such frequency. In other words, it is the idea of the fête, and of Trinidad as the home of 
the perpetual fête, that is most central in the public imaginary. The fête in this sense 
operates as a trope of broader Afro-Creole derived Trinidadian values that embrace the 
country as a party island. Trinidad, in this view from the public imaginary, is 
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distinguished from other Caribbean islands by its willingness to let go, to celebrate, to 
enjoy life through song, dance, drink, and to live the culture of carnival15. This logos 
permeates much of Trinidadian popular culture, and not exclusively the Afro-Trinidadian 
imaginary. The State’s role in patronizing Carnival masquerade groups, or mas camps 
(Scher 2004), is an implicit endorsement of including not only Carnival itself as a 
singular, copyrightable (Scher 2010: 160-179) event but the carnivalesque as a central 
node of a distinct nationalism. A major stumbling block to a cohesive and coherent 
nationalism is the widespread opposition to Carnival as a concrete yet emblematic event, 
and the carnivalesque as an abstract ethos played out in smaller venues from fêtes to rum 
shops to limin’ on street corners. 
 We can now understand in more detail the publicly voiced protests of Hindu 
leaders such as Sat Maharaj of the Maha Sabha, as well as those of the program 
coordinators I worked with, who worry about their children attempting to self-actualize 
and compete in a globally competitive environment in a nation whose principle ethos is 
perpetual celebration. Munasinghe is right to suggest that Trinidad’s struggles with a 
functional nationalist project are the result of problematic colonial discursive forms that 
generated racialized social strata while demanding a homogenized nationalism (2001: 
34). However, the political struggle she outlines takes place within the terrain of what she 
identifies as ethnic identity politics. Shifting the lens from a focus on identity to a focus 
on transnationalized economic logics – competition, efficiency, agency – a different, yet 
equally salient, problem set emerges. In the communities I worked with I saw less 
                                                        
15 José Limón’s engaging study of the celebration of carne, carnales, and the 
carnivalesque among Mexican immigrants in a Texas border town has a clear parallel 
here (1989: 471-486).  
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evidence of the essentialist racial discourse inherited in part from Western knowledge 
categories, and more evidence of anxiety over cultural constructs that appear to obstruct 
Trinidad’s potential. The practices of preservationism and cultural reimagination of 
Hinduism I witnessed could be, and are, viewed as a form of ethnic nationalism. But to 
do so invokes its own kind of discursive hegemony that fixes the focus on colonially 
derived notions of ethnic superiority rather than the recent shifts in global logics that 
exert an identifiable and analyzable influence on communities eager to prove themselves 
capable of competing on these terms. To view cultural praxis in this way is neither to 
deny the existence of racism nor offer an apologia for colonialism. Far from it, the effort 
here is to tap into accelerating logical and ethical shifts taking place within local 
imaginative spaces influenced by and engaging in more expansive discursive fronts.  
 If the goal of an anthropology of the actual, or a “history of the present”, as 
Rabinow has it, “is to identify apparatuses, to trace their genealogy, to show their 
emergence, and thereby make them available for thought and change” (2005: 55), we can 
trace Shakha to the central problematization of the coloniality of neo-liberalism. The 
introduction of neo-liberalism in the developing world, and the Caribbean in particular, 
through policies of structural adjustment and increasing trade liberalization has been well 
documented (Mandle 1989; Black 2003; Dupuy 2005; McBain 2005; Grosfoguel 2008). 
Understood as an apparatus, or a “kind of formation” that coalesces as “a specific 
response to a historical problem” (Rabinow 2005: 54), neo-liberalism inaugurates novel 
governmentalities and revives certain old ones. In the case of the HSS and the Kendra, 
the local prominence of globalized neo-liberal ideologies of independence, discipline, and 
order, to name a few, blend with the refashioning of ancient texts and practices to form a 
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kind of radical pedagogy. The line formation drills, textual recitations in Sanskrit and 
Awadhi, and Shakha games (Figure 5) are both accommodations and recreations of a 
neo-liberal apparatus. As I will explore in the next chapter, the process of interpretation 
among members of the Hindu community is complicated by a dual position of resistance 
to the shifts in popular culture engendered by globalized formations of neo-liberalism, 
and as consumers of those forms partially liberated by the imaginative potential they 
carry.      
 
 
Figure 5. HSS Shakha Gana 
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CHAPTER V 
 INTERPRETATION, KNOWLEDGE, PARADOX 
 
 
It is not always the case that the dominant term as it is translated into the language (the 
idioms, the discursive and institutional norms) of a subordinated culture remains the 
same upon the occasion of translation. 
    ~ Judith Butler, Restaging the Universal 
 
...a language (langue) is still a system for possible statements, a finite body of rules that 
authorizes an infinite number of performances. 
    ~ Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
 
You feel you know Ramayana, but that is not so. You cannot possibly know Ramayana. 
    ~ Shrutiji, to her Ramayana theory class 
 
In 1937 Trinidad erupted in a series of labor riots led by oil, cocoa and sugar cane 
workers frustrated by the exploitation as usual practices of the colonial regime. Stagnant 
wages in the oil, cocoa, and sugar industries, where profit margins continued to expand, 
as well as unacceptable working and living conditions prompted Afro- and Indo-
Trinidadian laborers to stand in solidarity against retrograde imperialist policies (see 
Johnson 1987, for a discussion of imperial oil policy in Trinidad). Led by Afro-
Trinidadian labor leader Tubal Uriah Butler and Indo-Trinidadian labor leader Adrian 
Cola Rienzi (formerly Krishna Deonarine), Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians staged 
Trinidad’s most effective uprising against British imperial authority. As historians of the 
labor unrest and the events leading up to it have noted, the customary mutual suspicion 
that had long marked Indo-Afro relations were conspicuous for there absence throughout 
the uprising (Samaroo 1985: 77-92). Speaking on the indiscriminate exploitation of all of 
Trinidad’s workers, businessman Timothy Roodal from the southern city of San 
Fernando noted in 1933 that, 
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 The Empire today stands upon two colossal pillars – Africa upon the one side and  
 India upon the other side, and believe me, sir, I have no hesitation in saying that  
 there is a perfect system of exploiting the lifeblood out of these people, destroying  
 two nations for the benefit and survival of another. (cited in Samaroo 1985: 85)  
 
Roodal’s racially inclusive condemnation of colonial oppression reflected the 
increasingly class-based protests gaining traction from the post-war 1920s to its apogee in 
1937. As Craig-James (1987) and Johnson (1987) point out, the ruling class response was 
swift, entailing both physical repression and the redoubling of efforts to invigorate the 
divisive politics of ethnic identity and racial essentialism that had long kept Afro- and 
Indo-Trinidadian laborers at odds with each other (see also Samaroo 1985: 92). 
 By 1956, when Eric Williams’ PNM party formed and later assumed control of 
the state apparatus at Independence in 1962, Indo-Afro relations had deteriorated to new 
lows, each accusing the other of playing politics with race (Premdas 1993). The rise of 
pan-African nationalist movements throughout the Americas in the 1960s and 70s, 
inspired by Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in the 
1930s and 40s, the Black Power movement in Jamaica and the United States, and the 
literature of Négritude (Burton 1997; Anderson 1995), Créolité (Bernabé et al 1993) and 
Antillanité (Glissant 1997) in the French Caribbean that sought to affirm the creative 
agency of black French West Indians, prompted renewed suspicions between Afro- and 
Indo-Trinidadians in the latter half of the 20th century. Despite Prime Minister Eric 
Williams’ occasional attempts at conciliation between his PNM party and the 
predominantly Indo-Trinidadian Democratic Labour Party (DLP), and thus between 
Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians (Oxaal 1968), tension remained high between the two 
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groups, especially during election cycles1. Almost sixty years after the labor riots of 
1937, Trinidad nearly erupted again into civil unrest after the election of its first Indo-
Trinidadian prime minister in 1995. As I pointed out in Chapter II, Basdeo Panday’s 
electoral victory invited widespread celebration among Indo-Trinidadians and stoked 
fears of retaliation for their years of political dominance among Afro-Trinidadians. 
Fearing ethnic favoritism, Afro-Trinidadians protested Panday’s victory vociferously and 
often. As Raviji related to me, reporters from the BBC were on hand prepared for rioting 
and massive ethnic clashes. When one of the reporters asked Raviji if he expected 
violence he replied, “To all appearances it looks as if it will [be violent], but I don’t think 
it will. Trinidadians go so far and stop just short of violence.”  
 Raviji’s prediction was, of course, accurate. No riots or large-scale acts of 
violence ever broke out over Panday’s election. Though he was never embraced in a 
meaningful way by any but his own Indo-Trinidadian community, he managed to hold his 
position until he was removed from office on corruption charges in 2000. Again in 2010 
Trinidad elected its second Indo-Trinidadian and first female prime minister in Kamla 
Persad-Bissessar of the United National Congress. Her election was remarkable for its 
lack of controversy, helped no doubt by the roughly equal proportion of Indo- to Afro-
Trinidadians in her cabinet.  
The history of Indo-Afro relations from the 1937 labor uprisings to universal adult 
suffrage in 1946 and the subsequent rise of the PNM in 1956, to the Black Power 
movement of the 1970s, to Panday’s controversial election, and to recent electoral events                                                         1 Ask any Trinidadian about Indo-Afro ethnic relations and they will report with the 
nonchalance of someone reporting the daily phenomenon of sunrise that it ebbs and flows 
with political cycles. As one informant succinctly stated the problem of racial 
antagonism, “It’s never good. But it’s worse during elections.”   
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surrounding the election of Kamla Persad-Bissessar illustrate the mobile nature of 
Trinidad’s national imaginary. The distressing tenacity of colonial-era ethnic discursive 
categories remain a salient feature of public and political culture in Trinidad, but as the 
aforementioned events attest, in the public space of Trinidad’s imaginary, that is, the 
shared space where what it means to be Trinidadian is conceived, articulated, performed, 
and contested, those discursive categories are subject to translation, which is always an 
act of interpretation. Following Appadurai (1996) and Rabinow et al (2008), I would like 
to explore the role of imagination in publically shared conceptual spaces and the ways in 
which these spaces are shaped, negotiated, contributed to and interpreted by Trinidad’s 
Hindu community. 
In his classic book Modernity at Large (1996) Arjun Appadurai expands 
Anderson’s (1981) thesis that print capitalism contributed to the rise of secular 
nationalisms by exploring the ways in which the globalization of electronic media carry 
the potential to enrich imaginative spaces. Similar to certain cultural studies theorists 
such as Dick Hebdige (2007), Stuart Hall (2008), Paul Willis (1990) and anthropologists 
of globalization such as Michaels (2004) and Larkin (2004), Appadurai rejects 
conclusions from both the left and the right that situate consumers of globalized media as 
passive dupes of western cultural neo-imperialism. It is not that Appadurai’s optimism 
has blinded him to the injustices and unequal power differentials between center and 
periphery. Rather, what he wants to explore is the “peculiar new force to the imagination 
in social life today. More persons in more parts of the world consider a wider set of 
possible lives than they ever did before” (1996: 53). In similar fashion, Rabinow’s 
insistence on an anthropology of the contemporary is a rather controversial attempt to 
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shift explorations of cultural norms and forms from those of historical determinism to 
those that can identify, document, and analyze new pressures influencing cultural spaces 
(2008). In a lively exchange George Marcus challenges Rabinow’s insistence on an 
“untimely” approach to ethnography, asking how anyone can agree with being asked “to 
forget history” (2008: 56). Rabinow’s response can be neatly summarized in his 
questioning of “whether historical conditions are everything. And I believe strongly that 
they are not. There is a great deal of contingency and under determination in most 
situations” (2008: 56).  
Taken together, the work of Appadurai and Rabinow and Marcus open up the 
terrain of public imagination for investigation through a focus on “decomposing” the 
micro-practices of everyday life (Rabinow et al 2008: 95). The events surrounding 
Trinidad’s recent national election capture the utility of a focus on the contemporary and 
on the role of globalized media in the shifting and shaping of public imaginaries.  
 
Yes, We Can Rise: Campaigning Obama-style in Trinidad 
When Barack Obama arrived in Trinidad in the spring of 2009 for a Summit of the 
Americas conference, the streets of Port of Spain, usually busy and bustling with traffic 
of all kinds, stood empty and silent. I happened to arrive in Trinidad just two weeks after 
Obama’s visit and could still feel the reverberations his presence left in Trinidad’s 
collective imaginary. Throughout Obama’s visit Trinidadians were glued to their 
televisions, watching his every move and listening intently to his address. Talking with 
Trinidadians after his visit I didn’t get the sense that it was the content necessarily of his 
speech that excited them so much as the potential he embodies being who he is in the 
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position he holds. Many Trinidadians said they sooner would have expected Americans 
to hire a woman for the job of president than a black man. The widespread public 
sentiment toward Obama in Trinidad echoes those of many other nations around the 
world. Though the American press and public seemed to recover quickly from the 
novelty of having just elected an African-American to the office of President, for many 
other nations, particularly those that suffered under the brutality of the slave trade and the 
centuries-long practice of slavery such as Africa and the Caribbean, that a black man has 
assumed the role of Commander in Chief of the most powerful nation on earth is nothing 
short of an improbable miracle. As a black leader of the free world Obama is a highly 
symbolic figure in Trinidad, representative of political potentialities, cultural changes, 
and individual possibilities. I was told by some locals that Kamla Persad-Bissessar and 
her team were impressed enough with Obama’s silky smooth campaign that they hired 
one of his former campaign managers to run hers. A “bacchanal”, that is, a controversy, 
had erupted over the issue because the PNM, I was told, attempted to block the campaign 
manager’s entry into the country for fear that the UNC’s campaign would be as 
successful as Obama’s. Though I never found any evidence that would directly  
corroborate these claims, Kamla’s campaign did bear an uncanny resemblance to 
Obama’s. The terse yet emotive “We Will Rise” of the UNC, coupled with its 
impressionistic image of a rising sun, recalled Obama’s “Yes, We Can” (Figure 6) with a 
backdrop of a rising sun over a prairie.  
At the end of an uncommonly well-attended political rally for the UNC in 
Chaguanas I attended one evening, some pathos laden music began playing through the 
massive speakers framing the gold-draped stage. I recognized the band instantly as 
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Orange Sky, a local band that has managed to gain some international notoriety for 
playing a kind of reggae infused heavy metal. But I also recognized a feature of the song 
I couldn’t put my finger on until I got home and watched Orange Sky’s “We Will Rise” 
video. Both the song and video were dead ringers for American musician will.i.am’s 
moving “Yes, We Can” song and video. “Yes, We Can” is shot in black and white, 
incorporating Obama’s speeches into an acoustically driven song that features various 
musicians, celebrities, and lay folk declaring, “Yes,We Can”. Orange Sky’s “We Will 
Rise” uses the same format: acoustic guitar backgrounding Kamla’s speeches as local 
people of note intermittently declare to the viewers that we will rise; all shot in black and 
white2.   
 
Figure 6. Yes, We Can/We Will Rise  
                                                        2 will.i.am’s Obama video can be viewed on YouTube at “Yes We Can - Barack Obama 
Music Video” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjXyqcx-mYY).  Orange Sky’s Kamla 
video can be viewed on YouTube at “We Will Rise – Victory” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQkWK7r6f9M).  A PNM supporter’s disdain for 
Kamla’s appropriation is evident in a “mash-up” combining the two videos, viewable on 
YouTube at “YES WE CAN' / 'WE WILL RISE” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X95u9fMh3Eo).    
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The similarity of Kamla’s campaign to Obama’s in tone, style, and evocations, 
was striking. Though certain similarities bordered on what in other circles would have 
constituted blatant copyright infringement, the campaign played well to Trinidad’s 
constituents. And for good reason. The campaign was remarkably well-run. The UNC 
used media such as music, video, and printed imagery effectively through evocative 
narratives and images. They tapped into simmering frustrations about a flagging 
economy, fears of corruption, and disturbingly high crime rates. And, perhaps most 
importantly, like Obama’s campaign message, they sought to transcend the long and 
tiresome history of racial division by promoting a message of trust and togetherness. Just 
as Obama’s Yes, We Can motto was intended as a positive message of hope that 
Americans may come together to solve their problems, so did Kamla’s We Will Rise 
attempt to reframe nationalist discourse into a message of renewed hope about the 
potentials for an ethnically united nation.  
 The upcoming local elections taking place just after the national elections built 
on the momentum of Kamla’s and the UNC’s successful run at government, continuing 
with the same imagery and message. Although Kamla’s campaign borrowed heavily from 
Obama’s in nearly every way, it never felt like a tawdry rip off. The theme of change, 
central to Obama’s message, was also the dominant theme of the UNC after ten years of 
PNM rule under the leadership of an increasingly hysterical Patrick Manning. Trinidad’s 
floundering economy, spiraling crime rate, and fears of corruption and complacency in 
government lent the message of change a genuine tone. Looking at the litany of troubles 
besetting Trinidad I couldn’t doubt the sincerity of UNC’s members and supporters as 
they called for widespread change in Trinidadian politics. Put another way, Obama’s 
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campaign did not simply inspire mimicry by the UNC. Rather, to phrase it in Appadurai’s 
terms, Obama’s successful campaign lent new imaginative possibilities to aspiring agents 
of change in Trinidadian politics. Orange Sky’s near carbon copy of will.i.am’s work is 
no less sincere, no less meaningful or relevant, for its direct influence. Kamla’s 
transcendent message intended to inspire hope and change, much like Obama’s, was a 
signal of an effort to shift the ideological direction of the nation toward an ethics of 
inclusion and united participation in improving Trinidad. Following Appadurai, if we are 
to understand Obama’s campaign, with its somewhat revolutionary methods, as a global 
flow, what happened in Trinidad throughout the UNC’s rise to power was the 
appropriation and re-imagination of a new way of interpreting, translating, and 
articulating real social problems and as they circulate in the public imaginary3. Obama’s 
message and representation of a problem given form in public culture and circulating as a 
fragment of the “global cultural economy” (Appadurai 1996: 32), played so well to 
audiences in Trinidad not because it was American and therefore modern, as Naipaul 
might suggest, but because Trinidad is inextricably linked to global public culture, 
                                                        
3 To clarify the distinction made here between real and imaginary problems, all I mean to 
say is that real problems exist as both observable, measurable phenomena and as 
subjectively interpreted events. For example, crime is a very real problem for nearly 
every Trinidadian I’ve ever spoken to. The murder rate in Trinidad has climbed from less 
than one hundred in 2000 to over six hundred in 2010. Understandably, Trinidadians are 
alarmed by this very real problem. Depending upon where one stands ideologically, 
politically, ethnically, and class-wise, the source of the problem shifts. For instance, a 
UNC aligned Indo-Trinidadian might point blame at an ineffectual PNM government, 
another might point to what they see as Afro-Trinidadians’ eagerness to join drug gangs 
in order to avoid hard work. Alternately, an Afro-Trinidadian might accuse the UNC and 
obstinate Indo-Trinidadians of obstructing PNM policies that would remedy the problem, 
and so on. All of these explanations for crime are ones I’ve heard first hand or read in 
editorials in the dailies. Hence the distinction between “real” social problems and those 
that exist in the public imaginary.  
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disjointed, contradictory, and irrational as it is, and shares the ethos of multiculturalism in 
an ethnically plural, late-capitalist context.   
The West Indies, as Paul Gilroy (1993) has pointed out, has always had an 
ambivalent relationship with modernity. The effort to reconcile indigenous logics and 
aspirations with the yearning for modernity creates a double bind, what Gilroy has termed 
“double consciousness”. Gilroy’s articulation of double consciousness, vividly described 
by his metaphor of facing two directions at once, neatly captures the bind of Trinidad’s 
Hindu community, which has attempted to chart its own course through the rocky terrain 
of modernity and global cultural flows. If Trinidad can be said to wholly embrace 
transnational flows of popular culture, that would only be true in a limited and highly 
qualified way. Trinidad’s vibrant Hindu community does consume and even contribute to 
local and global popular culture/s, but it does so in calculated, uneven, and paradoxical 
ways. 
 
Symbolic Creativity in Hindu Modernity 
Sitting on the floor of the Kendra after the Prarthana one morning, Shrutiji announced 
that she had something very important to discuss with us. Always a no-nonsense woman 
who maintains a rather stern countenance, Shrutiji held the children in rapt attention as 
they awaited her report. Though Shrutiji suffers little nonsense, she is not an easily 
perturbed woman. This morning, however, she was clearly addled. “I want to talk to you 
today about an advertisement for Wendy’s I read about yesterday.” The kids looked a 
little confused, probably trying to figure out what Wendy’s was as there are no Wendy’s 
chains in Trinidad. Indeed, foreign owned fast food chains are completely monopolized 
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by KFC and a few Church’s Fried Chicken and Popeye’s Fried Chicken. There was a 
McDonald’s years ago in St. James, a working class suburb of Port of Spain, but it 
closed, and there has not been a fast food burger establishment in Trinidad since. Shrutiji 
described the ad for us. “The advertisement has a big picture of Devi Lakshmi – 
everybody knows who Lakshmi is?”  Several children eagerly raised their hands. “She 
the wife of Vishnu,” a boy from the 5-7 year old class reported. “Very good. She is the 
wife of Vishnu,” Shrutiji said, correcting his dialect. “In this advertisement Lakshmi is 
sitting in front of a giant hamburger. The caption says, ‘The Sandwich is Sacred.’ I will 
ask you, What does a Hindu deity have to do with hamburgers? Why did they use Mataji 
Lakshmi for their hamburger? Why are people always using Hindu deities for their 
advertisements? Do you think this is acceptable?” A girl from the high school group 
raised her hand. “They wouldn’t ever use Jesus in their advertisements.” I was astounded 
at the immediacy and clarity of her statement. Shrutiji quickly concurred.  
 Following on the girl’s insight, Shrutiji asked, “Why don’t they use Jesus instead 
of Lakshmi?” Before giving any of the students a chance to answer, she went on to 
explain the myriad ways in which Hinduism is disrespected in much of popular media 
around the world, making at times what appeared to me as oblique references to a long 
history of cultural imperialism and arrogance. This is a theme she would repeat for the 
students many times. After the release of the global blockbuster film Avatar, Shrutiji 
lamented the intellectual infringement by Hollywood of ancient Hindu concepts. She 
informed her class that Hollywood film makers are continually raiding Hindu 
iconography and lore for ideas that the Hindus will never get credit for.  
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Shrutiji’s exasperation with the Wendy’s ad and the film Avatar was not simply 
over the use, or misuse, of Hindu iconography by mass media. Rather, in a critique of 
popular culture that bears a striking resemblance to Fredric Jameson’s (1999) critique of 
postmodernity, Shrutiji sees the “random cannibalization”, as Jameson has it, of Hindu 
mythology as metonymical of a larger problem involving the dissolution of respect for 
tradition, the sacred, and ultimately, discipline. If Shrutiji were simply concerned with the 
misrepresentation of Hinduism she would have left off with the statement that the 
tradition is forever being cannibalized and that as Hindus we must be vigilant about 
protesting such abuses. But woven into her narrative was a critique of a permissive 
modern global culture that disregards sacred traditions and allows for the random 
appropriation of anybody’s iconography. Her lecture was not simply then a call to arms 
against those that would debase Hinduism, but more importantly it was a lesson on the 
moral dangers of an increasingly chaotic, careless world. The Wendy’s ad was merely a 
symptom of a global pathology that promotes an anything goes mentality. The ironic and 
offensive use of Lakshmi to sell a hamburger is a clear indication for Shrutiji that the 
boundaries between the sacred and the profane have been eroded by a global ethos of 
carelessness and self-indulgence. As with many of her other lectures, this one built on the 
theme of chaos abounding in the world, evidenced through the calloused disregard for 
traditions that strive to promote discipline. The adharmic tendencies of the modern 
world, that is, those that are non-dharmic, orient people’s focus toward decadence, self-
indulgence, laziness. This interpretation of modernity follows from a rather widespread 
Hindu belief that we are living in the historical epoch of Kaliyuga, the last of times 
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before the earth is destroyed and remade. But it is complicated by a participation in and 
consumption of many of the forms, ideologies, and products of global popular culture.  
I found it telling in this last regard that Shrutiji’s diatribes never suggested that 
Hollywood stop appropriating Hindu cosmological concepts and iconography but rather 
that Hindus should get credit as the originators of the ideas. For the film Avatar Shrutiji 
seemed less irritated with the bizarre interpretation of avatars and more annoyed with the 
fact that no mention was made of Hindus as originators of the idea. I got the distinct 
sense that had credit been duly given to Hindus as creators of the concept of avatars the 
discussion would have taken on a much different tone. “Hindus must be on their feet”, 
she implored her audience, “because people are always taking things from Hinduism and 
twisting them around.” Following on that theme, she also wondered why Greek 
mythology was so radically “changed up” in the film Clash of the Titans. What she 
appeared to be advocating for was narrative accuracy and credit for origination, rather 
than a moratorium on the use of another culture’s ideas. I spent hours puzzling over this 
position without ever finding the right question to resolve it tactfully. Her position was 
puzzling on two levels. First, she seemed to be tacitly admitting that she viewed Hindu 
cosmology as a social construct. Based on some of her previous statements, in specific 
the one asserting that the Orisha and Hindu traditions worship the same things, this isn’t 
all that startling. But in light of what looks like a fundamentalist approach to Ramayana 
study in her theory course, her campaign for intellectual credit stands at odds with that 
worldview. Shrutiji is not one to use words carelessly, so that she would discuss Hindu 
cosmology as just one set of ideas among the many circulating in popular culture is 
surprising. Second, though the tone of her discussion was stern, the content revealed an 
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undercurrent of flattery. It was as if she was saying that to borrow concepts from the deep 
well of Hindu lore is understandable, but the source should be cited appropriately. 
Though the paradox in Shrutiji’s position is not easy to resolve (indeed, doing so would 
be presumptuous), it does, I believe, reveal the kinds of subjective negotiations of popular 
media that involve accommodation, resistance, and interpretation that Stuart Hall 
articulates so clearly in his work4 (2007).     
Taken together, the trenchant criticisms of the Wendy’s ad and the film Avatar 
can be seen as one way in which the lawlessness of popular culture is resisted by a 
socially conservative community. Like Partap’s belief that the music played in maxi-taxis 
“disturbs the mind”, or the view from HSS leaders that situates popular culture, both local 
and global, as a force of personal destruction, Shrutiji’s readings of the many texts of 
popular culture resemble the concerns of early theorists of mass culture. Q.D. and F.R. 
Leavis (2008), for example, wrote voluminously in the 1930s-50s on the moral and 
intellectual dangers of mass culture on young generations. In their view, popular culture 
texts pandered to humans’ base instincts, bringing out their most savage and childish                                                         4 During a lull in the theory lecture, I attempted to make sense of the paradox in this way: 
“It seems that the Indian longing for total recognition [I appropriate this phrasing from 
Scott 2005 in his treatment of Bernard Yack 1992] cannot be satisfied. Buried in that 
longing is an ideological conservatism that seeks to fix tradition and practice in such a 
way that derivations are deemed inauthentic. It also longs to lay claim to ideas and 
innovations as if there has not been a longstanding global tradition of culture exchange – 
or as if ideas could not independently co-arise. Jung’s work on archetypes, however 
misguided by universalist implications, at least demonstrated that many similar concepts 
arose in various groups. This Hindu diffusionism rehearses the same absurdities the 
heliocentric anthropologists developed in the 19th century arguing that Egypt was the 
mother of all cultures – the Um al Cultur. Boas’s historical particularism went a long way 
a long time ago to demonstrate the independent creativity and ingenuity of all culture 
groups. But we might also see in this brand of discourse an anti-orientalist narrative. It is 
an indirect way of stating how the West plundered and exploited the East. Seen in this 
light, narratives of intellectual property theft are ones that seek recognition for their 
contribution to western culture and imperial dominance.”     
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qualities. For them, the corrective to the deleterious effects of mass culture was so-called 
high culture – classics of literature, art, and music. As the Leavises saw things, it was the 
duty of the upper classes, those who maintained knowledge and love of the classics, to 
promote civilization among the masses.  
Upon this minority depends our power of profiting by the finest human  
experience of the past; they keep alive the subtlest and most perishable parts of  
tradition. Upon them depend the implicit standards that order the finer living of an  
age, the sense that this is worth more than that, this rather than that is the direction  
in which to go, that the centre is here rather than there. (Leavis 2008 [1933]: 13) 
 
   Here, the Leavises take their cue from the 19th century social critic Mathew 
Arnold, whose 1869 classic Culture and Anarchy outlined the ways in which working 
class culture in England was undermining classical culture and thus promoting social 
anarchy. Much like Hindu elders today in Trinidad, Arnold worried that losing sight of 
culture, which he defines as “the best that has been thought and said in the world” and 
which makes people “sensible to beauty, intelligent and alive”, would result in a lack of 
deference among the working classes for their superiors (2010: 6-7). For Hindu 
community organizers in Trinidad, culture carries a much more modern gloss and is often 
imbricated with ethnicity. Even so, its function as a civilizing force of discipline that 
attunes people, in this case youth, to what is right and good remains almost the same. For 
Trinidadian Hindus the concern is that the allure of mass culture, which, as we have seen, 
is an anarchic space where respect and deference are in short supply, will attune their 
children to selfishness and narcissism. A shared imaginary space that allows for the 
cannibalization of Hindu iconography to sell hamburgers, or carelessly appropriates 
important features of Hindu cosmology, or composes Calypsos making wanton and lewd 
references to Indian women, is a space that must be countered by the inherently rectifying 
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principles of key Hindu practices. The purpose behind exact recitations of Sanskrit and 
Awadhi scripture, yoga postures in the morning, raga (devotional music) lessons in the 
afternoon, and the acting of Ramayana is to cultivate a healthy mind that is focused, 
disciplined, and inclined toward moral duty, or dharma.  
  In similar fashion, Trinidad’s Hindu community leaders regard their mission not 
so much as one of preservationism, but rather one of promoting ideal characteristics in 
the youth that act as ballast to the moral entropy of mass culture. That many leaders of 
the myriad Hindu communities in Trinidad view themselves as carrying this moral 
responsibility is, in my estimation, beyond question. Indeed, most parents who enroll 
their children in Hindu programs such as the Bal Ramdilla Vacation course, the HSS, 
Shakha, the Hindu Maha Sabha, the Chin Maya Mission, and many others, do so not only 
to cultivate and protect a distinct ethnic/religious identity but to expose their children to 
the ancient wisdom of the Vedas and its morally strengthening potential.  
 The rigid structure of the morning routines and classes at the Kendra give way to 
more free-flowing theatrical exercises in the afternoon. Often under the guidance of 
Raviji, whose own natural theatricality and wit inspires many of the children to strive to 
impress him, students will practice stage techniques by performing short skits for each 
other. Curious about the program, some parents show up well before the 5:00 pm pick up 
time to see what their kids are doing in the program. I take this opportunity to chat with 
parents, gently interrogating them about their motivations for enrolling their children in 
the program, what they think of the Kendra’s methods, whether they see a difference in 
their child’s or children’s behavior, and so on. I looked forward to seeing some parents, 
cherishing their sophisticated understanding of pedagogy and child development. One 
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such parent was Brinsley, a father of a boy in Meenaji’s 7-9 year old class. Soft-spoken 
and articulate, his thoughtful gaze trained on the roomful of students as they performed 
their skits, Brinsley explained that he wanted his son to learn strong social skills. Brinsley 
regretted having lost a connection with his Hindu past, admitting with mild shame that he 
really didn’t know much about it. After speaking with him several times I thought he was 
being modest, but if he compared himself to other parents like, say, Partap, his 
knowledge of Hinduism was relatively thin. Though he wanted his son to learn more 
about Hinduism and Indian history in Trinidad, he expressed more enthusiasm about his 
son learning greater self-confidence through the Kendra’s performance program. Brinsley 
was concerned that his son, a well-liked but rather shy boy, would have a difficult time 
later in life if he didn’t learn to assert himself and speak out. As I will discuss in greater 
detail in the next chapter, Raviji routinely pointed out to the students, to me, and likely to 
parents, that Indo-Trinidadians are too passive and thus too afraid to speak out against 
injustice and to speak up for themselves. Though he didn’t reference it specifically, 
Raviji’s 4Ps program of self-empowerment was the kind training Brinsley sought for his 
quiet son. Like many of the parents I talked to, Brinsley said nothing of a Hindu 
renaissance. Indeed, of the roughly two dozen parents I spoke with on a regular basis, 
only two expressed excitement about a Hindu revival in Trinidad – one was Partap and 
the other Bharati, an energetic and outspoken woman bearing a large, full-color tattoo of 
Shiva, god creation and destruction, on her upper right arm.  
 If any of the other parents I spoke with shared Partap’s and Bharati’s enthusiasm 
for a renewed assertion of Hinduness in Trinidadian public life, they didn’t say so. I 
suspect several of them, like Brinsley, would have been embarrassed to say so even they 
  191 
were excited by the prospect of a Hindu rashtra (nation) in Trinidad5. But I never got the 
sense that Brinsley, or any of the other parents who shared their concerns about their 
children’s future with me for that matter, was dissimulating. Even when talking about the 
recovery of Hinduism in Trinidadian, Brinsley was exceedingly careful not to disparage 
other traditions and pedagogies. 
My parent’s generation, and mine too, have lost a lot of the knowledge of the 
older people. I don’t know much about Hinduism – a little bit – but not much. I 
think it’s good people want to keep it strong. Raviji is a clever man and he knows 
a lot. I think my son can learn a lot here. What they teach here you don’t get in the 
public schools. Learning to respect elders, being punctual, discipline – they [the 
children] don’t learn in that in the public schools.  
 
Brinsley’s circumspect treatment of Hindu pedagogy is fairly representative of most 
parent’s motivations for sending their kids to discipline oriented programs. Like the 
teachers of the Kendra, the HSS, and the Chin Maya Mission I worked and spoke with, 
foremost in their mission statements to me, and even to the children and their parents, is 
an effort to build confident, disciplined children. It is for this reason that several of the 
children attending these programs lack any sense of self-control when signing up.  
 About a week into the summer vacation course Ellen enrolled her five year old 
daughter in the Kendra. Aware that her daughter “is a handful”, she agreed to stay at the 
Kendra throughout the day as a volunteer. Her daughter, Kharabi, participated in the 
activities she wanted to and ignored the others if they failed to meet her standards of 
                                                        
5 Driving back to Port of Spain from the Kendra one evening, my friend related to me that 
there was a group of radically minded Hindu intellectuals who harbored longings for a 
Hindu rashtra in Trinidad. The group, probably no more than about dozen people, hashed 
out plans to establish a rashtra in parts of Central and South that would eventually agitate 
for independence. The plan gained little traction and never enjoyed the backing of any of 
Trinidad’s prominent Hindus. Following the well-worn path of nearly all utopias, the plan 
crumbled under the weight of reality and, to my knowledge, has not re-emerged since.   
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interest. At rest time after lunch, she would routinely refuse to lie down, making a fuss 
over whether her resting mat was properly arranged or positioned beside the classmate of 
her liking. She followed rules only when they suited her, and feared the rebuke of none. 
Her cavalier disregard for the Kendra’s firmly established order rattled Shrutiji in ways I 
have not seen before or since. When one of the older kids had the audacity to steup (suck 
one’s teeth in a display of indifference) Shrutiji she was irritated, but only expressed it to 
a small group of us later. Kharabi, by contrast, required herculean efforts of patience by 
the instructors. Steuping a teacher was one thing, but disregarding Raviji was something 
not even the greenest neophytes could imagine. Kharabi did. She made her own rules and 
feared no one. I had never seen a child vex Raviji. Indeed, I didn’t think anyone ever 
could. The deference shown to Raviji by children and adults of all ages, classes, and 
stations is like none I have ever seen in such a context. It seemed impossible that anyone 
would try to vex Raviji. But Kharabi made a good run of it. During circle time after their 
short rest Raviji leads the children in performance practice. He has a firm yet entirely 
unintimidating way of including even the most bashful child in large group activities. 
Kharabi would have none of it. She never threw a tantrum about it, she just refused to 
bend to his will, which was all the more galling.  
 At the end of the long days the teachers and interns often hold informal 
conferences in the early evenings after the children and parents had all gone to lime and 
blow off a little steam, as all teachers need to do on occasion. These relaxed yet often 
intense conversations were some of my favorite times. The teachers’ feelings and 
anxieties were aired, the talk was casual and open, and we would all share insights about 
best practices as a community of teachers. The group was agreed that Kharabi would 
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acculturate once she picked up the program’s routine and became a part of the 
community. The other kids would help her along and the pressure to conform in the face 
of her peer group would weed out her solipsistic tendencies. I worried aloud that she may 
not assimilate seeing how little she cared for the approval of others. There were nods of 
agreement and we decided on a wait and see approach, which was all we could really do.  
 Ellen fretted over her daughter’s recalcitrance, but as far as Shrutiji was 
concerned, not enough. Shrutiji feared that the child was spoiled almost beyond repair 
and was in dire need of serious and consistent disciplinary measures if she was to be 
straightened out. Ellen too had a difficult time controlling her willful daughter and 
thought a program such as the Kendra would help remedy her lawlessness. Ellen is a 
bright, well-educated and extremely cosmopolitan woman. Having lived in India, the 
United States, Canada, and most recently Trinidad, Ellen has a worldliness about her that 
stands in contrast to other parents of the Kendra, most of whom are small town 
Trinidadians. Her husband a successful businessman, Ellen can afford the finer things of 
life that her peers clearly cannot. She wears saris of the finest fabrics, which she pairs 
artfully with modest amounts of high- end jewelry. Ellen’s upper-class habitus affords 
her social capital few enjoy in Trinidad’s rural communities. Despite her station, 
however, she is a genuine and generous woman whose expectations of and commitment 
to the Kendra came in equal measures. I had ample opportunity to talk with Ellen and 
found her company easy and her insight keen. Like Brinsley, Ellen enrolled her child in 
the Kendra because of Raviji’s sterling reputation and her hopes that he, and the Kendra, 
could help instill a strong work ethic and love of knowledge in Kharabi. Unlike much of 
America’s upper classes, Ellen did not feel entitled to her wealth and recognized what a 
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tenuous thing prosperity can be. She worried what would become of her daughter as she 
ages and must begin competing against others on difficult exams for entry into elite 
universities. Like many Kendra parents, Ellen views the modern world as a competitive 
place that is best negotiated with a focused and disciplined attitude.  
Kharabi is a smart girl. She has a lot of talents. But she has her own mind. I want 
her to get along with the other children. And I want her to be successful. But she 
needs to know how to work. She must learn to work with others. I think she is too 
independent. Some [independence] is good, but not too much. 
 
Despite my subtle coercions, Ellen either overlooked or dismissed any critique of 
an overly individualistic, competitive global order, just as Shrutiji had done before her. 
Having lived in India, and later in Houston, Texas, and now Trinidad, it is likely Ellen 
has seen a good deal of class division and her fair share of extreme poverty. How deeply 
she has internalized and reflected on the issue was difficult to discern, but it was clear 
that she recognized her privileged status and the work it took to get there. As a family, 
they had to make sacrifices to enjoy their relative wealth, the largest being her husband’s 
long absences from the home. But cashing in time for prosperity is a price they are 
clearly willing to pay. Her daughter too would have to make sacrifices in order to be 
successful, a lesson she wanted her to learn sooner rather than later. Ellen’s narratives 
about her daughter’s future, like the narratives of so many other parents, contained 
clashing strands of anxiety borne of uncertainty and an eager willingness to ensure 
Kharabi’s success. For Ellen, the task at hand is to minimize the distracting forces of 
popular culture that will likely feed Kharabi’s solipsism by introducing her to Hinduism’s 
timeless values and empowering practices.  
I try not to let her watch too much TV. I want her to be here learning with the 
other children. I heard great things about Raviji. I like the way he teaches the 
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children. He’s creative, yet very strict. I think my daughter needs that. Learning 
Ramayana will help her. 
  
The space of global and local popular culture is one whose values, logics, and 
aesthetics are often viewed by Hindus, both in Trinidad and beyond, as ones clashing 
with the timeless attributes of discipline, ambition, and duty promoted through Hindu 
texts, practices, and beliefs. Popular culture’s prominent place in the discourse of Kendra 
and HSS leaders is one clear indication of their effort to counteract the powerful 
influence of mass media on their community. Another indication, as I will explore in the 
next chapter, is their willingness to participate in and contribute to Trinidad’s popular 
culture in the form of musics such as pichakaree and chutney soca that reflect their 
concerns and make their voices heard amid the chorus of other voices.  
 Though Trinidad’s Hindu teachers and community leaders work to counteract 
popular culture’s adharmic (non- or even anti-dharmic) pull, they stop short of the kinds 
of critiques that hail it as universally destructive, irreparably wrong, or purely 
ideological, as articulated by the Frankfurt School and later Marxists. For scholars like 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1998 [1944]), whose work can be situated to some degree along 
the lines of Arnold and the Leavises, popular culture represented a form of capitalist 
ideology whose primary function is to dull the masses. Far from promoting individuality, 
the culture industry’s main motivation is to appear to promote individuality while 
actually generating a homogenized mass of mindless consumers. “In the culture 
industry,” they write, “the individual is an illusion not merely because of the 
standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so long as his complete 
identification with the generality is unquestioned” (1998: 154). For Adorno and 
Horkheimer, and even contemporary Marxists like Jameson, the fear is that popular 
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culture, in all its vapid, shallow, and meaningless images and references, will circumvent 
the possibility of true self-actualization, class consciousness, and a revolution of social 
equality. Trinidadian Hindus do not see the texts of popular culture as capitalist ideology 
or, as Barthes has it, mythology (1972). Indeed, if they did somehow begin to regard 
popular culture as an ideological formation of capitalist logic they may in fact view it 
more favorably. The issue at stake for Trinidadian Hindus is, counterintuitively, not 
necessarily the promotion of a just and classless society but rather the effective 
competition of their members within the existing system. Put another way, the Hindu 
community activists I work with are not seeking to reform the uneven access to 
prosperity engendered in a center/periphery global arrangement but instead seek to prove 
their meddle within that center dominated scheme. As Ellen poignantly demonstrates, the 
problem with the emerging global order of individual achievement is not the differential 
access to the banquet of prosperity, but rather how best to ensure her own daughter’s 
place at the table.  
 
Interpreting the Present, the Past, and the Present Future 
The Ramayana class for 5-7 year olds at the Kendra is a busy place. The head instructor, 
Judyji, bears the countenance of a kindly matriarch, suffering the unruliness of the 
children with the patience of a doting grandmother. Her thin, sallow face set with soulful 
eyes and framed by her black and grey hair, lend her an aura of warmth and sincerity. 
Sitting in her class, the walls adorned with pictures of the devas and devis, I was amazed 
at her ability to hold the attention of the kids as she recounted stories from the Ramayana. 
She held the picture book from which the kids would soon be coloring as they listened 
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intently to her narration. The kids knew the story well, occasionally interrupting Judyji by 
predicting an event or bit of dialogue. When she launched into a rich and colorful 
description of Ayodhya, the city ruled by Raja (King) Dasharatra, the earthly father of 
Rama, the children sat in rapt attention, hanging on her every word. After describing the 
royal city of Ayodhya, Judyji paused and, in her thick Indo-Trinidadian dialect, asked the 
children if they’d like to go to there. 
“Who want to go to Ayodhya”? she asked expectantly. 
Sima, an outspoken girl of six raised her hand and simultaneously said, “I want to go to 
New York.” 
“Good, you want to go to New York,” Judyji responded, clearly dismayed that her effort 
to bring Ayodhya to life in the children’s imagination had failed.  
Judyji’s daily struggle is to bring to life for her young students the epic leela, or 
play, of Rama and his companions as they attempt to rescue the pure Sita from the 
clutches of Rawana. In much the same way that biblical stories were simplified into 
battles of good versus evil in the Protestant Sunday school lessons I attended as a child, 
so too is the Ramayana condensed into a series of mini narratives recounting the heroism 
of Rama and his loyal band as they adventure through India in an epic quest to save Sita. 
As the children age, the narratives, themes, and exegesis of the scripture become more 
sophisticated. By the time an adept and astute student has finished Shutiji’s theory course 
at the end of high school, she will have memorized the story of Rama, will have 
memorized several caupais (verses), some in Awadhi, and will have performed the leela 
countless times. The Ramayana and its central themes and significations will be as 
familiar to her as the Nativity narrative of Jesus is to her devoutly Christian counterpart. 
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Indeed, her familiarity is likely even deeper in many ways because she will have 
memorized many of the caupais in Awadhi and Sanskrit, and it is seldom, if ever, the 
case that Christians in Bible camps learn both Greek and Aramaic while studying the 
gospels. For example, “Rama junema sukka mulah” (Rama’s birth is the source of all joy) 
is one of several Awadhi phrases nearly all of the children will have memorized upon 
graduating from Bal Ramdilla.  
Sitting in on and even “teaching” several times the three courses – Judyji’s 5-7 
year olds, Meenaji’s 8-11 year olds, and Shrutiji’s high schoolers – it was clear that the 
interpretation of the Ramayana was guided very much by the teachers’ sets of concerns 
regarding modernity, popular culture, and the difficulty of success in a deregulated global 
capital market. Though few would likely phrase it this way, particularly in the case of the 
last concern, their repeated admonitions about the tenuousness of success amounted to a 
tacit recognition that prosperity is an individually achieved outcome. The means by 
which they draw meaning and life lessons from Ramayana scripture follow from a 
paradoxical interpretation of modern global culture. Shrutiji is typically unyielding in her 
condemnation of popular culture, often characterizing it as meaningless and tending 
toward self-indulgence, yet she maintains an impressive knowledge of 1970s and 80s era 
pop and rock music, both American and British. And she adores Hollywood films with 
mystical, mysterious themes, which she asks me to bring when I come down to visit. On 
my last trip I brought the film The Last Mimzy, about a brother and sister in the 8-11 year 
old range who find a mysterious artifact on the beach that possesses mystical powers. 
Shrutiji liked the film she said because it demonstrated the wonder and mystery in the 
world that adults often miss because of their preoccupation with work, status, and getting 
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ahead. Though the Kendra mission, as with the HSS, is centered around building children 
into successful young adults that can compete effectively in the high pressure world of 
professional business and politics, here Shrutiji seems to lump personal ambition and 
gain as part of an ideology that distracts people from the profound mysteries of the world. 
The film, which has what religious studies scholars might label “New Age” themes, 
resonated with Shrutiji because it illustrated a truth about the mysterious powers that 
surround us that we routinely ignore. Shrutiji’s paradoxical interpretation of modern 
global public culture that, on the one hand, follows the HSS’s neoliberal dictum, “We 
Achieve By Our Own Efforts” and, on the other, suggests that we strive for success at the 
peril of our ability to perceive or imagine life’s mysteries, articulates a paradox already 
well established in American capitalist culture. 
Appadurai’s critical inquiry into public imaginary spaces and the ways in which 
these spaces are altered, enriched, and expanded through transnational media accurately 
captures Shrutiji’s widely shared paradox. Instances and articulations of capitalist 
ideologies promoting individual striving and achievement abound in popular texts 
(Parenti 1991). Yet countless nostalgic texts also emerge lamenting our loss of a child’s 
sense of wonder and amazement at the world bartered away in a quest for notoriety and 
status (for example, The Last Mimzy, Big, any film by Hayao Miyazaki). Shrutiji’s 
paradox then is an attempt to reconcile her belief that success is borne of discipline, 
maturity, and constant striving for excellence and her fear that the mysterious powers that 
animate our world are obscured by excessive attention to the self. Shrutiji’s dualistic 
approach to interpreting the myriad texts of modernity is emblematic of Appadurai’s 
insight that local imaginative spaces are expanded by globalized media. The way in 
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which powerful and mysterious forces are conceived and represented in The Last Mimzy 
reflect American, middle-class, New Age articulations of what some might call the 
“numinous”, or primordial power. New Age spirituality’s highly eclectic and rather 
amorphous cosmology is itself influenced by transnationalized religious traditions 
ranging from indigenous cosmologies of Australia and North America to the so-called 
world religions and their mystical offshoots. That such an eclectic spiritual vision is 
coupled with a somewhat ambiguous critique of modernity, points up the paradoxical 
position of contemporary Trinidadian Hindus as those who both consume and resist 
global media. While local imaginative spaces are enriched by global media and events, 
those same spaces become sites of accommodation and resistance as well as, most 
importantly, creative translation.  
Trinidadian Hindus’ interpretation of the Ramayana reflects the particular 
historical trajectory of East Indians as subjects of empire and contemporary cultural shifts 
inaugurated by changing relational dynamics and conceptualizations of self and other. 
The narratives of success so central to many Hindu community of Trinidad reflect an 
eagerness to participate in the highly competitive, individualizing space of late 
capitalism. Though years of neo-liberal policies globally instituted throughout the Reagan 
and Thatcher years of the 1980s up to the present have effectively dismantled market 
regulators that offered developing nations a fighting chance to compete against already 
robust economies, Trinidad’s Hindus seek not to reform the system toward greater 
egalitarianism but to succeed within it. In distinction to the way in which many 
Jamaicans have leveled trenchant critiques against an exploitative neo-imperial order and 
sought to reform it (Black 2003), Trinidad’s Hindus tend to see critical narratives about 
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and activism against differential access to power as complaining. Rather than agitating to 
expand the circle of privilege to include more of the world’s citizens, or to attempt to 
erase those boundaries altogether, many of the Hindus I work with seek to pack 
themselves into the already crowded circle.  
In an event that demonstrated to me that I had spent too much time in graduate 
school reading heady Marxist theory and romanticizing the potential of class 
consciousness, I asked Shrutiji one day about her thoughts on neo-imperialism. She had 
been relating to me the struggles of young people in today’s social climate and how 
success was dependent on a strategic approach to the contemporary world. Before I could 
check myself, I asked in jargon-laden terms if the difficulty she described was the result 
of neo-imperial hegemony that creates unequal access to agency. Given how often I had 
heard her critique popular culture, both local and global, I thought maybe I could strike a 
chord. Shrutiji is an exceedingly sharp woman whose tolerance for nonsense is minimal. 
She knew precisely what I was getting at, but promptly refuted my suggestion. For 
Shrutiji, as for many of the Hindu teachers and community leaders I spoke with, the 
problem was not the hegemonic fabrication of an unequal system but rather a more 
insidious problem of a globally declining moral order that had little to nothing to do with 
powerful transnational actors. The amoral world her students will inherit and must 
negotiate largely independently someday can be linked not so much to imperial 
hegemony but more so to cosmological events articulated in ancient Vedic literature. In 
Shrutiji’s analysis we are living in the time Kaliyuga, the last of the world’s epochs 
before its ultimate destruction and recreation. I found this difficult to reconcile with her 
sharp and highly detailed analysis of colonial imperialist practices throughout the slavery 
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and indenture period. Shrutiji’s savvy about colonialism and its coercive techniques of 
manipulation and control through deceit and division are unmatched by most of the laity. 
Yet her willingness to attribute contemporary local and global problems to modern forms 
of inequality is virtually nonexistent.  
It would be tempting to locate Shrutiji’s, and the broader Hindu Trinidadian 
community’s, unwillingness to interrogate structural inequality as a symptom of 
ideology. On first glance, it is clearly emblematic of the effectiveness of capitalist 
discourse. Indeed, the Althusserian in me sees the earnest striving for membership within 
the circle of successful elites rather than a longing to dismantle that system as an 
archetypal example of the ways in which competition is naturalized as an inherent human 
tendency. After my discussion with Shrutiji, on the long bus ride back to Port of Spain 
from Chaguanas, I scribbled frantically in my notebook, wondering why Shrutiji, who 
articulates an uncommonly critical historiography of 19th century colonial technologies, 
would refuse to implicate those same powers in contemporary class hierarchies. Does she 
believe that Independence should be taken at face value? Did the end of formal 
colonialism signal for her the end of western imperialism? How could she, as well as 
leaders from the HSS and the Chin Maya Mission who reiterated virtually the same 
outlook, believe that prosperity is equally open to all when it is fairly common 
knowledge throughout the Caribbean that the US, among other international actors, has 
been meddling in regional politics and economics since at least the US control of Haiti in 
1915 (Trouillot 1990: 100-102)? In the face of such overwhelming evidence supporting 
claims of a globalized caste/class system, how could someone as smart and observant as 
Shrutiji not see, at least in an impressionistic way, that the global political economy is 
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dominated by a handful of actors? Is this a prime example of Brackette Williams’ (1991) 
Gramscian insight played out in the global political-economic field? 
I would love nothing more than to spin a yarn detailing how I wrestled with these 
questions, and others besides, filing painstakingly through my catalogue of interpretations 
until I found a definitive and accurate answer to them. But I do not believe that that is the 
purpose of ethnography. As Laura Bohanan learned from her community in Africa, the 
heart that learns wisdom learns slowly (1956...). The purpose of my effort here is to 
struggle openly with questions of interpretation. On the one hand, I believe it would be 
hasty to dismiss a Gramscian/Althusserian interpretation that teases out the subtle 
mechanisms of ideological control at work in the Hindu community’s unwillingness to 
interrogate critically the present arrangement of capitalism that to my mind structure 
inequalities. The sensationalization of prosperity as articulated by American standards 
and broadcast through global media has clearly gained purchase in countless public 
imaginary spaces. The anthropology of globalization provides rich testament to the 
massive aesthetic shifts throughout the world in this regard (see, for example, Inda and 
Rosaldo 2002). On the other hand, however, the people I work with, to borrow a term 
from Stuart Hall, are not dupes. To the contrary, the teachers, program designers, activity 
leaders, pundits, and visionaries I spend time with are astoundingly bright, creative, alert 
individuals. They translate, interpret and negotiate modernity in ways that suggest more 
than idiosyncrasy but also an alertness to the pitfalls of both too much ambition and, of 
course, not enough. While they want their students to be successful, here in the standard 
sense of capital accumulation, they also fear a loss of tradition that is more than mere 
ethnic nationalism. Loss of tradition in this sense is also a loss of self-actualizing values 
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that transcend the quotidian concerns of personal achievement. Losing contact with one’s 
tradition, in this instance a Trinidadian Hindu tradition, is to lose sight of self-sustaining, 
empowering practices and values. The present and the “present future” then, as Rabinow 
has it, are read through a lens colored by a certain longing for tradition. And yet at the 
same time, that tradition is read through a lens colored by present interpretive practices 
and imaginative shifts whose provenience is local and global.  
 The contemporary needs of Trinidad’s Hindus center around confronting and 
defeating cultural tendencies that lean toward apathy, pleasure, and excesses of all kinds. 
The inevitably declining moral order we must endure signals for the Kendra’s teachers a 
greater need for the lessons of the past. Shrutiji’s Ramayana theory class is for the 
students an intensive study in scriptural exegesis and meaning and tradition. For me, the 
class was an intensive study in eisegesis and the contingency of meaning and tradition. 
To listen to the Kendra’s teachers, particularly Shrutiji in her theory course, is similar to 
how I have often imagined lessons from Confucius. Like Confucius, the teachers lay a 
heavy emphasis on the ancients, imploring students to study them as exemplars of moral 
fortitude and intellectual acuity (Fingarette 1998). If in the past the story of Rama and his 
companions was an exemplary and inspirational tale for exploited and impoverished 
indentured workers in the face of colonial oppression, today it serves as a model for 
inspiring perseverance in the face of cultural forces that encourage carelessness and 
hedonism. “In ancient times”, Shrutiji tells her class, “people were nice to one another. 
They were also kind and appropriate. We have lost that tradition. We are not as polite to 
one another as we should be. People of ancient times had nice words to describe one 
anther.” This is more than simply an elder’s nostalgia narrative lamenting the passing of a 
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romanticized age. Rather, given the context in which this emerges, we must also see it as 
a means of contesting a social order she finds problematic. Whether or not people have 
become less civil is immaterial, what lies behind the motivation to interpret the past and 
ancient scripture in this way is what underscores her interpretive techniques and biases. 
 As further evidence that moral degradation is the way of the world, Shrutiji also 
informed us that humans are smaller and weaker than they were in ancient times. Our 
communicative abilities are poorer and as such we can no longer communicate with other 
species as we could before. We do not understand the ways of the world, of the devas and 
devis, and even of ourselves as we once did. Our once robust and giant physiques have 
dwindled over the ages into the feeble, often sickly bodies we have now. Our powers of 
comprehension have been compromised by an increasing emphasis on pleasure. We do 
not live nearly as long as we once did. In short, we are weaker, spiritually and physically, 
than our ancient ancestors. If there is any consolation in this dreary news it is that the 
devas and devis cut modern humans some slack for their weaknesses and temptations. 
We cannot be held to the standard of the ancients whose many powers and talents far 
surpassed ours. Nonetheless, we have not been granted free passes. Failure is an ever-
present shadow. Success is the reward of the vigilant. And we achieve by our own efforts. 
Given our spiritually and intellectually debased state, it is easy to fall victim to vulgar 
epicureanism, to hedonism and drunkenness in an effort to avoid life’s difficulties and 
pain. Since the time of indenture the tool that Trinidad’s Hindus have used to remain 
morally strong in the face of oppression, exclusion, and temptation is the Ramayana.  
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More than Sacred Text 
The Prarthana opens with a blessing to Baba Tulsidas, regarded by teachers of the Kendra 
as “the Father of the Hindu Caribbean”. Te dhanya Tulsidas aas/bihai je hari ranga rai 
(Blessed is Baba Tulsidas who is enrapt in Shri Rama). The veneration of Goswami 
Tulsidas, whose murti (statue) stands at the center of the deva sthaan (shrine area), is 
intended to remind students of the great gift of insight he bestowed through his 
interpretation of Valmiki’s Ramayana. It is also a reminder of where they come from and 
how they landed in the Caribbean in the first place. As Raviji explained to me, most of 
the Indians coerced onto the Caribbean bound ships by the arkatis hailed from India’s 
northern states. One of the most popular recruiting regions was the sugar producing state 
of Uttar Pradesh, also the home of Goswami Tulsidas. The poet Tulsidas then is both a 
link to their ancestral homeland and symbol of insight and creativity as oracle of Lord 
Rama.  
 In writing the Ramacaritamanasa in vernacular, Tulsidas opened early versions of 
Rama’s life and adventures to a much broader audience of commoners. His poem, which 
casts Rama as a divine being and direct avatar of Vishnu, became hugely popular 
throughout India, upsetting Ramayana purists who sought to protect the devotional text 
from interpretive corruption (Martin 2005: 192). As popular scripture the 
Ramacaritamanasa sought to reconcile longstanding interpretive and devotional divisions 
within Hinduism. Tulsidas’s devotional poem bridged nirguna (God without qualities, or 
Brahma) and saguna (God with qualities, i.e. avatars/devas and devis) interpretive 
traditions as well as the two major strands of devotional practice, advaita (contemplative 
worship) and bhakti (devotional worship) (Martin 2005: 192). By refashioning the 
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Ramayana as a popular text, accessible to the laity and thus open to all, Tulsidas stripped 
advaita elites from their interpretive monopoly of key sacred texts. Because of the 
accessibility of the epic, Tulsidas’s Ramayana was and remains hugely popular with 
Hindus within India and throughout the diaspora. The compelling battle between classic 
archetypes of good (Rama and his companions) and evil (Rawana and his Rakshasas) has 
spawned lilas (plays) performed by Hindu communities throughout the world, films, 
countless TV programs – starting with Ramanand Sagar’s unforgettable 1987 version – 
and comic books.  
 Writing in vernacular for Tulsidas was not simply a matter of translation – it was, 
at the time, a radical act of interpretive subversion. Not only did the epic poet rewrite the 
post-Vedic era text to bring it to a broader audience, perhaps more importantly, he 
refashioned its narrative arc, thus for the times, modernizing it. As with other 
interpretations of the Ramayana, Tulsidas conceived of the text in a fashion particular to 
his cultural-historic time and place. By reconceiving the text in such a radical way, he 
opened new pathways of approaching and reading sacred scripture. Tulsidas was not the 
first reader and writer to reimagine ancient Hindu scripture, but he remains one of the 
most memorable in the minds of Hindus. His effort inaugurated novel renderings of the 
text that show little sign of letting up. Ironically, however, a substantial faction of Hindus 
are very particular about how the Ramayana is to be read and performed. The Kendra, 
one of Trinidad’s most popular performers of the Ram Leela (local spelling), draw 
inspiration from theologically conservative groups such as the RSS whose performances 
of the Ramayana follow strict standards and well-established protocol. 
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 In the parallel universe of western popular culture discourse, Paul Willis, 
responding to high culture theorists alarmed at the debasement of civilization through 
mass culture media, wrote that critiques of popular culture and its consumers from both 
the left and the right “ignore the dynamic and living qualities of everyday culture and 
especially their necessary work and symbolic creativity” (2007: 241). Willis’s work was 
concerned with demonstrating the creative process inherent in human activity, which 
includes consumption of the material commodities and symbolic media that permeate 
mass culture. As Willis succinctly states his case, the play of consumption includes work 
(2007: 242). In other words, an integral feature of consumerist processes necessarily 
involves the work of symbolic creativity. Cultural processes, Willis insists, cannot be 
easily reduced to mere repetition, gullibility, or mindlessness. Reductionist models that 
situate consumerism as exploitation, as discourse from the left articulates it, or as a 
dumbing down of the masses, as the right argues, overlook the myriad micro-processes of 
creative work that go into every subject-object interaction. Willis is right to state that 
“there is no such thing as an autonomous artefact capable of printing its own intrinsic 
values, one way, on human sensibility” (2007: 243). Willis’s attention to the details of 
language here demonstrates his keen marksmanship. By inserting the seemingly 
insignificant two-word phrase “one way” Willis captures a Hegelian understanding of the 
complex relation between the comprehending subject and the symbolic object. For what 
is outside the subject is always symbolic. Stated in Structuralist terms, objects 
encountered by the subject must always be mediated, a process which necessarily 
involves creative interpretation. Willis’s model then is helpful on several scores. 
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 Shrutiji’s ambivalent relationship to local and global forms of popular culture 
underscore Willis’s claim that consumers of mass media do so with a heightened sense of 
creativity, not a diminished one. Following Stuart Hall, Shrutiji’s frustration with 
representations of and appropriations from Hindu iconography and cosmology on the one 
hand, and her adoration of New Age films and certain rock bands, on the other, point up 
the continually active intellectual processes that contain, resist, accommodate, and 
refashion popular texts (Hall 2007: 68-9). What the work of Hall, Willis, Raymond 
Williams and others allow us to do is do is recognize that contradictory processes, and 
even ideologies, can exist in the same imagined space. As Hall accurately frames the 
problem, “The danger arises because we tend to think of cultural forms as whole and 
coherent: either wholly corrupt or wholly authentic. Whereas, they are deeply 
contradictory; they play on contradictions, especially when they function in the domain 
of the ‘popular’” (2007: 68). What Hall and Willis open up for us in the context of 
Trinidad’s socially and largely theologically conservative Hindu communities is the 
possibility of recognizing how they mediate popular texts as symbols that shift 
conceptions of the self and other in shared imaginative spaces. Like Appadurai, the 
Cultural Studies approach to popular artifacts and texts allows us to apprehend creative 
micro-movements in cultural practices and formations without reifying one side of the 
agency/hegemony binary. 
 Additionally, though Hall’s and Willis’s work relates to consumer practices 
within a capitalist marketplace, their insights apply equally well to recognizing the 
critical role subjective creativity plays in the interpretation and recreation of reading and 
performing sacred texts such as the Ramayana. Trinidad’s unique historical-cultural 
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setting, where creolization is as active a trope in the public imaginary as, say, 
individualism is in American public culture, promotes hybridization at every turn, despite 
how contested the term ‘creole’ may be. On several occasions Trinidadian Hindus related 
to me stories about how impressed Indian Hindus are with the vibrancy of Trinidad’s 
religious practices. As Raviji put it to me, “I think they are surprised that we managed to 
keep the traditions, that we are as much Hindus as they are.” Shrutiji backed him, saying 
that “Many Indians still do not know we are even here. Most never even knew about the 
indenture program”. Raviji went on to say that for him being a Hindu in Trinidad had 
privileges that he could not enjoy in India, the most central to him being the freedom to 
improvise, recreate, and creatively interpret – in a word, to creolize – Hinduism. Upon 
returning to Trinidad in the early 1980s after ten years of study with the conservative 
RSS in India, Raviji quickly established programs founded on and in some cases nearly 
identical to those he experienced in India. However, he also began the process of 
indigenizing the fundamentalist brand of Hinduism he studied for a decade. Facing no 
theological authority, no public sentiment that insisted on prescribed forms of religious 
practice, and no governing body that regulated how he interpreted, practiced, and taught 
Hindu texts and worship, Raviji was free to implement programs, art forms, and ritual 
practices in ways that suited Trinidad’s bakhti oriented Hindu community.  
 The Kendra’s performance of the Ram Leela that began in 2004 was a natural 
outgrowth of the central role the Ramayana plays in Trinidadian bakhti worship. It must 
also be seen, however, as an outgrowth of the creative ways in which several of 
Trinidad’s Hindu communities use sacred scripture as means of promoting individual 
achievement and community empowerment. To use a popular text in this fashion is to 
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also recast it to fit the symbolic and ideological contours of the community. It is in this 
sense that Kendra and HSS leaders and teachers resemble Liberation theologians of Latin 
America whose interpretation of key biblical passages reflect the social-political-
economic context of impoverished Christians. Just as the Latin American context of 
colonial oppression gave rise to interpretive forms that challenged western cultural 
imperialism on its own terms (Morkovsky 1997), so too does Ramayana interpretation 
function as a means of combating cultural forms and practices that Hindus find spiritually 
destructive. While the contexts between Central and South American Christian 
communities and Trinidadian Hindus are obviously quite different, the way in which 
those contexts exert influence on interpretations of scripture remain startlingly similar. 
For Latin American Christians frustrated with western cultural dominance, Liberation 
Theology was not only a means of indigenizing the Europeans’ own scripture but, equally 
as important, it was a means of mobilizing communities to fight injustice. Likewise, to 
view the persistent centrality of the Ramayana, or any other Hindu scripture, as cultural 
preservationism or identity maintenance would be to miss the critical role these texts play 
in negotiating dominant local and global cultural forms. The longer I sat in Shrutiji’s 
Ramayana theory class the more parallels I saw with certain features of Liberation 
Theology.  
Liberation Theology, like Rastafari, was a profound act of political-symbolic 
subversion as it appropriated the Bible as the people’s text. Using a mostly Marxist 
influenced interpretation, Liberation theologians focused on God’s incarnation as a 
working class, marginalized laborer who came to liberate the oppressed, the dispossessed, 
and downtrodden from the heel of imperialism (Morkovsky 1997: 528-9). By reading the 
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Bible almost as a handbook of both political and spiritual liberation, Liberation Theology 
subverted European interpretive hegemony that had situated salvation as a process 
requiring acceptance of a western worldview. Similar to Rastafari practice (Chevannes 
1998: 27-8), Liberation Theology read stories of captivity, exile, and even exodus, as 
events that spoke to their condition under European imperialism. For both Liberation 
Theology and Rastafari, the eventual liberation that God promises the Israelites is the 
same liberation those suffering under the yolk of European oppression can expect. Thus, 
these readings of scripture are not simply adaptations to local contexts, they are a means 
of situating their own plight in the historical trajectory of oppressed peoples outlined in 
the Bible. As Morkovsky reminds us, the object of Liberation Theology “is not to adapt 
the Bible to present situations but something more radical: to reinterpret scripture from 
their personal experience as human beings, believers, and [a] church” (1997: 529). The 
Ramayana, of course, is not a western text – at best it was a literary curiosity of the 
Orient – and therefore not as symbolically radical as indigenous readings of the Bible. 
However, what Liberation Theology, Rastafari, and certain Trinidadian Hindus share is 
an attempt to use scripture as both historical insight and tool of political/social 
mobilization and community empowerment.   
Shrutiji’s theory class is intended to be a close, detail oriented study into the 
Ramayana. I spent countless hours as a student in the class, my back sweating against the 
vinyl chair as I madly noted each day’s lesson. On most days Shrutiji wrote on the board, 
or had a student take dictation on it for her, charting complex concepts, terms, and 
definitions with grids circumscribing each category. I was surprised at the level of 
difficulty involved in the lessons. For example, on one day we covered Vishnu’s Ten 
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Avatars from his first as a fish (matsya), to his last as the being “yet to come” (kalki). On 
another day we covered the Sixteen Sanskars, or spiritual development practices and rites 
to be conducted from the conception of a child (the garbhadan sanskar involoving prayer 
for child’s well-being) to the death of the student at old age (antayeshti sanskar, a 
mortuary rite involving cremation so that the atman, or soul, is not tempted to linger after 
death). The names for the sanskars were delivered in Sanskrit, which the students were 
expected to pronounce flawlessly. Additionally, students were asked to memorize certain 
lines of the Ramayana, often in Awadhi, and recite them to Shrutiji to her exacting 
standards. More challenging than the rote memorization, however, is the expectation that 
students understand the difficult concepts that Tulsidas worked into his epic poem from 
Hindu cosmology. Adding a layer of intellectual difficulty, Shrutiji would routinely ask 
the students to relate one of these concepts from the Ramayana to contemporary events 
and trends. I could see some students bending under the pressure. When addressing 
Shrutiji and the rest of the class students must rise, stand straight, and speak their 
thoughts clearly in Standard English (or at least a close approximation thereof). Students 
that giggle, look to their friends, or answer sheepishly are promptly reproached and made 
to stay standing until they answer a question or repeat a phrase correctly. Not once did I 
see Shrutiji let a struggling student off the hook.  
The lesson on the birth of Rama as the seventh avatar of Vishnu illustrates the 
way in which contemporary readings of the Ramayana, and the changing Hindu 
cosmology within it, can be contextually located. As with almost every lesson Shrutiji 
gave, her treatment of Rama’s birth involved numerous references to contemporary 
events and popular texts. In this instance the birth of Rama lesson gave way to her 
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dissertation on why the film Avatar is problematic and how its twisted presentation of 
heavenly incarnations misapprehends the divine process. In nearly every instance where 
Shrutiji related an important concept from the Ramayana or the Hindu complex, it was 
accompanied by a discussion or critique of contemporary cultural practice, popular texts, 
or both. In contrast to many Christian groups in the United States that employ such 
tactics, Shrutiji did not make these popular references in an effort to make scripture 
relevant to a modern young audience. Her goal was not to appear trendy or hip in order to 
entice the students to like her more or entertain a more favorable view of Ramayana 
themes. The very idea that Shrutiji would seek the children’s approval by referencing 
what is essentially their popular culture is inconceivable to me. Her unwavering aura of 
professionalism, her almost Victorian sense of propriety, and her steadfast view of herself 
as the students’ teacher, not friend, precludes the possibility of her using popular culture 
as subterfuge for scriptural lessons. Shrutiji is much more direct than that. By citing 
popular texts, cultural forms, and power relations (western imperialism, Christianity vs 
Hinduism, ethnic relations) I understood her objective as an effort to demonstrate how 
students might understand their situation in light of the Ramayana and, furthermore, 
apply its principles as exemplified by Sri Rama to succeed against formidable opposition. 
Here again though it must be noted that she rarely spoke in pejorative terms about 
popular culture in toto. Indeed it would make little sense for her to do so because, like so 
many other Hindu community leaders in Trinidad, the purpose of Hindu education is not 
to create a generation of turncoats who resist mass culture but rather individuals who 
succeed within it and, at least locally, participate in reshaping it. It is in this sense that the 
Kendra, as well as the HSS, embodies Gilroy’s notion of double consciousness. When 
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Shrutiji stands before her high school students in the Ramayana theory class, lecturing on 
the ages old Vedic concept of sanskars and seamlessly relates that concept to 
contemporary practices, she stands between ancient tradition and modernity, India and 
Trinidad, communalism and neo-liberalism, nationalism and multi-culturalism.  
 A particularly salient instance of counter posing Ramayana themes against 
contemporary cultural struggles was Shrutiji’s treatment of Rama’s birth. In this 
discussion, Shrutiji opened the lesson with a description of Ramnameen, the celebration 
“of the actual birth and rebirth of Rama every year. Because he’s coming again and again 
and again.” Here, as with many of Shrutiji’s lessons, I thought I detected a thinly veiled 
jab at Christians’ self-appointed monopoly on the concept of a godhead’s divine rebirth 
as a source of salvation. Shrutiji’s soteriological lesson contains creole elements that 
reflect both the interpretation’s influence from Christianity (perhaps to some degree by 
way of the Arya Samaj, see chapter 1) and the importance of Rama as a model of 
behavior in the face of destructive forces. I do not think it would be accurate or fair to 
suggest that Kendra Hindus, or those of the Arya Samaj for that matter, view Rama as 
salvation from the morally destructive temptations of Rawana as mimesis of the Christian 
cosmic battle between Satan and God in the struggle to harvest human souls. Rawana and 
his Rakshasas are, however, certainly used as metaphors of moral corruption. Rama’s 
initial birth and continual rebirth is to help, in Shrutiji’s terms, “take beings across the 
ocean of samsara” (the cycle of birth and death). Identifiable in Shrutiji’s treatment is a 
micro-event whereby an instance of western religious influence in the form of soteriology 
(see Bhatt 2001: 23-5) is simultaneously appropriated and resisted. The Christianization 
of certain features of Hinduism that Bhatt identifies in 19th century nationalist movements 
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in India is evident here as an undercurrent of human relationships with the divine. At the 
same time, this creolized form is also challenged by a subtext of primary origination as it 
articulates salvation (a largely Christian concept) in distinctly Vedic and post-Vedic 
terms, in this case Rama as one who carries beings from the pain and suffering of 
samsara to moksha, or divine transcendence.   
As we can see, the challenge for many of the instructors of Hinduism in Trinidad 
is, as Gilroy has put it, to face two directions at once, to embody a double-consciousness. 
They must adapt readings of scripture, whether it is the Ramayana, Bhagavad Gita, the 
Puranas, or Vedic texts, to modern, creole audiences while, at the same time, adapting 
the modern audience to the ancient texts. Modernity, in all its guises and implications, 
exerts an unquestionable influence on the interpretive practices of Trinidad’s Hindu 
communities. The way in which modern apparatuses, ideologies, representations, and 
conceptual practices have altered publically shared imaginative spaces is evident in 
contemporary hermeneutics of the Ramayana. Similarly, the way in which several of 
Trinidad’s Hindu communities interpret modernity and its rapidly changing contours, is 
given shape by an effort to preserve and promote ancient interpretive practices. 
Preservationism then shares space in the Hindu imaginary with innovation, adaptation, 
reinvention and creative translation. Just as modern popular culture texts are read in light 
of efforts to preserve certain features of Hinduism, so is the Ramayana read in light of the 
changing imaginative possibilities opened through popular culture. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 CONCLUSION: IMAGINED TRANSNATIONALITIES 
 
I am, of course, sympathetic to this oppositional desire to affirm the humanity of the 
subaltern, but I have a doubt that the story of resistance and agency this line of argument 
promotes is the best hope we have in this postcolonial present. 
~ David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity 
 
[Heidegger] says, about Science, there are people who study anthropology and write 
anthropological books. He says they get a lot of facts and put them together but there is 
nothing to it. I accept that. 
~ C.L.R. James, Wilson Harris – A Philosophical Approach 
 
In his deftly argued book Conscripts of Modernity (2005), David Scott maintains, 
following historian Hayden White, that the poetic forms of a narrative determine that 
narrative’s contents. Tragedies fashion narratives in one way, Romances in another. For 
Scott, the problem of critical Caribbean historiography, and of anthropology for that 
matter, has long been a focus on the oppressive brutality of colonialism and the creative 
resistance of its unwilling subjects. The writing of West Indian history as “a longing for 
total revolution”, he contends, forecloses on opportunities to conceptualize alternative 
constructions of Caribbean societies. Scott’s motivation is not to deny or minimize 
colonialism’s legacy of harsh exploitation but rather to interrogate the forms and 
questions scholars and writers use to understand West Indian pasts, presents, and futures.  
 If the forms of narrative...have built into their linguistic structures different myth- 
 models or story-potentials, and if different stories organize the relation between  
 past, present, and future differently, it may be important to inquire into the  
 relation between the poetic form and the conceptual and ideological content of  
 historical discourse. Historically minded criticisms of colonialisms seem to me to 
have something to learn from this idea. (2005: 7)  
  
 The key link here is between “the poetic form and the conceptual and ideological 
content of historical discourse.” The “longing for total revolution”, as Scott has phrased 
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it, among West Indians eager to distance themselves from European domination and 
recreate distinctly Caribbean forms, has generated a body of historical and social science 
literature1 that continually hinges on the oppression vs. agency, or domination vs. 
resistance binary to the exclusion of other social constructions. Prevalent among scholars 
of West Indian history and anthropology is an overdetermined model of resistance that 
stages anti-colonialism as the principle logic of Caribbean social constructivism. The 
focus point of these narratives is on creative agency, and the background always 
colonialism’s artificial societies. Modern West Indian history then is continually cast as 
an epic, often tragic, struggle between oppressor and oppressed, the dominant and the 
subaltern, the center and its alter/native, as Kamau Brathwaite has it (cited in Edwards 
2007: 2).   
What stands out in this critical interrogation of West Indian history for an 
observer of purported Hindu nationalism is first, that the longing for total revolution has 
never been evident among the East Indian migrants to the Caribbean (indeed, the opposite 
can be, and has been, noted), and second that the discourse exploring the 
oppression/agency binary excludes the East Indian presence and their historical narratives 
of colonialism. If, as Scott has noted, the poetic form of literary and historical narratives 
determines content, Trinidadian Hindus’ adaptive approach to reading, translating, and 
using popular culture is indicative of movement away from longing for total revolution. 
In other words, the poetic form crafted and operationalized by Indo-Trinidadians since 
the late 19th century to the present is neither tragedy nor revolutionary. The poetic form 
might better be labeled epic, evidenced in the parallel and often intertwined histories of                                                         1 For a critique of anthropological work in this vein, particularly of Mintz, Price, and 
Thornton, see Scott 2005: 108-12.  
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the East Indians in the New World and the Ramayana. The epic narration of the Indian 
presence in Trinidad indicates not a longing for rebellion or total revolution but an 
eagerness to participate in and be viewed as equal partners in social constructivism.  
If the poetic form of Indo-Trinidadian historiography (especially ethno-
historiography) can be labeled epic, the content of such narrations is rife with themes of 
adaptation and progress even as they look to the past, often the mythic past, for guidance. 
The Romantic narratives of “overcoming” and “vindication” cited by Scott in common 
West Indian literature and history are not as clearly evident in Indo-Trinidadian ethno-
history. In contrast, one finds narratives of an almost epic adventure and of admirable 
striving in the face of adversity. The themes of epic adventure, of striving, and of 
progress, neatly fit the worldview and historiography that situate Indians as intellectual 
pioneers and as cultural and literary innovators every bit equal to, if not in some cases 
superior than, Europeans. This is not to say that Indo-Trinidadians do not treat in great 
detail the trickery, coercion, exploitation, and brutality they faced as victims of the 
indenture system. Histories chronicling the grisly details and grim lives of indentured 
servants abound. Yet what lives in the Indo-Trinidadian historical imagination, 
particularly of the Hindus reading and performing the Ramayana, is a historical narrative 
with more epic and less tragic dimensions. Their history is more hero’s journey (as is the 
Ramayana) and less baleful tragedy (cf. Aimé Césaire’s Une Tempête 21975 ]1969]). Part 
of the appeal of the Ramayana stems from its emergence from the Indian state many 
                                                        2 Une Tempête is Martiniquan poet Aimé Césaire’s adaptation of Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest. Caliban in Césaire’s version is a black slave forced to suffer the indignity and 
brutality of his white master, Prospero. Like C.L.R. James’s framing of Toussaint 
L’Ouverture, Caliban rejects peaceful means of overthrowing his white master and 
violently rebels to restore his freedom.  
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Indo-Trinidadians were recruited from (Uttar Pradesh). More central though is the 
similarity of Rama’s exile from Ayodhya and his quest to subdue the forces of 
destruction, which suggests that history in the New World for Hindu Trinidadians is one 
of a conquest over powerful negating forces and the fortitude and determination to 
continue striving in the face of adversity.  
The theme of resistance against imperialism, evident in certain histories of India 
during British occupation, of the New World indenture program, and of the plantocracy, 
is further complicated by many Trinidadian Hindus’ alignment with western principles 
and ideologies commensurate with late capitalism. When a student in Shrutiji’s high 
school class asked if women should have all the rights of men, Shrutiji replied that the 
Hindu perspective on men and women is that there is no difference between the two. As 
an example she pointed out the Shiva/Paravati divine androgyne (Ardhanarishvara). 
Ironically, she went on to reproach men for not being as strong (emotionally? 
physically?) as they used to be. “Men want to go out and lime and go to bars and kill 
themselves drag racing. They want to be little boys forever.” She then tied her 
paradoxical critique of sexuality and wayward masculinity to the original question stating 
that “the dharma is important, not rights. Rights are selfish. Concern with what is fair will 
make you petty.” Resistance then is not directed against unfair treatment, or unequal 
laws, or differential access to power and agency, but rather against the undisciplined 
practices sanctioned by the libidinal economy of Trinidad’s loose morality3. It is within 
this thematic context that we can see that the mobilization of historical narratives 
involving colonialism is not to underscore Indians’ radical and creative resistance of 
                                                        3 I take the notion of a libidinal economy from Žižek (1992), a useful concept in Trinidad.   
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British imperialism but more so to indicate their success through discipline, devotion, 
hard work, and ultimate yet tenuous success in the face of adversity. In other words, the 
history of Indo-Trinidadians is a didactic, in some tellings even heroic, epic no less than 
the Ramayana.    
  Despite their resistance to Trinidadian morality, or lack of it as they see it, the 
Hindus of Central Trinidad are not turncoats, fashioning a culture independent of the 
Afro-Creole public culture of North. The Hindus here are neither steadfast resisters of 
Trinidadian popular culture nor passive consumers of it, but rather participants in the 
delineation of its parameters and the shaping of its forms and contours. They are actors, 
in the fullest sense of the term, acting as those that perform a Hindu self within a visible 
space and as those who interpret and act on the representations, ideals, and values in 
currency within the shared space of the public imaginary. The Kendra’s programs – the 
line formations, Ramayana rehearsals and performance, Shakha, pichakaaree – can be 
viewed collectively as signaling shifts in ideological and interpretive domains both 
shared and contested in Trinidad’s Hindu community. Following Rabinow I see the 
Kendra’s pedagogy, with its emphasis on fashioning disciplined subjects by means of a 
creolized Hindu practice, as a micro-event interpreting, responding to, and attempting to 
participate in the shaping of public culture in Trinidad. But it is not only Trinidadian 
popular space that the Kendra interprets, responds to, and attempts to shape. Kendra 
participants are also affected by transnational flows of ideas, concepts, power dynamics, 
commodities, and people. Since colonialism, Trinidad has been a participant in these 
flows and as such has existed also in the abstract-conceptual space of the northern 
metropolitan powers. Kendra leaders, along with many other Trinidadians, share an 
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abiding concern with rectifying and reshaping an image they fear is too often reinforced 
by the “culture of the continual Carnival” and a lack of discipline in politics and other 
areas of social life. Just as Eric Williams had attempted to impose austere disciplinary 
measures on his newly formed PNM party in 1956 in the attempt to prove to the colonial 
office that Trinidad can be self-governed (Ryan 2009), so too is the Kendra eager to 
dispel the notion, among Trinidadians and the broader global community, that Trinidad is 
little more than an island of perpetual indulgence. The point is that while Trinidad’s 
Hindu community is a subject of influence by transnational flows it is also an active 
participant in those flows as they attempt to shape, or reshape, knowledge circulating in 
the global economy of ideas.   
The Kendra’s active and often critical participation in imagined spaces lends 
credence both to Appadurai’s (1993) notion that rapid shifts in media promote cultural 
change on global and local levels as well as to Ulf Hannerz’s (2002: 37-45) position that 
there are asymmetries between the center and periphery in the production of meaning. In 
other words, local “structures of meaning”, as Hannerz phrases it, are altered in 
unpredictable ways. Center-based knowledge production is therefore never totally 
hegemonic as it is interpreted, negotiated, and used idiosyncratically. Shrutiji uses and 
draws on some features of globalized popular culture; others she discards or virulently 
opposes and plenty of it she ignores. The texts and artifacts of popular media she extracts, 
either for use or criticism, are always/already contingent on, among many other things, 
her ideological agenda and ever-changing interpretive lens. Shrutiji’s relationship to these 
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texts and artifacts is never passive (true, most likely, of all consumers4) as she actively 
resists certain representations, such as of Hindus (the Wendy’s ad) or Hindu cosmology 
(James Cameron’s Avatar film), and energetically embraces others as examples of proper 
conduct and right relationship (The Last Mimzy).  
In Ulf Hannerz’s prescient articulation of public culture, “world cultural flow, it 
appears, has a much more intricate organization of diversity than is allowed in a center-
periphery structure with just a handful of all-purpose centers. A further issue...is to what 
extent the peripheries indeed talk back” (2002: 39). Shrutiji’s irritation with the notion 
that “anytime is Trinidad time” and her commitment to rectifying that view in the 
imaginary of the “global ecumene”, is her committed attempt to talk back. That is, 
Shrutiji’s effort to shape disciplined subjects who value punctuality, professionalism, 
attention to detail, and commitment to hard work, and who consume popular media 
critically, is not only an ideological position engendered by global capitalism but also an 
attempt to participate in global structures of meaning. That Kendra pedagogy employs, 
discards, and criticizes flows of meaning, representations, and concepts, indicates not 
only asymmetrical flows but also critical participation in local and transnational imagined 
spaces. Their participation in what we might call imagined transnationalities 
demonstrates more than a simple binaristic model of consumption that is either passive or 
resistant. Rather it involves a measure of both in addition to creative interpretation, 
critical interrogation, didactic use, and symbolic recreation.  
                                                        4 I appreciate Appadurai’s observation in this regard that “the imagination has broken out 
of the special expressive space of art, myth, and ritual and has now become a part of the 
quotidian mental work of ordinary people in many societies. It has entered the logic of 
ordinary life from which it had largely been successfully sequestered” (1996: 5).  
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My argument throughout this thesis has been that nationalism is an 
overdetermined category that does injustice to social processes that involve contingency, 
mobility, and a fair deal of indeterminacy. I believe Appadurai is right to criticize 
primordialist discourse for failing to consider the inevitable contingencies of ethnic 
identity politics. Resting as it does on a universalist framework, primordialist discourses 
of nationalism overlook essential micropractices of social-political life that form linkages 
with events and ideas occurring beyond individual societies. Inspired by much of the 
work from cultural studies discourse, as I have been as well, Appadurai points out that 
such work recognizes that “conceptions of the future play a far larger role than ideas of 
the past in group politics today” (1996: 145). As I have already argued, though the 
Kendra uses texts and traditions from the distant past to create disciplined subjects, they 
do so with an ever-vigilant eye to future. In other words, Kendra pedagogy is as 
motivated by the future as it is by the past, if not more so. That cultural studies discourse 
is sensitive to micro-changes in identity formation and politics, engendered by 
macroevents in broader circulation, allows anthropologists of identity and ethnic or 
religious nationalism to be equally attentive to these subtle yet important shifts. 
Hebdige’s (2007) study of experimentation with style and identity is applicable, I would 
argue, not only to western subcultures such as punk rockers, but also to ethnic subcultures 
sharing material and conceptual space with a more dominant culture. Likewise, the work 
of Stuart Hall (2007; 2009; 2011) challenges us to take stock of the continual movement 
of expressive forms and cultural patterns that we would attempt to identify, observe, 
document, and analyze (Rabinow et al 2008). Appadurai’s attentiveness to linkages 
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between macroevents and local interpretive structures builds organically on cultural 
studies discourse. He writes,  
Macroevents, or cascades, work their way into highly localized structures of  
feeling by being drawn into the discourse and narratives of the locality, in  
casual conversations and low-key editorializing of the sort that often accompanies 
the collective reading of newspapers in many neighborhoods and on many front 
stoops of the world. Concurrently, the local narratives and plots in terms of which  
ordinary life and its conflicts are read and interpreted become shot through with a  
subtext of interpretive possibilities that is the direct product of the workings of the 
local imagining of broader regional, national, and global events. (emphasis in  
original 1996: 153) 
 
Appadurai goes on to point out that such local readings are typically silent and 
practically imperceptible. However, it is within this “incessant murmur” that local 
structures of meaning are continually refashioned, rearticulated, and reimagined. What I 
have attempted to do here is listen to murmurings of concerns among a small community 
of diasporic Hindus in Trinidad to understand how these concerns inform their approach 
to pedagogy, discipline, and subject creation. My work has hinged on the “interpretive 
possibilities” opened up by the freeing of artistic expression, as Appadurai has it, that 
globalized media allows. The UNC’s generous borrowing of themes and styles from 
Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign is a glaring example of the localization of a global 
event. On a smaller, more regional or even subcultural level, the disciplinary measures 
carried out by the Kendra are done so with global trends and possible futures always in 
mind. The Kendra’s emphasis is always on participation and action in the broader 
community and the shaping of Trinidadian culture and lifestyle in the context of global 
representation.  
As a final consideration I would like to suggest that we can add nuance to 
Appadurai’s thesis by recognizing that the contingency of local structures of meaning, or 
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even of the process and politics of identity, rests ultimately in the shadowy domain of 
thought. Foucault reminds us that, 
We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social as the only instance of 
the real and stop regarding that essential element in human life and human 
relations – I mean thought – as so much wind. Thought does exist, both beyond 
and before systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden 
but always drives everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought occurring 
even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. 
(1994: 456) 
 
Thought, of course, is not something cultural anthropologists study. However, 
attentiveness to the freedom inherent in thought, which, as Butler would argue is the 
genesis of discursive instability, allows, as it does Rabinow, to identify and analyze the 
fissures in local structures of knowledge and meaning. We are not then, as C.L.R. James 
(1965) accuses, simply stringing together lists of “facts”, but interpreting and analyzing 
the small events played out in response to larger events and contexts. If, as Foucault 
argues, “thinking is the freedom one has in relation to what one does, the movement 
through which one detaches oneself, constitutes oneself as an object and reflects on all of 
this motion as a problem” (cited in Rabinow 2003:47), we must attune ourselves to 
Rabinow’s radical yet insightful conclusion that history is only deterministic on a 
contingent basis. The discursive categories of race, ethnicity, and religion left as an 
imprint of imperial presence, have been, and are subject to ruptures, instability, and 
fragility. Sadly, colonial discursive categories have not been “rendered fragile” enough, 
to use Foucault’s term, to break. Yet the incessant murmurings and the programs they 
inspire of a small group of Hindus in Trinidad does indicate that those discursive forms 
are far from stable as they are continually reimagined, reinterpreted, and, in some cases, 
completely discarded.
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS   
 
BJP       Bharatiya Janata Party (India) 
DLP      Democratic Labour Party 
COP      Congress of the People  
DLP      Democratic Labour Party 
HSS      Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (Trinidad) 
NJAC   National Joint Action Committee 
PNM     People’s National Movement 
RSS      Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (India) 
TOP     Tobago Organization of the People 
UNC     United National Congress  UNIA   Universal Negro Improvement Association
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APPENDIX B  
GLOSSARY  
Sanskrit, Hindi, and Trinidadian Creole terms 
 
Adharma –  anti-dharma or unrighteousness; that which goes against the dharma or 
       Hindu morality  
Araam – at ease 
Arkatis – Indian recruiters for the indenture program 
Bacchanal – a Creole, highly polyvalent, term usually indicating corruption or conflict 
        between people, particularly people of high social or political standing. It can  
        also indicate social chaos and be used in its traditional European sense to 
        indicate a gluttonous or decadent context.   
Bhakti – devotional worship (cf. Jnana, Raja, Karma) 
Daksha – attention  
Dan – giving 
Darshan – seeing  
Devasthaan – shrine area in a mandir 
Dharma – Hindu morality 
Gana – group 
Hindutva – concept developed in late 19th early 20th century India to identify and describe 
       a Hindu essence; associated with Hindu nationalism 
Jati – community 
Jnana – experimental, meditative worship 
Karma – 1) action; 2) type of worship or meditation involving physical work 
Lila, or leela – Ram Lila (Ramdila in Trinidadian creole) is the performance version of  
            the epic poem Ramayana  
Liming – Creole slang for conversing, hanging out, chatting 
Mandir – Hindu temple  
Prarthana – scriptural recitation 
Raga – devotional music 
Raja – here indicating a type of meditation involving advanced tantric techniques 
Rashtra – nation  
Rishi – saint, advanced Hindu 
Sadhanas – practice, ritual, meditation 
Sanatan – eternal  
Sankhya – line count  
Sanskriti – sacred language of India 
Satsang – worship service, in Trinidad typically held on Wednesday evenings and 
    Sunday mornings  
Shruti – revealed texts, usually referring to the Vedic texts.  
Smriti – heard texts, usually referring to post-Vedic texts such as the epics the 
 Mahabharata and the Ramayana as well as the Puranas  
Steup – sucking of teeth to indicate indifference 
Svasthaan – line formation 
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Utishta - stand 
Vedanta – Hindu philosophy 
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